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THE
DISASTER AT KOORN SPRUIT. THE ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY WORKING THEIR GUNS
From: H. W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
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Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XXII
The Halt at Bloemfontein
On March 13th Lord Roberts
occupied the capital of the Orange Free State. On May 1st, more than six
weeks later, the advance was resumed. This long delay was absolutely
necessary in order to supply the place of the ten thousand horses and mules
which are said to have been used up in the severe work of the preceding
month. It was not merely that a large number of the cavalry chargers had
died or been abandoned, but it was that of those which remained the majority
were in a state wbich made them useless for immediate service. How far this
might have been avoided is open to question, for it is notorious that
General French's reputation as a horsemaster does not stand so high as his
fame as a cavalry leader. But besides the horses there was urgent need of
every sort of supply, from boots to hospitals, and the only way by which
they could come was by two single-line railways which unite into one
single-line railway, with the alternative of passing over a precarious
pontoon bridge at Norval's Pont, or truck by truck over the road bridge at
Bethulie. To support an army of fifty thousand men under these
circumstances, eight hundred miles from a base, is no light matter, and a
premature advance which could not be thrust home would be the greatest of
misfortunes. The public at home and the army in Africa became restless under
the inaction, but it was one more example of the absolute soundness of Lord
Roberts's judgment and the quiet resolution with which he adheres to it. He
issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Free State promising
protection to all who should bring in their arms and settle down upon their
farms. The most stringent orders were issued against looting or personal
violence, but nothing could exceed the gentleness and good humour of the
troops. Indeed there seemed more need for an order which should protect them
against the extortion of their conquered enemies. It is strange to think
that we are separated by only ninety years from the savage soldiery of
Badajoz and San Sebastian.
The streets of the little Dutch town formed during this interval a curious
object-lesson in the resources of the Empire. All the scattered Anglo-Celtic
races had sent their best blood to fight for the common cause. Peace is the
great solvent, as war is the powerful unifier. For the British as for the
German Empire much virtue had come from the stress and strain of battle. To
stand in the market square of Bloemfontein and to see the warrior types
around you was to be assured of the future of the race. The middle-sized,
square-set, weather-tanned, straw-bearded British regulars crowded the
footpaths. There also one might see the hard-faced Canadians, the
loose-limbed dashing Australians, fireblooded and keen, the dark
New-Zealanders, with a Maori touch here and there in their features, the
gallant men of Tasmania, the gentlemen troopers of India and Ceylon, and
everywhere the wild South African irregulars with their bandoliers and
unkempt wiry horses, Rimington's men with the racoon bands, Roberts's Horse
with the black plumes, some with pink puggarees, some with birdseye, but all
of the same type, hard, rugged, and alert. The man who could look at these
splendid soldiers, and, remembering the sacrifices of time, money, and
comfort which most of them had made before they found themselves fighting in
the heart of Africa, doubt that the spirit of the race burned now as
brightly as ever, must be devoid of judgment and sympathy. The real glories
of the British race lie in the future, not in the past. The Empire walks,
and may still walk, with an uncertain step, but with every year its tread
will be firmer, for its weakness is that of waxing youth and not of waning
age.
The greatest misfortune of the campaign, one which it was obviously
impolitic to insist upon at the time, began with the occupation of
Bloemfontein. This was the great outbreak of enteric among the troops. For
more than two months the hospitals were choked with sick. One general
hospital with five hundred beds held seventeen hundred sick, nearly all
enterics. A half field hospital with fifty beds held three hundred and
seventy cases. The total number of cases could not have been less than six
or seven thousand - and this not of an evanescent and easily treated
complaint, but of the most persistent and debilitating of continued fevers,
the one too which requires the most assiduous attention and careful nursing.
How great was the strain only those who had to meet it can tell. The
exertions of the military hospitals and of those others which were fitted
out by private benevolence sufficed, after a long struggle, to meet the
crisis. At Bloemfontein alone, as many as fifty men died in one day, and
more than 1,000 new graves in the cemetery testify to the severity of the
epidemic. No men in the campaign served their country more truly than the
officers and men of the medical service, nor can any one who went through
the epidemic forget the bravery and unselfishness of those admirable nursing
sisters who set the men around them a higher standard of devotion to duty.
Enteric fever is always endemic in the country, and especially at
Bloemfontein, but there can be no doubt that this severe outbreak had its
origin in the Paardeberg water. All through the campaign, while the
machinery for curing disease was excellent, that for preventing it was
elementary or absent. If bad water can cost us more than all the bullets of
the enemy, then surely it is worth our while to make the drinking of
unboiled water a stringent military offence, and to attach to every company
and squadron the most rapid and efficient means for boiling it - for
filtering alone is useless. An incessant trouble it would be, but it would
have saved a division for the army. It is heartrending for the medical man
who has emerged from a hospital full of water-born pestilence to see a
regimental watercart being filled, without protest, at some polluted wayside
pool. With precautions and with inoculation all those lives might have been
saved. The fever died down with the advance of the troops and the coming of
the colder weather.
To return to the military operations: these, although they were stagnant so
far as the main army was concerned, were exceedingly and inconveniently
active in other quarters. Three small actions, two of which were disastrous
to our arms, and one successful defence marked the period of the pause at
Bloemfontein.
To the north of the town, some twelve miles distant lies the ubiquitous
Modder River, which is crossed by a railway bridge at a place named Glen.
The saving of the bridge was of considerable importance, and might by the
universal testimony of the farmers of that district have been effected any
time within the first few days of our occupation. We appear, however, to
have imperfectly appreciated how great was the demoralisation of the Boers.
In a week or so they took heart, returned, and blew up the bridge. Roving
parties of the enemy, composed mainly of the redoubtable Johannesburg
police, reappeared even to the south of the river. Young Lygon was killed,
and Colonels Crabbe and Codrington with Captain Trotter, all of the Guards,
were severely wounded by such a body, whom they gallantly but injudiciously
attempted to arrest when armed only with revolvers.
These wandering patrols who kept the country unsettled, and harassed the
farmers who had taken advantage of Lord Roberts's proclamation, were found
to have their centre at a point some six miles to the north of Glen, named
Karee. At Karee a formidable line of hills cut the British advance, and
these had been occupied by a strong body of the enemy with guns. Lord
Roberts determined to drive them off, and on March 28th Tucker's 7th
Division, consisting of Chermside's brigade (Lincolns, Norfolks, Hampshires,
and Scottish Borderers), and Wavell's brigade (Cheshires, East Lancashires,
North Staffords, and South Wales Borderers), were assembled at Glen. The
artillery consisted of the veteran 18th, 62nd, and 75th R.F.A. Three
attenuated cavalry brigades with some mounted infantry completed the force.
The movement was to be upon the old model, and in result it proved to be
only too truly so. French's cavalry were to get round one flank, Le
Gallais's mounted infantry round the other, and Tucker's Division to attack
in front. Nothing could be more perfect in theory and nothing apparently
more defective in practice. Since on this as on other occasions the mere
fact that the cavalry were demonstrating in the rear caused the complete
abandonment of the position, it is difficult to see what the object of the
infantry attack could be. The ground was irregular and unexplored, and it
was late before the horsemen on their weary steeds found themselves behind
the flank of the enemy. Some of them, Le Gallais's mounted infantry and
Davidson's guns, had come from Bloemfontein during the night, and the horses
were exhausted by the long march, and by the absurd weight which the British
troop-horse is asked to carry. Tucker advanced his infantry exactly as
Kelly-Kenny had done at Driefontein, and with a precisely similar result.
The eight regiments going forward in echelon of battalions imagined from the
silence of the enemy that the position had been abandoned. They were
undeceived by a cruel fire which beat upon two companies of the Scottish
Borderers from a range of two hundred yards. They were driven back, but
reformed in a donga. About half-past two a Boer gun burst shrapnel over the
Lincolnshires and Scottish Borderers with some effect, for a single shell
killed five of the latter regiment. Chermside's brigade was now all involved
in the fight, and Wavell's came up in support, but the ground was too open
and the position too strong to push the attack home. Fortunately, about four
o'clock, the horse batteries with French began to make their presence felt
from behind, and the Boers instantly quitted their position and made off
through the broad gap which still remained between French and Le Gallais.
The Brandfort plain appears to be ideal ground for cavalry, but in spite of
that the enemy with his guns got safely away. The loss of the infantry
amounted to one hundred and sixty killed and wounded, the larger share of
the casualties and of the honour falling to the Scottish Borderers and the
East Lancashires. The infantry was not well handled, the cavalry was slow,
and the guns were inefficient-altogether an inglorious day. Yet
strategically it was of importance, for the ridge captured was the last
before one came to the great plain which stretched, with a few
intermissions, to the north. From March 29th until May 2nd Karee remained
the advanced post.
In the meanwhile there had been a series of operations in the east which had
ended in a serious disaster. Immediately after the occupation of
Bloemfontein (on March 18th) Lord Roberts despatched to the east a small
column consisting of the 10th Hussars, the composite regiment, two batteries
(Q and U) of the Horse Artillery, some mounted infantry, Roberts's Horse,
and Rimington's Guides. On the eastern horizon forty miles from the capital,
but in that clear atmosphere looking only half the distance, there stands
the impressive mountain named Thabanchu (the black mountain). To all Boers
it is an historical spot, for it was at its base that the wagons of the
Voortrekkers, coming by devious ways from various parts, assembled. On the
further side of Thabanchu, to the north and east of it, lies the richest
grain-growing portion of the Free State, the centre of which is Ladybrand.
The forty miles which intervene between Bloemfontein and Thabanchu are
intersected midway by the Modder River. At this point are the waterworks,
erected recently with modern machinery, to take the place of the insanitary
wells on which the town had been dependent. The force met with no
resistance, and the small town of Thabanchu was occupied.
Colonel Pilcher, the leader of the Douglas raid, was inclined to explore a
little further, and with three squadrons of mounted men he rode on to the
eastward. Two commandos, supposed to be Grobler's and Olivier's, were seen
by them, moving on a line which suggested that they were going to join Steyn,
who was known to be rallying his forces at Kroonstad, his new seat of
government in the north of the Free State. Pilcher, with great daring,
pushed onwards until with his little band on their tired horses he found
himself in Ladybrand, thirty miles from his nearest supports. Entering the
town he seized the landdrost and the field-cornet, but found that strong
bodies of the enemy were moving upon him and that it was impossible for him
to hold the place. He retired, therefore, holding grimly on to his
prisoners, and got back with small loss to the place from which he started.
It was a dashing piece of bluff, and, when taken with the Douglas exploit,
leads one to hope that Pilcher may have a chance of showing what he can do
witb larger means at his disposal. Finding that the enemy was following him
in force, he pushed on the same night for Thabanchu. His horsemen must have
covered between fifty and sixty miles in the twenty-four hours.
Apparently the effect of Pilcher's exploit was to halt the march of those
commandos which had been seen trekking to the north-west, and to cause them
to swing round upon Thabanchu. Broadwood, a young cavalry commander who had
won a name in Egypt, considered that his position was unnecessarily exposed
and fell back upon Bloemfontein. He halted on the first night near the
waterworks, halfway upon his journey.
The Boers are great masters in the ambuscade. Never has any race shown such
aptitude for this form of warfare - a legacy from a long succession of
contests with cunning savages. But never also have they done anything so
clever and so audacious as De Wet's dispositions in this action. One cannot
go over the ground without being amazed at the ingenuity of their attack,
and also at the luck which favoured them, for the trap which they had laid
for others might easily have proved an absolutely fatal one for themselves.
The position beside the Modder at which the British camped had numerous
broken hills to the north and east of it. A force of Boers, supposed to
number about two thousand men, came down in the night, bringing with them
several heavy guns, and with the early morning opened a brisk fire upon the
camp. The surprise was complete. But the refinement of the Boer tactics lay
in the fact that they had a surprise within a surprise - and it was the
second which was the more deadly.
The force which Broadwood had with him consisted of the 10th Hussars and the
composite regiment, Rimington's Scouts, Roberts's Horse, the New Zealand and
Burmah Mounted Infantry, with Q and U batteries of Horse Artillery. With
such a force, consisting entirely of mounted men, he could not storm the
hills upon which the Boer guns were placed, and his twelve-pounders were
unable to reach the heavier cannon of the enemy. His best game was obviously
to continue his march to Bloemfontein. He sent on the considerable convoy of
wagons and the guns, while he with the cavalry covered the rear, upon which
the long-range pieces of the enemy kept up the usual well-directed but
harmless fire.
Broadwood's retreating column now found itself on a huge plain which
stretches all the way to Bloemfontein, broken only by two hills, both of
which were known to be in our possession. The plain was one which was
continually traversed from end to end by our troops and convoys, so that
once out upon its surface all danger seemed at an end. Broadwood had
additional reasons for feeling secure, for he knew that, in answer to his
own wise request, Colvile's Division had been sent out before daybreak that
morning from Bloemfontein to meet him. In a very few miles their vanguard
and his must come together. There were obviously no Boers upon the plain,
but if there were they would find themselves between two fires. He gave no
thought to his front therefore, but rode behind, where the Boer guns were
roaring, and whence the Boer riflemen might ride.
But in spite of the obvious there WERE Boers upon the plain, so placed that
they must either bring off a remarkable surprise or be themselves cut off to
a man. Across the veldt, some miles from the waterworks, there runs a deep
donga or watercourse - one of many, but the largest. It cuts the rough road
at right angles. Its depth and breadth are such that a wagon would dip down
the incline, and disappear for about two minutes before it would become
visible again at the crown of the other side. In appearance it was a huge
curving ditch with a stagnant stream at the bottom. The sloping sides of the
ditch were fringed with Boers, who had ridden thither before dawn and were
now waiting for the unsuspecting column. There were not more than three
hundred of them, and four times their number were approaching; but no odds
can represent the difference between the concealed man with the magazine
rifle and the man upon the plain.
There were two dangers, however, which the Boers ran, and, skilful as their
dispositions were, their luck was equally great, for the risks were
enormous. One was that a force coming the other way (Colvile's was only a
few miles off) would arrive, and that they would be ground between the upper
and the lower millstone. The other was that for once the British scouts
might give the alarm and that Broadwood's mounted men would wheel swiftly to
right and left and secure the ends of the long donga. Should that happen,
not a man of them could possibly escape. But they took their chances like
brave men, and fortune was their friend. The wagons came on without any
scouts. Behind them was U battery, then Q, with Roberts's Horse abreast of
them and the rest of the cavalry behind.
As the wagons, occupied for the most part only by unarmed sick soldiers and
black transport drivers, came down into the drift, the Boers quickly but
quietly took possession of them, and drove them on up the further slope.
Thus the troops behind saw their wagons dip down, reappear, and continue on
their course. The idea of an ambush could not suggest itself. Only one thing
could avert an absolute catastrophe, and that was the appearance of a hero
who would accept certain death in order to warn his comrades. Such a man
rode by the wagons - though, unhappily, in the stress and rush of the moment
there is no certainty as to his name or rank. We only know that one was
found brave enough to fire his revolver in the face of certain death. The
outburst of firing which answered his shot was the sequel which saved the
column. Not often is it given to a man to die so choice a death as that of
this nameless soldier.
But the detachment was already so placed that nothing could save it from
heavy loss. The wagons had all passed but nine, and the leading battery of
artillery was at the very edge of the donga. Nothing is so helpless as a
limbered-up battery. In an instant the teams were shot down and the gunners
were made prisoners. A terrific fire burst at the same instant upon
Roberts's Horse, who were abreast of the guns. 'Files a bout! gallop!'
yelled Colonel Dawson, and by his exertions and those of Major
Pack-Beresford the corps was extricated and reformed some hundreds of yards
further off. But the loss of horses and men was heavy. Major Pack-Beresford
and other officers were shot down, and every unhorsed man remained
necessarily as a prisoner under the very muzzles of the riflemen in the
donga.
As Roberts's Horse turned and galloped for dear life across the flat, four
out of the six guns [Footnote:Of the other two one overturned and could not
be righted, the other had the wheelers shot and could not be extricated from
the tumult. It was officially stated that the guns of Q battery were halted
a thousand yards off the donga, but my impression was, from examining the
ground, that it was not more than six hundred.] of Q battery and one gun
(the rearmost) of U battery swung round nd dashed frantically for a place of
safety. At the same instant every Boer along the line of the donga sprang up
and emptied his magazine into the mass of rushing, shouting soldiers,
plunging horses, and screaming Kaffirs. It was for a few moments a
SAUVE-QUI-PEUT. Serjeant-Major Martin of U, with a single driver on a
wheeler, got away the last gun of his battery. The four guns which were
extricated of Q, under Major Phipps-Hornby, whirled across the plain, pulled
up, unlimbered, and opened a brisk fire of shrapnel from about a thousand
yards upon the donga. Had the battery gone on for double the distance, its
action would have been more effective, for it would have been under a less
deadly rifle fire, but in any case its sudden change from flight to
discipline and order steadied the whole force. Roberts's men sprang from
their horses, and with the Burmese and New-Zealanders flung themselves down
in a skirmish line. The cavalry moved to the left to find some drift by
which the donga could be passed, and out of chaos there came in a few
minutes calm and a settled purpose.
It was for Q battery to cover the retreat of the force, and most nobly it
did it. A fortnight later a pile of horses, visible many hundreds of yards
off across the plain, showed where the guns had stood. It was the Colenso of
the horse gunners. In a devilish sleet of lead they stood to their work,
loading and firing while a man was left. Some of the guns were left with two
men to work them, one was loaded and fired by a single officer. When at last
the order for retirement came, only ten men, several of them wounded, were
left upon their feet. With scratch teams from the limbers, driven by single
gunners, the twelve-pounders staggered out of action, and the skirmish line
of mounted infantry sprang to their feet amid the hail of bullets to cheer
them as they passed.
It was no slight task to extricate that sorely stricken force from the close
contact of an exultant enemy, and to lead it across that terrible donga.
Yet, thanks to the coolness of Broadwood and the steadiness of his
rearguard, the thing was done. A practicable passage had been found two
miles to the south by Captain Chester-Master of Rimington's. This corps,
with Roberts's, the New-Zealanders, and the 3rd Mounted Infantry, covered
the withdrawal in turn. It was one of those actions in which the horseman
who is trained to fight upon foot did very much better than the regular
cavalry. In two hours' time the drift had been passed and the survivors of
the force found themselves in safety.
The losses in this disastrous but not dishonourable engagement were severe.
About thirty officers and five hundred men were killed, wounded, or missing.
The prisoners came to more than three hundred. They lost a hundred wagons, a
considerable quantity of stores, and seven twelve-pounder guns - five from U
battery and two from Q. Of U battery only Major Taylor and Sergeant-Major
Martin seem to have escaped, the rest being captured EN BLOC. Of Q battery
nearly every man was killed or wounded. Roberts's Horse, the New-Zealanders,
and the mounted infantry were the other corps which suffered most heavily.
Among many brave men who died, none was a greater loss to the service than
Major Booth of the Northumberland Fusiliers, serving in the mounted
infantry. With four comrades he held a position to cover the retreat, and
refused to leave it. Such men are inspired by the traditions of the past,
and pass on the story of their own deaths to inspire fresh heroes in the
future.
Broadwood, the instant that he had disentangled himself, faced about, and
brought his guns into action. He was not strong enough, however, nor were
his men in a condition, to seriously attack the enemy. Martyr's mounted
infantry had come up, led by the Queenslanders, and at the cost of some loss
to themselves helped to extricate the disordered force. Colvile's Division
was behind Bushman's Kop, only a few miles off, and there were hopes that it
might push on and prevent the guns and wagons from being removed. Colvile
did make an advance, but slowly and in a flanking direction instead of
dashing swiftly forward to retrieve the situation. It must be acknowledged,
however, that the problem which faced this General was one of great
difficulty. It was almost certain that before he could throw his men into
the action the captured guns would be beyond his reach, and it was possible
that he might swell the disaster. With all charity, however, one cannot but
feel that his return next morning, after a reinforcement during the night,
without any attempt to force the Boer position, was lacking in
enterprise.[Footnote: It may be urged in General Colvile's defence that his
division had already done a long march from Bloemfontein. A division,
however, which contains two such brigades as Macdonald's and Smith-Dorrien's
may safely be called upon for any exertions. The gunner officers in
Colvile's division heard their comrades' guns in 'section-fire' and knew it
to be the sign of a desperate situation.] The victory left the Boers in
possession of the waterworks, and Bloemfontein had to fall back upon her
wells - a change which reacted most disastrously upon the enteric which was
already decimating the troops.
The effect of the Sanna's Post defeat was increased by the fact that only
four days later (on April 4th) a second even more deplorable disaster befell
our troops. This was the surrender of five companies of infantry, two of
them mounted, at Reddersberg. So many surrenders of small bodies of troops
had occurred during the course of the war that the public, remembering how
seldom the word 'surrender' had ever been heard in our endless succession of
European wars, had become very restive upon the subject, and were sometimes
inclined to question whether this new and humiliating fact did not imply
some deterioration of our spirit. The fear was natural, and yet nothing
could be more unjust to this the most splendid army which has ever marched
under the red-crossed flag. The fact was new because the conditions were
new, and it was inherent in those conditions. In that country of huge
distances small bodies must be detached, for the amount of space covered by
the large bodies was not sufficient for all military purposes. In
reconnoitring, in distributing proclamations, in collecting arms, in
overawing outlying districts, weak columns must be used. Very often these
columns must contain infantry soldiers, as the demands upon the cavalry were
excessive. Such bodies, moving through a hilly country with which they were
unfamiliar, were always liable to be surrounded by a mobile enemy. Once
surrounded the length of their resistance was limited by three things: their
cartridges, their water, and their food. When they had all three, as at
Wepener or Mafeking, they could hold out indefinitely. When one or other was
wanting, as at Reddersberg or Nicholson's Nek, their position was
impossible. They could not break away, for how can men on foot break away
from horsemen? Hence those repeated humiliations, which did little or
nothing to impede the course of the war, and which were really to be
accepted as one of the inevitable prices which we had to pay for the
conditions under which the war was fought. Numbers, discipline, and
resources were with us. Mobility, distances, nature of the country,
insecurity of supplies, were with them. We need not take it to heart
therefore if it happened, with all these forces acting against them, that
our soldiers found themselves sometimes in a position whence neither wisdom
nor valour could rescue them. To travel through that country, fashioned
above all others for defensive warfare, with trench and fort of superhuman
size and strength, barring every path, one marvels how it was that such
incidents were not more frequent and more serious. It is deplorable that the
white flag should ever have waved over a company of British troops, but the
man who is censorious upon the subject has never travelled in South Africa.
In the disaster at Reddersberg three of the companies were of the Irish
Rifles, and two of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers - the same unfortunate
regiments which had already been cut up at Stormberg. They had been detached
from Gatacre's 3rd Division, the headquarters of which was at Springfontein.
On the abandonment of Thabanchu and the disaster of Sanna's Post, it was
obvious that we should draw in our detached parties to the east; so the five
companies were ordered to leave Dewetsdorp, which they were garrisoning, and
to get back to the railway line. Either the order was issued too late, or
they were too slow in obeying it, for they were only halfway upon their
journey, near the town of Reddersberg, when the enemy came down upon them
with five guns. Without artillery they were powerless, but, having seized a
kopje, they took such shelter as they could find, and waited in the hope of
succour. Their assailants seem to have been detached from De Wet's force in
the north, and contained among them many of the victors of Sanna's Post. The
attack began at 11 A.M. of April 3rd, and all day the men lay among the
stones, subjected to the pelt of shell and bullet. The cover was good,
however, and the casualties were not heavy. The total losses were under
fifty killed and wounded. More serious than the enemy's fire was the absence
of water, save a very limited supply in a cart. A message was passed through
of the dire straits in which they found themselves, and by the late
afternoon the news had reached headquarters. Lord Roberts instantly
despatched the Camerons, just arrived from Egypt, to Bethany, which is the
nearest point upon the line, and telegraphed to Gatacre at Springfontein to
take measures to save his compromised detachment. The telegram should have
reached Gatacre early on the evening of the 3rd, and he had collected a
force of fifteen hundred men, entrained it, journeyed forty miles up the
line, detrained it, and reached Reddersberg, which is ten or twelve miles
from the line, by 10.30 next morning. Already, however, it was too late, and
the besieged force, unable to face a second day without water under that
burning sun, had laid down their arms. No doubt the stress of thirst was
dreadful, and yet one cannot say that the defence rose to the highest point
of resolution. Knowing that help could not be far off, the garrison should
have held on while they could lift a rifle. If the ammunition was running
low, it was bad management which caused it to be shot away too fast. Captain
McWhinnie, who was in command, behaved with the utmost personal gallantry.
Not only the troops but General Gatacre also was involved in the disaster.
Blame may have attached to him for leaving a detachment at Dewetsdorp, and
not having a supporting body at Reddersberg upon which it might fall back;
but it must be remembered that his total foree was small and that he had to
cover a long stretch of the lines of communication. As to General Gatacre's
energy and gallantry it is a by-word in the army; but coming after the
Stormberg disaster this fresh mishap to his force made the continuance of
his command impossible. Much sympathy was felt with him in the army, where
he was universally liked and respected by officers and men. He returned to
England, and his division was taken over by General Chermside.
In a single week, at a time when the back of the war had seemed to be
broken, we had lost nearly twelve hundred men with seven guns. The men of
the Free State - for the fighting was mainly done by commandos from the
Ladybrand, Winburg, Bethlehem, and Harrismith districts -deserve great
credit for this fine effort, and their leader De Wet confirmed the
reputation which he had already gained as a dashing and indefatigable
leader. His force was so weak that when Lord Roberts was able to really
direct his own against it, he brushed it away before him; but the manner in
which De Wet took advantage of Roberts's enforced immobility, and dared to
get behind so mighty an enemy, was a fine exhibition of courage and
enterprise. The public at home chafed at this sudden and unexpected turn of
affairs; but the General, constant to his own fixed purpose, did not permit
his strength to be wasted, aud his cavalry to be again disorganised, by
flying excursions, but waited grimly until he should be strong enough to
strike straight at Pretoria.
In this short period of depression there came one gleam of light from the
west. This was the capture of a commando of sixty Boers, or rather of sixty
foreigners fighting for the Boers, and the death of the gallant Frenchman,
De Villebois-Mareuil, who appears to have had the ambition of playing
Lafayette in South Africa to Kruger's Washington. From the time that
Kimberley had been reoccupied the British had been accumulating their force
there so as to make a strong movement which should coincide with that of
Roberts from Bloemfontein. Hunter's Division from Natal was being moved
round to Kimberley, and Methuen already commanded a considerable body of
troops, which included a number of the newly arrived Imperial Yeomanry. With
these Methuen pacified the surrounding country, and extended his outposts to
Barkly West on the one side, to Boshof on the other, and to Warrenton upon
the Vaal River in the centre. On April 4th news reached Boshof that a Boer
commando had been seen some ten miles to the east of the town, and a force,
consisting of Yeomanry, Kimberley Light Horse, and half of Butcher's veteran
4th battery, was sent to attack them. They were found to have taken up their
position upon a kopje which, contrary to all Boer custom, had no other
kopjes to support it. French generalship was certainly not so astute as Boer
cunning. The kopje was instantly surrounded, and the small force upon the
summit being without artillery in the face of our guns found itself in
exactly the same position which our men had been in twenty-four hours before
at Reddersberg. Again was shown the advantage which the mounted rifleman has
over the cavalry, for the Yeomanry and Light Horsemen left their horses and
ascended the hill with the bayonet. In three hours all was over and the
Boers had laid down their arms. Villebois was shot with seven of his
companions, and there were nearly sixty prisoners. It speaks well for the
skirmishing of the Yeomanry and the way in which they were handled by Lord
Chesham that though they worked their way up the hill under fire they only
lost four killed and a few wounded. The affair was a small one, but it was
complete, and it came at a time when a success was very welcome. One
bustling week had seen the expensive victory of Karee, the disasters of
Sanna's Post and Reddersberg, and the successful skirmish of Boshof. Another
chapter must be devoted to the movement towards the south of the Boer forces
and the dispositions which Lord Roberts made to meet it.
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