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THE
ADVANCE GUARD OF BULLER'S ARMY ENTERING LADYSMITH
From: H. W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
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Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XVII
Buller's Final Advance
THE heroic moment of the
siege of Ladysmith was that which witnessed the repulse of the great attack.
The epic should have ended at that dramatic instant. But instead of doing so
the story falls back to an anticlimax of crowded hospitals, slaughtered
horses, and sporadic shell fire. For another six weeks of inactivity the
brave garrison endured all the sordid evils which had steadily grown from
inconvenience to misfortune and from misfortune to misery. Away in the south
they heard the thunder of Buller's guns, and from the hills round the town
they watched with pale faces and bated breath the tragedy of Spion Kop,
preserving a firm conviction that a very little more would have transformed
it into their salvation. Their hearts sank with the sinking of the
cannonade, and rose again with the roar of Vaalkranz. But Vaalkranz also
failed them, and they waited on in the majesty of their hunger and their
weakness for the help which was to come.
It has been already narrated how General Buller had made his three attempts
for the relief of the city. The General who was inclined to despair was now
stimulated by despatches from Lord Roberts, while his army, who were by no
means inclined to despair, were immensely cheered by the good news from the
Kimberley side. Both General and army prepared for a last supreme effort.
This time, at least, the soldiers hoped that they would be permitted to
burst their way to the help of their starving comrades or leave their bones
among the hills which had faced them so long. All they asked was a fight to
a finish, and now they were about to have one.
General Buller had tried the Boers' centre, he had tried their extreme
right, and now he was about to try their extreme left. There were some
obvious advantages on this side which make it surprising that it was not the
first to be attempted. In the first place, the enemy's main position upon
that flank was at Hlangwane mountain, which is to the south of the Tugela,
so that in case of defeat the river ran behind them. In the second,
Hlangwane mountain was the one point from which the Boer position at Colenso
could be certainly enfiladed, and therefore the fruits of victory would be
greater on that flank than on the other. Finally, the operations could be
conducted at no great distance from the railhead, and the force would be
exposed to little danger of having its flank attacked or its communications
cut, as was the case in the Spion Kop advance. Against these potent
considerations there is only to be put the single fact that the turning of
the Boer right would threaten the Freestaters' line of retreat. On the
whole, the balance of advantage lay entirely with the new attempt, and the
whole army advanced to it with a premonition of success. Of all the examples
which the war has given of the enduring qualities of the British troops
there is none more striking than the absolute confidence and whole hearted
delight with which, after three bloody repulses, they set forth upon another
venture.
On February 9th the movements were started which transferred the greater
part of the force from the extreme left to the centre and right. By the 11th
Lyttelton's (formerly Clery's) second division and Warren's fifth division
had come eastward, leaving Burn Murdoch's cavalry brigade to guard the
Westem side. On the 12th Lord Dundonald, with all the colonial cavalry, two
battalions of infantry, and a battery, made a strong reconnaissance towards
Hussar Hill, which is the nearest of the several hills which would have to
be occupied in order to turn the position. The hill was taken, but was
abandoned again by General Buller after he had used it for some hours as an
observatory. A long-range action between the retiring cavalry and the Boers
ended in a few losses upon each side.
What Buller had seen during the hour or two which he had spent with his
telescope upon Hussar Hill had evidently confirmed him in his views, for two
days later (February 14th) the whole army set forth for this point. By the
morning of the 15th twenty thousand men were concentrated upon the sides and
spurs of this eminence. On the 16th the heavy guns were in position, and all
was ready for the advance.
Facing them now were the formidable Boer lines of Hlangwane Hill and Green
Hill, which would certainly cost several thousands of men if they were to
take them by direct storm. Beyond them, upon the Boer flank, were the hills
of Monte Christo and Cingolo, which appeared to be the extreme outside of
the Boer position. The plan was to engage the attention of the trenches in
front by a terrific artillery fire and the threat of an assault, while at
the same time sending the true flank attack far round to carry the Cingolo
ridge, which must be taken before any other hill could be approached.
On the 17th, in the early morning, with the first tinge of violet in the
east, the irregular cavalry and the second division (Lyttelton's) with
Wynne's Brigade started upon their widely curving flanking march. The
country through which they passed was so broken that the troopers led their
horses in single file, and would have found themselves helpless in face of
any resistance. Fortunately, Cingolo Hill was very weakly held, and by
evening both our horsemen and our infantry had a firm grip upon it, thus
turning the extreme left flank of the Boer position. For once their
mountainous fortresses were against them, for a mounted Boer force is so
mobile that in an open position, such as faced Methuen, it is very hard and
requires great celerity of movement ever to find a flank at all. On a
succession of hills, however, it was evident that some one hill must mark
the extreme end of their line, and Buller had found it at Cingolo. Their
answer to this movement was to throw their flank back so as to face the new
position.
Even now, however, the Boer leaders had apparently not realised that this
was the main attack, or it is possible that the intervention of the river
made it difficult for them to send reinforcements. However that may be, it
is certain that the task which the British found awaiting them on the 18th
proved to be far easier than they had dared to hope. The honours of the day
rested with Hildyard's English Brigade (East Surrey, West Surrey, West
Yorkshires, and 2nd Devons). In open order and with a rapid advance, taking
every advantage of the cover - which was better than is usual in South
African warfare - they gained the edge of the Monte Christo ridge, and then
swiftly cleared the crest. One at least of the regiments engaged, the Devons,
was nerved by the thought that their own first battalion was waiting for
them at Ladysmith. The capture of the hill made the line of trenches which
faced Buller untenable, and he was at once able to advance with Barton's
Fusilier Brigade and to take possession of the whole Boer position of
Hlangwane and Green Hill. It was not a great tactical victory, for they had
no trophies to show save the worthless DEBRIS of the Boer camps. But it was
a very great strategical victory, for it not only gave them the whole south
side of the Tugela, but also the means of commanding with their guns a great
deal of the north side, including those Colenso trenches which had blocked
the way so long. A hundred and seventy killed and wounded (of whom only
fourteen were killed) was a trivial price for such a result. At last from
the captured ridges the exultant troops could see far away the haze which
lay over the roofs of Ladysmith, and the besieged, with hearts beating high
with hope, turned their glasses upon the distant mottled patches which told
them that their comrades were approaching.
By February 20th the British had firmly established themselves along the
whole south bank of the river, Hart's brigade bad occupied Colenso, and the
heavy guns had been pushed up to more advanced positions. The crossing of
the river was the next operation, and the question arose where it should be
crossed. The wisdom which comes with experience shows us now that it would
have been infinitely better to have crossed on their extreme left flank, as
by an advance upon this line we should have turned their strong Pieters
position just as we had already turned their Colenso one. With an absolutely
master card in our hand we refused to play it, and won the game by a more
tedious and perilous process. The assumption seems to have been made (on no
other hypothesis can one understand the facts) that the enemy were
demoralised and that the positions would not be strongly held. Our flanking
advantage was abandoned and a direct advance was ordered from colenso,
involving a frontal attack upon the Pieters position.
On February 21st Buller threw his pontoon bridge over the river near
Colenso, and the same evening his army began to cross. It was at once
evident that the Boer resistance had by no means collapsed. Wynne's
Lancashire Brigade were the first across, and found themselves hotly engaged
before nightfall. The low kopjes in front of them were blazing with musketry
fire. The brigade held its own, but lost the Brigadier (the second in a
month) and 150 rank and file. Next morning the main body of the infantry was
passed across, and the army was absolutely committed to the formidable and
unnecessary enterprise of fighting its way straight to Ladysmith.
The force in front had weakened, however, both in numbers and in morale.
Some thousands of the Freestaters had left in order to defend their own
country from the advance of Roberts, while the rest were depressed by as
much of the news as was allowed by their leaders to reach them. But the Boer
is a tenacious fighter, and many a brave man was still to fall before Buller
and White should shake hands in the High Street of Ladysmith.
The first obstacle which faced the army, after crossing the river, was a
belt of low rolling ground, which was gradually cleared by the advance of
our infantry. As night closed in the advance lines of Boers and British were
so close to each other that incessant rifle fire was maintamed until
morning, and at more than one point small bodies of desperate riflemen
charged right up to the bayonets of our infantry. The morning found us still
holding our positions all along the line, and as more and more of our
infantry came up and gun after gun roared into action we began to push our
stubborn enemy northwards. On the 21st the Dorsets, Middlesex, and Somersets
had borne the heat of the day. On the 22nd it was the Royal Lancasters,
followed by the South Lancashires, who took up the running. It would take
the patience and also the space of a Kinglake in this scrambling broken
fight to trace the doings of those groups of men who strove and struggled
through the rifle fire. All day a steady advance was maintained over the low
kopjes, until by evening we were faced by the more serious line of the
Pieter's Hills. The operations had been carried out with a monotony of
gallantry. Always the same extended advance, always the same rattle of
Mausers and clatter of pom-poms from a ridge, always the same victorious
soldiers on the barren crest, with a few crippled Boers before them and many
crippled comrades behind. They were expensive triumphs, and yet every one
brought them nearer to their goal. And now, like an advancing tide, they
lapped along the base of Pieter's Hill. Could they gather volume enough to
carry themselves over? The issue of the long-drawn battle and the fate of
Ladysmith hung upon the question.
Brigadier Fitzroy Hart, to whom the assault was entrusted, is in some ways
as singular and picturesque a type as has been evolved in the war. A dandy
soldier, always the picture of neatness from the top of his helmet to the
heels of his well-polished brown boots, he brings to military matters the
same precision which he affects in dress. Pedantic in his accuracy, he
actually at the battle of Colenso drilled the Irish Brigade for half an hour
before leading them into action, and threw out markers under a deadly fire
in order that his change from close to extended formation might be
academically correct. The heavy loss of the Brigade at this action was to
some extent ascribed to him and affected his popularity; but as his men came
to know him better, his romantic bravery, his whimsical soldierly humour,
their dislike changed into admiration. His personal disregard for danger was
notorious and reprehensible. 'Where is General Hart?' asked some one in
action. 'I have not seen him, but I know where you will find him. Go ahead
of the skirmish line and you will see him standing on a rock,' was the
answer. He bore a charmed life. It was a danger to be near him. 'Whom are
you going to?' 'General Hart,' said the aide-de-camp. 'Then good-bye!' cried
his fellows. A grim humour ran through his nature. It is gravely recorded
and widely believed that he lined up a regiment on a hill-top in order to
teach them not to shrink from fire. Amid the laughter of his Irishmen, he
walked through the open files of his firing line holding a laggard by the
ear. This was the man who had put such a spirit into the Irish Brigade that
amid that army of valiant men there were none who held such a record. 'Their
rushes were the quickest, their rushes were the longest, and they stayed the
shortest time under cover,' said a shrewd military observer. To Hart and his
brigade was given the task of clearing the way to Ladysmith.
The regiments which he took with him on his perilous enterprise were the 1st
Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Rangers,
and the Imperial Light Infantry, the whole forming the famous 5th Brigade.
They were already in the extreme British advance, and now, as they moved
forwards, the Durham Light Infantry and the 1st Rifle Brigade from
Lyttelton's Brigade came up to take their place. The hill to be taken lay on
the right, and the soldiers were compelled to pass in single file under a
heavy fire for more than a mile until they reached the spot which seemed
best for their enterprise. There, short already of sixty of their comrades,
they assembled and began a cautious advance upon the lines of trenches and
sangars which seamed the brown slope above them.
For a time they were able to keep some cover, and the casualties were
comparatively few. But now at last, as the evening sun threw a long shadow
from the hills, the leading regiment, the Inniskillings, found themselves at
the utmost fringe of boulders with a clear slope between them and the main
trench of the enemy. Up there where the shrapnel was spurting and the great
lyddite shells crashing they could dimly see a line of bearded faces and the
black dots of the slouch hats. With a yell the Inniskillings sprang out,
carried with a rush the first trench, and charged desperately onwards for
the second one. It was a supremely dashing attack against a supremely steady
resistance, for among all their gallant deeds the Boers have never fought
better than on that February evening. Amid such a smashing shell fire as
living mortals have never yet endured they stood doggedly, these hardy men
of the veldt, and fired fast and true into the fiery ranks of the Irishmen.
The yell of the stormers was answered by the remorseless roar of the Mausers
and the deep-chested shouts of the farmers. Up and up surged the infantry,
falling, rising, dashing bull-headed at the crackling line of the trench.
But still the bearded faces glared at them over the edge, and still the
sheet of lead pelted through their ranks. The regiment staggered, came on,
staggered again, was overtaken by supporting companies of the Dublins and
the Connaughts, came on, staggered once more, and finally dissolved into
shreds, who ran swiftly back for cover, threading their way among their
stricken comrades. Never on this earth was there a retreat of which the
survivors had less reason to be ashamed. They had held on to the utmost
capacity of human endurance. Their Colonel, ten officers, and more than half
the regiment were lying on the fatal hill. Honour to them, and honour also
to the gallant Dutchmen who, rooted in the trenches, had faced the rush and
fury of such an onslaught! Today to them, tomorrow to us - but it is for a
soldier to thank the God of battles for worthy foes.
It is one thing, however, to repulse the British soldier and it is another
to rout him. Within a few hundred yards of their horrible ordeal at
Magersfontein the Highlanders reformed into a military body. So now the
Irishmen fell back no further than the nearest cover, and there held grimly
on to the ground which they had won. If you would know the advantage which
the defence has over the attack, then do you come and assault this line of
tenacious men, now in your hour of victory and exultation, friend Boer!
Friend Boer did attempt it, and skilfully too, moving a flanking party to
sweep the position with their fire. But the brigade, though sorely hurt,
held them off without difficulty, and was found on the morning of the 24th
to be still lying upon the ground which they had won.
Our losses had been very heavy, Colonel Thackeray of the Inniskillings,
Colonel Sitwell of the Dublins, three majors, twenty officers, and a total
of about six hundred out of 1,200 actually engaged. To take such punishment
and to remain undemoralised is the supreme test to which troops can be put.
Could the loss have been avoided? By following the original line of advance
from Monte Christo, perhaps, when we should have turned the enemy's left.
But otherwise no. The hill was in the way and had to be taken. In the war
game you cannot play without a stake. You lose and you pay forfeit, and
where the game is fair the best player is he who pays with the best grace.
The attack was well prepared, well delivered, and only miscarried on account
of the excellence of the defence. We proved once more what we had proved so
often before, that all valour and all discipline will not avail in a frontal
attack against brave coolheaded men armed with quick-firing rifles.
While the Irish Brigade assaulted Railway Hill an attack had been made upon
the left, which was probably meant as a demonstration to keep the Boers from
reinforcing their comrades rather than as an actual attempt upon their
lines. Such as it was, however, it cost the life of at least one brave
soldier, for Colonel Thorold, of the Welsh Fusiliers, was among the fallen.
Thorold, Thackeray, and Sitwell in one evening. Who can say that British
colonels have not given their men a lead?
The army was now at a deadlock. Railway Hill barred the way, and if Hart's
men could not carry it by assault it was hard to say who could. The 24th
found the two armies facing each other at this critical point, the Irishmen
still clinging to the slopes of the hill and the Boers lining the top.
Fierce rifle firing broke out between them during the day, but each side was
well covered and lay low. The troops in support suffered somewhat, however,
from a random shell fire. Mr. Winston Churchill has left it upon record that
within his own observation three of their shrapnel shells fired at a venture
on to the reverse slope of a hill accounted for nineteen men and four
horses. The enemy can never have known how hard those three shells had hit
us, and so we may also believe that our artillery fire has often been less
futile than it appeared.
General Buller had now realised that it was no mere rearguard action which
the Boers were fighting, but that their army was standing doggedly at bay;
so he reverted to that flanking movement which, as events showed, should
never have been abandoned. Hart's Irish Brigade was at present almost the
right of the army. His new plan - a masterly one - was to keep Hart pinning
the Boers at that point, and to move his centre and left across the river,
and then back to envelope the left wing of the enemy. By this manoeuvre Hart
became the extreme left instead of the extreme right, and the Irish Brigade
would be the hinge upon which the whole army should turn. It was a large
conception, finely carried out. The 24th was a day of futile shell fire -
and of plans for the future. The heavy guns were got across once more to the
Monte Christo ridge and to Hlangwane, and preparations made to throw the
army from the west to the east. The enemy still snarled and occasionally
snapped in front of Hart's men, but with four companies of the 2nd Rifle
Brigade to protect their flanks their position remained secure.
In the meantime, through a CONTRETEMPS between our outposts and the Boers,
no leave had been given to us to withdraw our wounded, and the unfortunate
fellows, some hundreds of them, had lain between the lines in agonies of
thirst for thirty-six hours - one of the most painful incidents of the
campaign. Now, upon the 25th, an armistice was proclaimed, and the crying
needs of the survivors were attended to. On the same day the hearts of our
soldiers sank within them as they saw the stream of our wagons and guns
crossing the river once more. What, were they foiled again? Was the blood of
these brave men to be shed in vain? They ground their teeth at the thought.
The higher strategy was not for them, but back was back and forward was
forward, and they knew which way their proud hearts wished to go.
The 26th was occupied by the large movements of troops which so complete a
reversal of tactics necessitated. Under the screen of a heavy artillery
fire, the British right became the left and the left the right. A second
pontoon bridge was thrown across near the old Boer bridge at Hlangwane, and
over it was passed a large force of infantry, Barton's Fusilier Brigade,
Kitchener's (VICE Wynne's, VICE Woodgate's) Lancashire Brigade, and two
battalions of Norcott's (formerly Lyttelton's) Brigade. Coke's Brigade was
left at Colenso to prevent a counter attack upon our left flank and
communications. In this way, while Hart with the Durhams and the 1st Rifle
Brigade held the Boers in front, the main body of the army was rapidly swung
round on to their left flank. By the morning of the 27th all were in place
for the new attack.
Opposite the point where the troops bad been massed were three Boer hills;
one, the nearest, may for convenience sake be called Barton's Hill. As the
army had formerly been situated the assault upon this hill would have been a
matter of extreme difficulty; but now, with the heavy guns restored to their
commanding position, from which they could sweep its sides and summits, it
had recovered its initial advantage. In the morning sunlight Barton's
Fusiliers crossed the river, and advanced to the attack under a screaming
canopy of shells. Up they went and up, darting and crouching, until their
gleaming bayonets sparkled upon the summit. The masterful artillery had done
its work, and the first long step taken in this last stage of the relief of
Ladysmith. The loss had been slight and the advantage enormous. After they
had gained the summit the Fusillers were stung and stung again by clouds of
skirmishers who clung to the flanks of the hill, but their grip was firm and
grew firmer with every hour.
Of the three Boer hills which had to be taken the nearest (or eastern one)
was now in the hands of the British. The furthest (or western one) was that
on which the Irish Brigade was still crouching, ready at any moment for a
final spring which would take them over the few hundred yards which
separated them from the trenches. Between the two intervened a central hill,
as yet untouched. Could we carry this the whole position would be ours. Now
for the final effort! Turn every gun upon it, the guns of Monte Christo, the
guns of Hlangwane! Turn every rifle upon it - the rifles of Barton's men,
the rifles of Hart's men, the carbines of the distant cavalry! Scalp its
crown with the machine-gun fire! And now up with you, Lancashire men,
Norcott's men! The summit or a glorious death, for beyond that hill your
suffering comrades are awaiting you! Put every bullet and every man and all
of fire and spirit that you are worth into this last hour; for if you fail
now you have failed for ever, and if you win, then when your hairs are white
your blood will still run warm when you think of that morning's work. The
long drama had drawn to an end, and one short day's work is to show what
that end was to be.
But there was never a doubt of it. Hardly for one instant did the advance
waver at any point of its extended line. It was the supreme instant of the
Natal campaign, as, wave after wave, the long lines of infantry went
shimmering up the hill. On the left the Lancasters, the Lancashire
Fusiliers, the South Lancashires, the York and Lancasters, with a burr of
north country oaths, went racing for the summit. Spion Kop and a thousand
comrades were calling for vengeance. 'Remember, men, the eyes of Lancashire
are watching you,' cried the gallant MacCarthy O'Leary. The old 40th swept
on, but his dead body marked the way which they had taken. On the right the
East Surrey, the, Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the 1st Rifle Brigade, the
Durhams, and the gallant Irishmen, so sorely stricken and yet so eager, were
all pressing upwards and onwards. The Boer fire lulls, it ceases - they are
running! Wild hat-waving men upon the Hlangwane uplands see the silhouette
of the active figures of the stormers along the sky-line and know that the
position is theirs. Exultant soldiers dance and cheer upon the ridge. The
sun is setting in glory over the great Drakensberg mountains, and so also
that night set for ever the hopes of the Boer invaders of Natal. Out of
doubt and chaos, blood and labour, had come at last the judgment that the
lower should not swallow the higher, that the world is for the man of the
twentieth and not of the seventeenth century. After a fortnight of fighting
the weary troops threw themselves down that night with the assurance that at
last the door was ajar and the light breaking through. One more effort and
it would be open before them.
Behind the line of hills which had been taken there extended a great plain
as far as Bulwana - that evil neighbour who had wrought such harm upon
Ladysmith. More than half of the Pieters position had fallen into Buller's
hands on the 27th, and the remainder had become untenable. The Boers had
lost some five hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.[Footnote: Accurate
figures will probably never be obtained, but a well-known Boer in Pretoria
informed me that Pieters was the most expensive fight to them of the whole
war.] It seemed to the British General and his men that one more action
would bring them safely into Ladysmith.
But here they miscalculated, and so often have we miscalculated on the
optimistic side in this campaign that it is pleasing to find for once that
our hopes were less than the reality. The Boers had been beaten - fairly
beaten and disheartened. It will always be a subject for conjecture whether
they were so entirely on the strength of the Natal campaign, or whether the
news of the Cronje disaster from the western side had warned them that they
must draw in upon the east. For my own part I believe that the honour lies
with the gallant men of Natal, and that, moving on these lines, they would,
Cronje or no Cronje, have forced their way in triumph to Ladysmith.
And now the long-drawn story draws to a swift close. Cautiously feeling
their way with a fringe of horse, the British pushed over the great plain,
delayed here and there by the crackle of musketry, but finding always that
the obstacle gave way and vanished as they approached it. At last it seemed
clear to Dundonald that there really was no barrier between his horsemen and
the beleaguered city. With a squadron of Imperial Light Horse and a squadron
of Natal Carabineers he rode on until, in the gathering twilight, the
Ladysmith picket challenged the approaching cavalry, and the gallant town
was saved.
It is hard to say which had shown the greater endurance, the rescued or
their rescuers. The town, indefensible, lurking in a hollow under commanding
hills, had held out for 118 days. They had endured two assaults and an
incessant bombardment, to which, towards the end, owing to the failure of
heavy ammunition, they were unable to make any adequate reply. It was
calculated that 16,000 shells had fallen within the town. In two successful
sorties they had destroyed three of the enemy's heavy guns. They had been
pressed by hunger, horseflesh was already running short, and they had been
decimated by disease. More than 2,000 cases of enteric and dysentery had
been in hospital at one time, and the total number of admissions had been
nearly as great as the total number of the garrison. One-tenth of the men
had actually died of wounds or disease. Ragged, bootless, and emaciated,
there still lurked in the gaunt soldiers the martial spirit of warriors. On
the day after their relief 2,000 of them set forth to pursue the Boers. One
who helped to lead them has left it on record that the most piteous sight
that he has ever seen was these wasted men, stooping under their rifles and
gasping with the pressure of their accoutrements, as they staggered after
their retreating enemy. A Verestschagen might find a subject these 2,000
indomitable men with their emaciated horses pursuing a formidable foe. It is
God's mercy they failed to overtake them.
If the record of the besieged force was great, that of the relieving army
was no less so. Through the blackest depths of despondency and failure they
had struggled to absolute success. At Colenso they had lost 1,200 men, at
Spion Kop 1,700, at Vaalkranz 400, and now, in this last long-drawn effort,
1,600 more. Their total losses were over 5,000 men, more than 20 per cent.
of the whole army. Some particular regiments had suffered horribly. The
Dublin and Inniskilling Fusiliers headed the roll of honour with only five
officers and 40 per cent. of the men left standing. Next to them the
Lancashire Fusiliers and the Royal Lancasters had been the hardest hit. It
speaks well for Buller's power of winning and holding the confidence of his
men that in the face of repulse after repulse the soldiers still went into
battle as steadily as ever under his command.
On March 3rd Buller's force entered Ladysmith in state between the lines of
the defenders. For their heroism the Dublin Fusiliers were put in the van of
the procession, and it is told how, as the soldiers who lined the streets
saw the five officers and small clump of men, the remains of what had been a
strong battalion, realising, for the first time perhaps, what their relief
had cost, many sobbed like children. With cheer after cheer the stream of
brave men flowed for hours between banks formed by men as brave. But for the
purposes of war the garrison was useless. A month of rest and food would be
necessary before they could be ready to take the field once more.
So the riddle of the Tugela had at last been solved. Even now, with all the
light which has been shed upon the matter, it is hard to apportion praise
and blame. To the cheerful optimism of Symons must be laid some of the blame
of the original entanglement; but man is mortal, and he laid down his life
for his mistake. White, who had been but a week in the country, could not,
if he would, alter the main facts of the military situation. He did his
best, committed one or two errors, did brilliantly on one or two points, and
finally conducted the defence with a tenacity and a gallantry which are
above all praise. It did not, fortunately, develop into an absolutely
desperate affair, like Massena's defence of Genoa, but a few more weeks
would have made it a military tragedy. He was fortunate in the troops whom
he commanded - half of them old soldiers from India - [Footnote: An officer
in high command in Ladysmith has told me, as an illustration of the nerve
and discipline of the troops, that though false alarms in the Boer trenches
were matters of continual occurrence from the beginning to the end of the
siege, there was not one single occasion when the British outposts made a
mistake.] - and exceedingly fortunate in his officers, French (in the
operations before the siege), Archibald Hunter, Ian Hamilton, Hedworth
Lambton, Dick-Cunyngham, Knox, De Courcy Hamilton, and all the other good
men and true who stood (as long as they could stand) by his side. Above all,
he was fortunate in his commissariat officers, and it was in the offices of
Colonels Ward and Stoneman as much as in the trenches and sangars of Csar's
Camp that the siege was won.
Buller, like White, had to take the situation as he found it. It is well
known that his own belief was that the line of the Tugela was the true
defence of Natal. When he reached Africa, Ladysmith was already beleaguered,
and he, with his troops, had to abandon the scheme of direct invasion and to
hurry to extricate White's division. Whether they might not have been more
rapidly extricated by keeping to the original plan is a question which will
long furnish an excellent subject for military debate. Had Buller in
November known that Ladysmith was capable of holding out until March, is it
conceivable that he, with his whole army corps and as many more troops as he
cared to summon from England, would not have made such an advance in four
months through the Free State as would necessitate the abandonment of the
sieges both of Kimberley and of Ladysmith? If the Boers persisted in these
sieges they could not possibly place more than 20,000 men on the Orange
River to face 60,000 whom Buller could have had there by the first week in
December. Methuen's force, French's force, Gatacre's force, and the Natal
force, with the exception of garrisons for Pietermaritzburg and Durban,
would have assembled, with a reserve of another sixty thousand men in the
colony or on the sea ready to fill the gaps in his advance. Moving over a
flat country with plenty of flanking room, it is probable that he would have
been in Bloemfontein by Christmas and at the Vaal River late in January.
What could the Boers do then? They might remain before Ladysmith, and learn
that their capital and their gold mines had been taken in their absence. Or
they might abandon the siege and trek back to defend their own homes. This,
as it appears to a civilian critic, would have been the least expensive
means of fighting them; but after all the strain had to come somewhere, and
the long struggle of Ladysmith may have meant a more certain and complete
collapse in the future. At least, by the plan actually adopted we saved
Natal from total devastation, and that must count against a great deal.
Having taken his line, Buller set about his task in a slow, deliberate, but
pertinacious fashion. It cannot be denied, however, that the pertinacity was
largely due to the stiffening counsel of Roberts and the soldierly firmness
of White who refused to acquiesce in the suggestion of surrender. Let it be
acknowledged that Buller's was the hardest problem of the war, and that he
solved it. The mere acknowledgment goes far to soften criticism. But the
singular thing is that in his proceedings he showed qualities which had not
been generally attributed to him, and was wanting in those very points which
the public had imagined to be charactenstic of him. He had gone out with the
reputation of a downright John Bull fighter, who would take punishment or
give it, but slog his way through without wincing. There was no reason for
attributing any particular strategical ability to him. But as a matter of
fact, setting the Colenso attempt aside, the crossing for the Spion Kop
enterprise, the withdrawal of the compromised army, the Vaalkranz crossing
with the clever feint upon Brakfontein, the final operations, and especially
the complete change of front after the third day of Pieters, were
strategical movements largely conceived and admirably carried out. On the
other hand, a hesitation in pushing onwards, and a disinclination to take a
risk or to endure heavy punishment, even in the case of temporary failure,
were consistent characteristics of his generalship. The Vaalkranz operations
are particularly difficult to defend from the charge of having been
needlessly slow and half-hearted. This 'saturnine fighter,' as he had been
called, proved to be exceedingly sensitive about the lives of his men - an
admirable quality in itself, but there are occasions when to spare them
to-day is to needlessly imperil them tomorrow. The victory was his, and yet
in the very moment of it he displayed the qualities which marred him. With
two cavalry brigades in band he did not push the pursuit of the routed Boers
with their guns and endless streams of wagons. It is true that he might have
lost heavily, but it is true also that a success might have ended the Boer
invasion of Natal, and the lives of our troopers would be well spent in such
a venture. If cavalry is not to be used in pursuing a retiring enemy
encumbered with much baggage, then its day is indeed past.
The relief of Ladysmith stirred the people of the Empire as nothing, save
perhaps the subsequent relief of Mafeking, has done during our generation.
Even sober unemotional London found its soul for once and fluttered with
joy. Men, women, and children, rich and poor, clubman and cabman, joined in
the universal delight. The thought of our garrison, of their privations, of
our impotence to relieve them, of the impending humiliation to them and to
us, had lain dark for many months across our spirits. It had weighed upon
us, until the subject, though ever present in our thoughts, was too painful
for general talk. And now, in an instant, the shadow was lifted. The
outburst of rejoicing was.not a triumph over the gallant Boers. But it was
our own escape from humiliation, the knowledge that the blood of our sons
had not been shed in vain, above all the conviction that the darkest hour
had now passed and that the light of peace was dimly breaking far away -
that was why London rang with joy bells that March morning, and why those
bells echoed back from every town and hamlet, in tropical sun and in Arctic
snow, over which the flag of Britain waved.
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