|
|
DEATH OF LIEUTENANT ROBERTS, ONLY SON OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS OF
KANDAHAR, IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE ABANDONED GUNS AT COLENSO
From: H. W.
Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
|
Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XI
The Battle of Colenso
Two serious defeats had
within the week been inflicted upon the British forces in South Africa.
Cronje, lurking behind his trenches and his barbed wire entanglements barred
Methuen's road to Kimberley, while in the northern part of Cape Colony
Gatacre's wearied troops had been defeated and driven by a force which
consisted largely of British subjects. But the public at home steeled their
hearts and fixed their eyes steadily upon Natal. There was their senior
General and there the main body of their troops. As brigade after brigade
and battery after battery touched at Cape Town, and were sent on instantly
to Durban, it was evident that it was in this quarter that the supreme
effort was to be made, and that there the light might at last break. In
club, and dining room, and railway car - wherever men met and talked - the
same words might be heard: 'Wait until Buller moves.' The hopes of a great
empire lay in the phrase.
It was upon October 30th that Sir George White had been thrust back into
Ladysmith. On November 2nd telegraphic communication with the town was
interrupted. On November 3rd the railway line was cut. On November 10th the
Boers held Colenso and the line of the Tugela. On the 14th was the affair of
the armoured train. On the 18th the enemy were near Estcourt. On the 21st
they had reached the Mooi River. On the 23rd Hildyard attacked them at
Willow Grange. All these actions will be treated elsewhere. This last one
marks the turn of the tide. From then onwards Sir Redvers Ruller was
massing his troops at Chieveley in preparation for a great effort to cross
the river and to relieve Ladysmith, the guns of which, calling from behind
the line of northern hills, told their constant tale of restless attack and
stubborn defence.
But the task was as severe a one as the most fighting General could ask for.
On the southern side the banks formed a long slope which could be shaved as
with a razor by the rifle fire of the enemy. How to advance across that
broad open zone was indeed a problem. It was one of many occasions in this
war in which one wondered why, if a bullet-proof shield capable of
sheltering a lying man could be constructed, a trial should not be given to
it. Alternate rushes of companies with a safe rest after each rush would
save the troops from the continued tension of that deadly never ending fire.
However, it is idle to discuss what might have been done to mitigate their
trials. The open ground had to be passed, and then they came to - not the
enemy, but a broad and deep river, with a single bridge, probably
undermined, and a single ford, which was found not to exist in practice.
Beyond the river was tier after tier of hills, crowned with stone walls and
seamed with trenches, defended by thousands of the best marksmen in the
world, supported by an admirable artillery. If, in spite of the advance over
the open and in spite of the passage of the river, a ridge could still be
carried, it was only to be commanded by the next; and so, one behind the
other, like the billows of the ocean, a series of hills and hollows rolled
northwards to Ladysmith. All attacks must be in the open. All defence was
from under cover. Add to this, that the young and energetic Louis Botha was
in command of the Boers. It was a desperate task, and yet honour forbade
that the garrison should be left to its fate. The venture must be made.
The most obvious criticism upon the operation is that if the attack must be
made it should not be made under the enemy's conditions. We seem almost to
have gone out of our way to make every obstacle - the glacislike approach,
the river, the trenches - as difficult as possible. Future operations were
to prove that it was not so difficult to deceive Boer vigilance and by rapid
movements to cross the Tugela. A military authority has stated, I know not
with what truth, that there is no instance in history of a determined army
being stopped by the line of a river, and from Wellington at the Douro to
the Russians on the Danube many examples of the ease with which they may be
passed will occur to the reader. But Buller had some exceptional
difficulties with which to contend. He was weak in mounted troops, and was
opposed to an enemy of exceptional mobility who might attack his flank and
rear if he exposed them. He had not that great preponderance of numbers
which came to him later, and which enabled him to attempt a wide turning
movement. One advantage he had, the possession of a more powerful artillery,
but his heaviest guns were naturally his least mobile, and the more direct
his advance the more effective would his guns be. For these or other reasons
he determined upon a frontal attack on the formidable Boer position, and he
moved out of Chieveley Camp for that purpose at daybreak on Friday, December
15th.
The force which General Buller led into action was the finest which any
British general had handled since the battle of the Alma. Of infantry he had
four strong brigades: the 2nd (Hildyard's) consisting of the 2nd Devons, the
2nd Queen's or West Surrey, the 2nd West Yorkshire, and the 2nd East Surrey;
the 4th Brigade (Lyttelton's) comprising the 2nd Cameronians, the 3rd
Rifles, the 1st Durhams, and the 1st Rifle Brigade; the 5th Brigade (Hart's)
with the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Rangers, 2nd Dublin
Fusiliers, and the Border Regiment, this last taking the place of the 2nd
Irish Rifles, who were with Gatacre. There remained the 6th Brigade
(Barton's), which included the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers,
the 1st Welsh Fusiliers, and the 2nd Irish Fusiliers - in all about 16,000
infantry. The mounted men, who were commanded by Lord Dundonald, included
the 13th Hussars, the 1st Royals, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, Thorneycroft's
Mounted Infantry, three squadrons of South African Horse, with a composite
regiment formed from the mounted infantry of the Rifles and of the Dublin
Fusiliers with squadrons of the Natal Carabineers and the Imperial Light
Horse. These irregular troops of horse might be criticised by martinets and
pedants, but they contained some of the finest fighting material in the
army, some urged on by personal hatred of the Boers and some by mere lust of
adventure. As an example of the latter one squadron of the South African
Horse was composed almost entirely of Texan muleteers, who, having come over
with their animals, had been drawn by their own gallant spirit into the
fighting line of their kinsmen.
Cavalry was General Buller's weakest arm, but his artillery was strong both
in its quality and its number of guns. There were five batteries (30 guns)
of the Field Artillery, the 7th, 14th, 63rd, 64th, and 66th. Besides these
there were no fewer than sixteen naval guns from H.M.S.'Terrible ' -
fourteen of which were 12-pounders, and the other two of the 4-7 type which
had done such good service both at Ladysmith and with Methuen. The whole
force which moved out from Chieveley Camp numbered about 21,000 men.
The work which was allotted to the army was simple in conception, however
terrible it might prove in execution. There were two points at which the
river might be crossed, one three miles off on the left, named Bridle Drift,
the other straight ahead at the Bridge of Colenso. The 5th or Irish Brigade
was to endeavour to cross at Bridle Drift, and then to work down the river
bank on the far side so as to support the 2nd or English Brigade, - which
was to cross at Colenso. The 4th Brigade was to advance between these, so as
to help either which should be in difficulties. Meanwhile on the extreme
right the mounted troops under Dundonald were to cover the flank and to
attack Hlangwane Hill, a formidable position held strongly by the enemy upon
the south bank of the Tugela. The remaining Fusilier brigade of infantry was
to support this movement on the right. The guns were to cover the various
attacks, and if possible gain a position from which the trenches might be
enfiladed. This, simply stated, was the work which lay before the British
army. In the bright clear morning sunshine, under a cloudless blue sky, they
advanced with high hopes to the assault. Before them lay the long level
plain, then the curve of the river, and beyond, silent and serene, like some
peaceful dream landscape, stretched the lines and lines of gently curving
hills. It was just five o'clock in the morning when the naval guns began to
bay, and huge red dustclouds from the distant foothills showed where the
lyddite was bursting. No answer came back, nor was there any movement upon
the sunlit hills. It was almost brutal, this furious violence to so gentle
and unresponsive a countryside. In no place could the keenest eye detect a
sign of guns or men, and yet death lurked in every hollow and crouched by
every rock.
It is so difficult to make a modern battle intelligible when fought, as this
was, over a front of seven or eight miles, that it is best perhaps to take
the doings of each column in turn, beginning with the left flank, where
Hart's Irish Brigade had advanced to the assault of Bridle Drift.
Under an unanswered and therefore an unaimed fire from the heavy guns the
Irish infantry moved forward upon the points which they had been ordered to
attack. The Dublins led, then the Connaughts, the Inniskillings, and the
Borderers. Incredible as it may appear after the recent experiences of
Magersfontein and of Stormberg, the men in the two rear regiments appear to
have been advanced in quarter column, and not to have deployed until after
the enemy's fire had opened. Had shrapnel struck this close formation, as it
was within an ace of doing, the loss of life must have been as severe as it
was unnecessary.
On approaching the Drift - the position or even the existence of which does
not seem to have been very clearly defined - it was found that the troops
had to advance into a loop formed by the river, so that they were exposed to
a very heavy cross-fire upon their right flank, while they were rained on by
shrapnel from in front. No sign of the enemy could be seen, though the men
were dropping fast. It is a weird and soul-shaking experience to advance
over a sunlit and apparently a lonely countryside, with no slightest
movement upon its broad face, while the path which you take is marked behind
you by sobbing, gasping, writhing men, who can only guess by the position of
their wounds whence the shots came which struck them down. All round, like
the hissing of fat in the pan, is the monotonous crackle and rattle of the
Mausers; but the air is full of it, and no one can define exactly whence it
comes. Far away on some hill upon the skyline there hangs the least gauzy
veil of thin smoke to indicate whence the six men who have just all fallen
together, as if it were some grim drill, met their death. Into such a
hell-storm as this it was that the soldiers have again and again advanced in
the course of this war, but it may be questioned whether they will not prove
to be among the last of mortals to be asked to endure such an ordeal. Other
methods of attack must be found or attacks must be abandoned, for smokeless
powder, quick-firing guns, and modern rifles make it all odds on the defence!
|
"LET'S MAKE A NAME FOR OURSELVES AND DIE !"
DASH OF THE DUBLINS ACROSS THE TUGELA
From: H. W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
The gallant Irishmen pushed on, flushed with battle and careless for their
losses, the four regiments clubbed into one, with all military organisation
rapidly disappearing, and nothing left but their gallant spirit and their
furious desire to come to hand-grips with the enemy. Rolling on in a broad
wave of shouting angry men, they never winced from the fire until they had
swept up to the bank of the river. Northern Inniskilling and Southern man of
Connaught, orange and green, Protestant and Catholic, Celt and Saxon, their
only rivalry now was who could shed his blood most freely for the common
cause. How hateful seem those provincial politics and narrow sectarian
creeds which can hold such men apart!
The bank of the river had been gained, but where was the ford? The water
swept broad and unruffled in front of them, with no indication of shallows.
A few dashing fellows sprang in, but their cartridges and rifles dragged
them to the bottom. One or two may even have struggled through to the
further side, but on this there is a conflict of evidence. It may be, though
it seems incredible, that the river had been partly dammed to deepen the
Drift, or, as is more probable, that in the rapid advance and attack the
position of the Drift was lost. However this may be, the troops could find
no ford, and they lay down, as had been done in so many previous actions,
unwilling to retreat and unable to advance, with the same merciless pelting
from front and flank. In every fold and behind every anthill the Irishmen
lay thick and waited for better times. There are many instances of their
cheery and uncomplaining humour. Colonel Brooke, of the Connaughts, fell at
the head of his men. Private Livingstone helped to carry him into safety,
and then, his task done, he confessed to having 'a bit of a rap meself,' and
sank fainting with a bullet through his throat. Another sat with a bullet
through both legs. 'Bring me a tin whistle and I'll blow ye any tune ye
like,' he cried, mindful of the Dargai piper. Another with his arm hanging
by a tendon puffed morosely at his short black pipe. Every now and then, in
face of the impossible, the fiery Celtic valour flamed furiously upwards.
'Fix bayonets, men, and let us make a name for ourselves,' cried a colour
sergeant, and he never spoke again. For five hours, under the tropical sun,
the grimy parched men held on to the ground they had occupied. British
shells pitched short and fell among them. A regiment in support fired at
them, not knowing that any of the line were so far advanced. Shot at from
the front, the flank, and the rear, the 5th Brigade held grimly on.
But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is certain that
had they not reached them the regiments would have been uselessly destroyed
where they lay. It seems to have been Buller himself, who showed
extraordinary and ubiquitous personal energy during the day, that ordered
them to fall back. As they retreated there was an entire absence of haste
and panic, but officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up, and General Hart
- whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose cool courage was
beyond praise - had hard work to reform the splendid brigade which six hours
before had tramped out of Chieveley Camp. Between five and six hundred of
them had fallen -a loss which approximates to that of the Highland Brigade
at Magersfontein. The Dublins and the Connaughts were the heaviest
sufferers.
So much for the mishap of the 5th Brigade. It is superfluous to point out
that the same old omissions were responsible for the same old results. Why
were the men in quarter column when advancing against an unseen foe? Why had
no scouts gone forward to be certain of the position of the ford? Where were
the clouds of skirmishers which should precede such an advance? The recent
examples in the field and the teachings of the text-books were equally set
at naught, as they had been, and were to be, so often in this campaign.
There may be a science of war in the lecture-rooms at Camberley, but very
little of it found its way to the veldt. The slogging valour of the private,
the careless dash of the regimental officer - these were our military assets
- but seldom the care and foresight of our commanders. It is a thankless
task to make such comments, but the one great lesson of the war has been
that the army is too vital a thing to fall into the hands of a caste, and
that it is a national duty for every man to speak fearlessly and freely what
he believes to be the truth.
Passing from the misadventure of the 5th Brigade we come as we move from
left to right upon the 4th, or Lyttelton's Brigade, which was instructed not
to attack itself but to support the attack on either side of it. With the
help of the naval guns it did what it could to extricate and cover the
retreat of the Irishmen, but it could play no very important part in the
action, and its losses were insignificant. On its right in turn Hildyard's
English Brigade had developed its attack upon Colenso and the bridge. The
regiments under Hildyard's lead were the 2nd West Surrey, the 2nd Devons
(whose first battalion was doing so well with the Ladysmith force), the East
Surreys, and the West Yorkshires. The enemy had evidently anticipated the
main attack on this position, and not only were the trenches upon the other
side exceptionally strong, but their artillery converged upon the bridge, at
least a dozen heavy pieces, besides a number of quick-firers, bearing upon
it. The Devons and the Queens, in open order (an extended line of khaki
dots, blending so admirably with the plain that they were hardly visible
when they halted), led the attack, being supported by the East Surrey and
the West Yorkshires. Advancing under a very heavy fire the brigade
experienced much the same ordeal as their comrades of Hart's brigade, which
was mitigated by the fact that from the first they preserved their open
order in columns of half-companies extended to six paces, and that the river
in front of them did not permit that right flank fire which was so fatal to
the Irishmen. With a loss of some two hundred men the leading regiments
succeeded in reaching Colenso, and the West Surrey, advancing by rushes of
fifty yards at a time, had established itself in the station, but a
catastrophe had occurred at an earlier hour to the artillery which was
supporting it which rendered all. further advance impossible. For the reason
of this we must follow the fortunes of the next unit upon their right.
This consisted of the important body of artillery who had been told off to
support the main attack. It comprised two field batteries, the 14th and the
66th, under the command of Colonel Long, and six naval guns (two of 4.7, and
four 12-pounders) under Lieutenant Ogilvy of the 'Terrible.' Long has the
record of being a most zealous and dashing officer, whose handling of the
Egyptian artillery at the battle of the Atbara had much to do with the
success of the action. Unfortunately, these barbarian campaigns, in which
liberties may be taken with impunity, leave an evil tradition, as the French
have found with their Algerians. Our own close formations, our adherence to
volley firing, and in this instance the use of our artillery all seem to be
legacies of our savage wars. Be the cause what it may, at an early stage of
the action Long's guns whirled forwards, outstripped the infantry brigades
upon their flanks, left the slow-moving naval guns with their ox-teams
behind them, and unlimbered within a thousand yards of the enemy's trenches.
From this position he opened fire upon Fort Wylie, which was the centre of
that portion of the Boer position which faced him.
But his two unhappy batteries were destined not to turn the tide of battle,
as he had hoped, but rather to furnish the classic example of the
helplessness of artillery against modern rifle fire. Not even Mercer's
famous description of the effect of a flank fire upon his troop of horse
artillery at Waterloo could do justice to the blizzard of lead which broke
over the two doomed batteries. The teams fell in heaps, some dead, some
mutilated, and mutilating others in their frantic struggles. One driver,
crazed with horror, sprang on a leader, cut the traces and tore madly off
the field. But a perfect discipline reigned among the vast majority of the
gunners, and the words of command and the laying and working of the guns
were all as methodical as at Okehampton. Not only was there a most deadly
rifle fire, partly from the lines in front and partly from the village of
Colenso upon their left flank, but the Boer automatic quick-firers found the
range to a nicety, and the little shells were crackling and banging
continually over the batteries. Already every gun had its litter of dead
around it, but each was still fringed by its own group of furious officers
and sweating desperate gunners. Poor Long was down, with a bullet through
his arm and another through his liver. 'Abandon be damned! We don't abandon
guns!' was his last cry as they dragged him into the shelter of a little
donga hard by. Captain Goldie dropped dead. So did Lieutenant Schreiber.
Colonel Hunt fell, shot in two places. Officers and men were falling fast.
The guns could not be worked, and yet they could not be removed, for every
effort to bring up teams from the shelter where the limbers lay ended in the
death of the horses. The survivors took refuge from the murderous fire in
that small hollow to which Long had been carried, a hundred yards or so from
the line of bullet-splashed cannon. One gun on the right was still served by
four men who refused to leave it. They seemed to bear charmed lives, these
four, as they strained and wrestled with their beloved 15-pounder, amid the
spurting sand and the blue wreaths of the bursting shells. Then one gasped
and fell against the trail, and his comrade sank beside the wheel with his
chin upon his breast. The third threw up his hands and pitched forward upon
his face; while the survivor, a grim powder-stained figure, stood at
attention looking death in the eyes until he too was struck down. A useless
sacrifice, you may say; but while the men who saw them die can tell such a
story round the camp fire the example of such deaths as these does more than
clang of bugle or roll of drum to stir the warrior spirit of our race.
For two hours the little knot of heart-sick humiliated officers and men lay
in the precarious shelter of the donga and looked out at the bullet-swept
plain and the line of silent guns. Many of them were wounded. Their chief
lay among them, still calling out in his delirium for his guns. They had
been joined by the gallant Baptie, a brave surgeon, who rode across to the
donga amid a murderous fire, and did what he could for the injured men. Now
and then a rush was made into the open, sometimes in the hope of firing
another round, sometimes to bring a wounded comrade in from the pitiless
pelt of the bullets. How fearful was that lead-storm may be gathered from
the fact that one gunner was found with sixty-four wounds in his body.
Several men dropped in these sorties, and the disheartened survivors settled
down once more in the donga.
The hope to which they clung was that their guns were not really lost, but
that the arrival of infantry would enable them to work them once more.
Infantry did at last arrive, but in such small numbers that it made the
situation more difficult instead of easing it. Colonel Bullock had brought
up two companies of the Devons to join the two companies (A and B) of Scots
Fusiliers who had been the original escort of the guns, but such a handful
could not turn the tide. They also took refuge in the donga, and waited for
better times.
|
THE LATE
LIEUTENANT ROBERTS, V.C.
From: H. W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
In the meanwhile the attention of Generals Buller and Clery had been called
to the desperate position of the guns, and they had made their way to that
further nullah in the rear where the remaining limber horses and drivers
were. This was some distance behind that other donga in which Long, Bullock,
and their Devons and gunners were crouching. 'Will any of you volunteer to
save the guns?' cried Buller. Corporal Nurse, Gunner Young, and a few others
responded. The desperate venture was led by three aides-de-camp of the
Generals, Congreve, Schofield, and Roberts, the only son of the famous
soldier. Two gun teams were taken down; the horses galloping frantically
through an infernal fire, and each team succeeded in getting back with a
gun. But the loss was fearful. Roberts was mortally wounded. Congreve has
left an account which shows what a modern rifle fire at a thousand yards is
like. 'My first bullet went through my left sleeve and made the joint of my
elbow bleed, next a clod of earth caught me smack on the right arm, then my
horse got one, then my right leg one, then my horse another, and that
settled us.' The gallant fellow managed to crawl to the group of castaways
in the donga. Roberts insisted on being left where he fell, for fear he
should hamper the others.
In the meanwhile Captain Reed, of the 7th Battery, had arrived with two
spare teams of horses, and another determined effort was made under his
leadership to save some of the guns. But the fire was too murderous.
Two-thirds of his horses and half his men, including himself, were struck
down, and General Buller commanded that all further attempts to reach the
abandoned batteries should be given up. Both he and General Clery had been
slightly wounded, and there were many operations over the whole field of
action to engage their attention. But making every allowance for the
pressure of many duties and for the confusion and turmoil of a great action,
it does seem one of the most inexplicable incidents in British military
history that the guns should ever have been permitted to fall into the hands
of the enemy. It is evident that if our gunners could not live under the
fire of the enemy it would be equally impossible for the enemy to remove the
guns under a fire from a couple of battalions of our infantry. There were
many regiments which had hardly been engaged, and which could have been
advanced for such a purpose. The men of the Mounted Infantry actually
volunteered for this work, and none could have been more capable of carrying
it out. There was plenty of time also, for the guns were abandoned about
eleven and the Boers did not venture to seize them until four. Not only
could the guns have been saved, but they might, one would think, have been
transformed into an excellent bait for a trap to tempt the Boers out of
their trenches. It must have been with fear and trembling that Cherry Emmett
and his men first approached them, for how could they believe that such
incredible good fortune had come to them? However, the fact, humiliating and
inexplicable, is that the guns were so left, that the whole force was
withdrawn, and that not only the ten cannon, but also the handful of Devons,
with their Colonel, and the Fusiliers were taken prisoners in the donga
which had sheltered them all day.
We have now, working from left to right, considered the operations of Hart's
Brigade at Bridle Drift, of Lyttelton's Brigade in support, of Hildyard's
which attacked Colenso, and of the luckless batteries which were to have
helped him. There remain two bodies of troops upon the right, the further
consisting of Dundonald's mounted men who were to attack Hlangwane Hill, a
fortified Boer position upon the south of the river, while Barton's Brigade
was to support it and to connect this attack with the central operations.
Dundonald's force was entirely too weak for such an operation as the capture
of the formidable entrenched hill, and it is probable that the movement was
meant rather as a reconnaissance than as an assault. He had not more than a
thousand men in all, mostly irregulars, and the position which faced him was
precipitous and entrenched, with barbed-wire entanglements and automatic
guns. But the gallant colonials were out on their first action, and their
fiery courage pushed the attack home. Leaving their horses, they advanced a
mile and a half on foot before they came within easy range of the hidden
riflemen, and learned the lesson which had been taught to their comrades all
along the line, that given approximately equal numbers the attack in the
open has no possible chance against the concealed defence, and that the more
bravely it is pushed the more heavy is the repulse. The irregulars carried
themselves like old soldiers, they did all that mortal man could do, and
they retired coolly and slowly with the loss of 130 of the brave troopers.
The 7th Field Battery did all that was possible to support the advance and
cover the retirement. In no single place, on this day of disaster, did one
least gleam of success come to warm the hearts and reward the exertions of
our much-enduring men.
Of Barton's Brigade there is nothing to be recorded, for they appear neither
to have supported the attack upon Hlangwane Hill on the one side nor to have
helped to cover the ill-fated guns on the other. Barton was applied to for
help by Dundonald, but refused to detach any of his troops. If General
Buller's real idea was a reconnaissance in force in order to determine the
position and strength of the Boer lines, then of course his brigadiers must
have felt a. reluctance to entangle their brigades in a battle which was
really the result of a misunderstanding. On the other hand, if, as the
orders of the day seem to show, a serious engagement was always intended, it
is strange that two brigades out of four should have played so insignificant
a part. To Barton's Brigade was given the responsibility of seeing that no
right flank attack was carried out by the Boers, and this held it back until
it was clear that no such attack was contemplated. After that one would have
thought that, had the situation been appreciated, at least two battalions
might have been spared to cover the abandoned guns with their rifle fire.
Two companies of the Scots Fusiliers did share the fortunes of the guns. Two
others, and one of the Irish Fusiliers, acted in support, but the brigade as
a whole, together with the 1st Royals and the 13th Hussars, might as well
have been at Aldershot for any bearing which their work had upon the
fortunes of the day.
And so the first attempt at the relief of Ladysmith came to an end. At
twelve o'clock all the troops upon the ground were retreating for the camp.
There was nothing in the shape of rout or panic, and the withdrawal was as
orderly as the advance; but the fact remained that we had just 1,200 men in
killed, wounded, and missing, and had gained absolutely nothing. We had not
even the satisfaction of knowing that we had inflicted as well as endured
punishment, for the enemy remained throughout the day so cleverly concealed
that it is doubtful whether more than a hundred casualties occurred in their
ranks. Once more it was shown how weak an arm is artillery against an enemy
who lies in shelter.
Our wounded fortunately bore a high proportion to our killed, as they always
will do when it is rifle fire rather than shell fire which is effective.
Roughly we had 150 killed and about 720 wounded. A more humiliating item is
the 250 or so who were missing. These men were the gunners, the Devons, and
the Scots Fusiliers, who were taken in the donga together with small bodies
from the Connaughts, the Dublins, and other regiments who, having found some
shelter, were unable to leave it, and clung on until the retirement of their
regiments left them in a hopeless position. Some of these small knots of men
were allowed to retire in the evening by the Boers, who seemed by no means
anxious to increase the number of their prisoners. Colonel Thackeray, of the
Inniskilling Fusiliers, found himself with a handful of his men surrounded
by the enemy, but owing to their good humour and his own tact he succeeded
in withdrawing them in safety. The losses fell chiefly on Hart's Brigade,
Hildyard's Brigade, and the colonial irregulars, who bore off the honours of
the fight.
In his official report General Buller states that were it not for the action
of Colonel Long and the subsequent disaster to the artillery he thought that
the battle might have been a successful one. This is a hard saying, and
throws perhaps too much responsibility upon the gallant but unfortunate
gunner. There have been occasions in the war when greater dash upon the part
of our artillery might have changed the fate of the day, and it is bad
policy to be too severe upon the man who has taken a risk and failed. The
whole operation, with its advance over the open against a concealed enemy
with a river in his front, was so absolutely desperate that Long may have
seen that only desperate measures could save the situation. To bring guns
into action in front of the infantry without having clearly defined the
position of the opposing infantry must always remain one of the most
hazardous ventures of war. 'It would certainly be mere folly,' says Prince
Kraft, 'to advance artillery to within 600 or 800 yards of a position held
by infantry unless the latter were under the fire of infantry from an even
shorter range.' This 'mere folly' is exactly what Colonel Long did, but it
must be remembered in extenuation that he shared with others the idea that
the Boers were up on the hills, and had no inkling that their front trenches
were down at the river. With the imperfect means at his disposal he did such
scouting as he could, and if his fiery and impetuous spirit led him into a
position which cost him so dearly it is certainly more easy for the critic
to extenuate his fault than that subsequent one which allowed the abandoned
guns to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nor is there any evidence that the
loss of these guns did seriously affect the fate of the action, for at those
other parts of the field where the infantry had the full and unceasing
support of the artillery the result was not more favourable than at the
centre.
So much for Colenso. A more unsatisfactory and in some ways inexplicable
action is not to be found in the range of British military history. And the
fuller the light which has been poured upon it, the more extraordinary does
the battle appear. There are a preface and a sequel to the action which have
put a severe strain upon the charity which the British public has always
shown that it is prepared to extend to a defeated General. The preface is
that General Buller sent word to General White that he proposed to attack
upon the 17th, while the actual attack was delivered upon the 15th, so that
the garrison was not prepared to make that demonstration which might have
prevented the besiegers from sending important reinforcements to Botha, had
he needed them. The sequel is more serious. Losing all heart at his defeat,
General Buller, although he had been officially informed that White had
provisions for seventy days, sent a heliogram advising the surrender of the
garrison. White's first reply, which deserves to live with the anecdote of
Nelson's telescope at his blind eye, was to the effect that he believed the
enemy had been tampering with Buller's messages. To this Buller despatched
an amended message, which with Sir George White's reply, is here appended:
Message of December 16th, as altered by that of December 17th, 1899.
'I tried Colenso yesterday, but failed; the enemy is too strong for my force
except with siege operations, and these will take one full month to prepare.
Can you last so long?
'How many days can you hold out? I suggest you firing away as much
ammunition as you can, and making best terms you can. I can remain here if
you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in. I find my
infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then only if water
can be got, and it is scarce here. Whatever happens, recollect to burn your
cipher, decipher, and code books, and all deciphered messages.'
From Sir G. White to Sir R. Buller. December 16th, 1899.
'Yours of today received and understood. My suggestion is that you take up
strongest available position that will enable you to keep touch of the enemy
and harass him constantly with artillery fire, and in other ways as much as
possible. I can make food last for much longer than a month, and will not
think of making terms till I am forced to. You may have hit enemy harder
than you think. All our native spies report that your artillery fire made
considerable impression on enemy. Have your losses been very heavy? If you
lose touch of enemy, it will immensely increase his opportunities of
crushing me, and have worst effect elsewhere. While you are in touch with
him and in communication with me, he has both of our forces to reckon with.
Make every effort to get reinforcements as early as possible, including
India, and enlist every man in both colonies who will serve and can ride.
Things may look brighter. The loss of 12,000 men here would be a heavy blow
to England. We must not yet think of it. I fear I could not cut my way to
you. Enteric fever is increasing alarmingly here. There are now 180 cases,
all within last month. Answer fully. I am keeping everything secret for the
present till I know your plans.'
Much allowance is to be made for a man who is staggering under the mental
shock of defeat and the physical exertions which Buller had endured. That
the Government made such allowance is clear from the fact that he was not
instantly recalled. And yet the cold facts are that we have a British
General, at the head of 25,000 men, recommending another General, at the
head of 12,000 men only twelve miles off, to lay down his arms to an army
which was certainly very inferior in numbers to the total British force; and
this because he had once been defeated, although he knew that there was
still time for the whole resources of the Empire to be poured into Natal in
order to prevent so shocking a disaster. Such is a plain statement of the
advice which Buller gave and which White rejected. For the instant the fate
not only of South Africa but even, as I believe, of the Empire hung upon the
decision of the old soldier in Ladysmith, who had to resist the proposals of
his own General as sternly as the attacks of the enemy. He who sorely needed
help and encouragement became, as his message shows, the helper and the
encourager. It was a tremendous test, and Sir George White came through it
with a staunchness and a loyalty which saved us not only from overwhelming
present disaster, but from a hideous memory which must have haunted British
military annals for centuries to come.
|
MAP OF THE BATTLE OF COLENSO
From: H. W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
|
|