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BOERS
SURRENDERING ARMS AT PRETORIA
From: H. W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria, 1902 |
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Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XXVIII
The Halt at Pretoria
Lord Roberts had now been
six weeks in the capital, and British troops had overrun the greater part of
the south and west of the Transvaal, but in spite of this there was
continued Boer resistance, which flared suddenly up in places which had been
nominally pacified and disarmed. It was found, as has often been shown in
history, that it is easier to defeat a republican army than to conquer it.
From Klerksdorp, from Ventersdorp, from Rustenburg, came news of risings
against the newly imposed British authority. The concealed Mauser and the
bandolier were dug up once more from the trampled corner of the cattle
kraal, and the farmer was a warrior once again. Vague news of the exploits
of De Wet stimulated the fighting burghers and shamed those who had
submitted. A letter was intercepted from the guerilla chief to Cronje's son,
who had surrendered near Rustenburg. De Wet stated that he had gained two
great victories and had fifteen hundred captured rifles with which to
replace those which the burghers had given up. Not only were the outlying
districts in a state of revolt, but even round Pretoria the Boers were
inclined to take the offensive, while both that town and Johannesburg were
filled with malcontents who were ready to fly to their arms once more.
Already at the end of June there were signs that the Boers realised how
helpless Lord Roberts was until his remounts should arrive. The mosquitoes
buzzed round the crippled lion. On June 29th there was an attack upon
Springs near Johannesburg, which was easily beaten off by the Canadians.
Early in July some of the cavalry and mounted infantry patrols were snapped
up in the neighbourhood of the capital. Lord Roberts gave orders accordingly
that Hutton and Mahon should sweep the Boers back upon his right, and push
them as far as Bronkhorst Spruit. This was done on July 6th and 7th, the
British advance meeting with considerable resistance from artillery as well
as rifles. By this movement the pressure upon the right was relieved, which
might have created a dangerous unrest in Johannesburg, and it was done at
the moderate cost of thirty-four killed and wounded, half of whom belonged
to the Imperial Light Horse. This famous corps, which had come across with
Mahon from the relief of Mafeking, had, a few days before, ridden with mixed
feelings through the streets of Johannesburg and past, in many instances,
the deserted houses which had once been their homes. Many weary months were
to pass before the survivors might occupy them. On July 9th the Boers again
attacked, but were again pushed back to the eastward.
It is probable that all these demonstrations of the enemy upon the right of
Lord Roberts's extended position were really feints in order to cover the
far-reaching plans which Botha had in his mind. The disposition of the Boer
forces at this time appears to have been as follows: Botha with his army
occupied a position along Delagoa railway line, further east than Diamond
Hill, whence he detached the bodies which attacked Hutton upon the extreme
right of the British position to the south-east of Pretoria. To the north of
Pretoria a second force was acting under Grobler, while a third under
Delarey had been despatched secretly across to the left wing of the British,
north-west of Pretoria. While Botha engaged the attention of Lord Roberts by
energetic demonstrations on his right, Grobler and Delarey were to make a
sudden attack upon his centre and his left, each point being twelve or
fifteen miles from the other. It was well devised and very well carried out;
but the inherent defect of it was that, when subdivided in this way, the
Boer force was no longer strong enough to gain more than a mere success of
outposts.
De la Rey's attack was delivered at break of day on July 11th at Uitval's
Nek, a post some eighteen miles west of the capital. This position could not
be said to be part of Lord Roberts's line, but rather to be a link to
connect his army with Rustenburg. It was weakly held by three companies of
the Lincolns with two others in support, one squadron of the Scots Greys,
and two guns of 0 battery R.H.A. The attack came with the first grey light
of dawn, and for many hours the small garrison bore up against a deadly
fire, waiting for the help which never came. All day they held their
assailants at bay, and it was not until evening that their ammunition ran
short and they were forced to surrender. Nothing could have been better than
the behaviour of the men, both infantry, cavalry, and gunners, but their
position was a hopeless one. The casualties amounted to eighty killed and
wounded. Nearly two hundred were made prisoners and the two guns were taken.
On the same day that De la Rey made his COUP at Uitval's Nek, Grobler had
shown his presence on the north side of the town by treating very roughly a
couple of squadrons of the 7th Dragoon Guards which had attacked him. By the
help of a section of the ubiquitous 0 battery and of the 14th Hussars,
Colonel Lowe was able to disengage his cavalry from the trap into which they
had fallen, but it was at the cost of between thirty and forty officers and
men killed, wounded, or taken. The old 'Black Horse' sustained their
historical reputation, and fought their way bravely out of an almost
desperate situation, where they were exposed to the fire of a thousand
riflemen and four guns.
On this same day of skirmishes, July 11th, the Gordons had seen some hot
work twenty miles or so to the south of Uitval's Nek. Orders had been given
to the 19th Brigade (Smith-Dorrien's) to proceed to Krugersdorp, and thence
to make their way north. The Scottish Yeomanry and a section of the 78th
B.F.A. accompanied them. The idea seems to have been that they would be able
to drive north any Boers in that district, who would then find the garrison
of Uitval's Nek at their rear. The advance was checked, however, at a place
called Dolverkrantz, which was strongly held by Boer riflemen. The two guns
were insufficiently protected, and the enemy got within short range of them,
killing or wounding many of the gunners. The lieutenant in charge, Mr. A. J.
Turner, the famous Essex cricketer, worked the gun with his own hands until
he also fell wounded in three places. The situation was now very serious,
and became more so when news was flashed of the disaster at Uitval's Nek,
and they were ordered to retire. They could not retire and abandon the guns,
yet the fire was so hot that it was impossible to remove them. Gallant
attempts were made by volunteers from the Gordons - Captain Younger and
other brave men throwing away their lives in the vain effort to reach and to
limber up the guns. At last, under the cover of night, the teams were
harnessed and the two field-pieces successfully removed, while the Boers who
rushed in to seize them were scattered by a volley. The losses in the action
were thirty-six and the gain nothing. Decidedly July 11th was not a lucky
day for the British arms.
It was well known to Botha that every train from the south was bringing
horses for Lord Roberts's army, and that it had become increasingly
difficult for De Wet and his men to hinder their arrival. The last horse
must win, and the Empire had the world on which to draw. Any movement which
the Boers would make must be made at once, for already both the cavalry and
the mounted infantry were rapidly coming back to their full strength once
more. This consideration must have urged Botha to deliver an attack on July
16th, which had some success at first, but was afterwards beaten off with
heavy loss to the enemy. The fighting fell principally upon Pole-Carew and
Hutton, the corps chiefly engaged being the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the
New-Zealanders, the Shropshires, and the Canadian Mounted Infantry. The
enemy tried repeatedly to assault the position, but were beaten back each
time with a loss of nearly a hundred killed and wounded. The British loss
was about sixty, and included two gallant young Canadian officers, Borden
and Birch, the former being the only son of the minister of militia. So
ended the last attempt made by Botha upon the British positions round
Pretoria. The end of the war was not yet, but already its futility was
abundantly evident. This had become more apparent since the junction of
Hamilton and of Buller had cut off the Transvaal army from that of the Free
State. Unable to send their prisoners away, and also unable to feed them,
the Freestaters were compelled to deliver up in Natal the prisoners whom
they had taken at Lindley and Roodeval. These men, a ragged and starving
battalion, emerged at Ladysmith, having made their way through Van Reenen's
Pass. It is a singular fact that no parole appears on these and similar
occasions to have been exacted by the Boers.
Lord Roberts, having remounted a large part of his cavalry, was ready now to
advance eastward and give Botha battle. The first town of any consequence
along the Delagoa Railway is Middelburg, some seventy miles from the
capital. This became the British objective, and the forces of Mahon and
Hamilton on the north, of. Pole-Carew in the centre, and of French and
Hutton to the south, all converged upon There was no serious resistance,
though the weather was abominable, and on July 27th the town was in the
hands of the invaders. From that date until the final advance to the
eastward French held this advanced post, while Pole-Carew guarded the
railway line. Rumours of trouble in the west had convinced Roberts that it
was not yet time to push his advantage to the east, and he recalled Ian
Hamilton's force to act for a time upon the other side of the seat of the
war. This excellent little army, consisting of Mahon's and Pilcher's mounted
infantry, M battery R.H.A., the Elswick battery, two 5-in. and two 4.7 guns,
with the Berkshires, the Border Regiment, the Argyle and Sutherlands, and
the Scottish Borderers, put in as much hard work in marching and in fighting
as any body of troops in the whole campaign.
The renewal of the war in the west had begun some weeks before, but was much
accelerated by the transference of De la Rey and his burghers to that side.
There is no district in the Transvaal which is better worth fighting for,
for it is a fair country side, studded with farmhouses and green with
orange-groves, with many clear streams running through it. The first sign of
activity appears to have been on July 7th, when a commando with guns
appeared upon the hills above Rustenburg. Hanbury Tracy, commandant of
Rustenburg, was suddenly confronted with a summons to surrender. He had only
120 men and one gun, but he showed a bold front. Colonel Houldsworth, at the
first whisper of danger, had started from Zeerust with a small force of
Australian bushmen, and arrived at Rustenburg in time to drive the enemy
away in a very spirited action. On the evening of July 8th Baden-Powell took
over the command, the garrison being reinforced by Plumer's command.
The Boer commando was still in existence, however, and it was reinforced and
reinvigorated by Delarey's success at Uitval's Nek. On July 18th they began
to close in upon Rustenburg again, and a small skirmish took place between
them and the Australians. Methuen's division, which had been doing very
arduous service in the north of the Free State during the last six weeks,
now received orders to proceed into the Transvaal and to pass northwards
through the disturbed districts en route for Rustenburg, which appeared to
be the storm centre. The division was transported by train from Kroonstad to
Krugersdorp, and advanced on the evening of July 18th upon its mission,
through a bare and fire-blackened country. On the 19th Lord Methuen
manoeuvred the Boers out of a strong position, with little loss to either
side. On the 21st he forced his way through Olifant's Nek, in the
Magaliesberg range, and so established communication with Baden-Powell,
whose valiant bushmen, under Colonel Airey, had held their own in a severe
conflict near Magato Pass, in which they lost six killed, nineteen wounded,
and nearly two hundred horses. The fortunate arrival of Captain FitzClarence
with the Protectorate Regiment helped on this occasion to avert a disaster.
The force, only 300 strong, without guns, had walked into an ugly ambuscade,
and only the tenacity and resource of the men enabled them ever to extricate
themselves.
Although Methuen came within reach of Rustenburg, he did not actually join
hands with Baden-Powell. No doubt he saw and heard enough to convince him
that that astute soldier was very well able to take care of himself.
Learning of the existence of a Boer force in his rear, Methuen turned, and
on July 29th he was back at Frederickstad on the Potchefstroom-Krugersdorp
railway. The sudden change in his plans was caused doubtless by the desire
to head off De Wet in case he should cross the Vaal River. Lord Roberts was
still anxious to clear the neighbourhood of Rustenburg entirely of the
enemy; and he therefore, since Methuen was needed to complete the cordon
round De Wet, recalled Hamilton's force from the east and despatched it, as
already described, to the west of Pretoria.
Before going into the details of the great De Wet hunt, in which Methuen's
force was to be engaged, I shall follow Hamilton's division across, and give
some account of their services. On August 1st he set out from Pretoria for
Rustenburg. On that day and on the next he had brisk skirmishes which
brought him successfully through the Magaliesberg range with a loss of forty
wounded, mostly of the Berkshires. On the 5th of August he had made his way
to Rustenburg and drove off the investing force. A smaller siege had been
going on to westward, where at Elands River another Mafeking man, Colonel
Hore, had been held up by the burghers. For some days it was feared, and
even officially announced, that the garrison had surrendered. It was known
that an attempt by Carrington to relieve the place on August 5th had been
beaten back, and that the state of the country appeared so threatening that
he had been compelled, or had imagined himself to be compelled, to retreat
as far as Mafeking, evacuating Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, abandoning the
considerable stores which were collected at those places. In spite of all
these sinister indications the garrison was still holding its own, and on
August 16th it was relieved by Lord Kitchener.
This stand at Brakfontein on the Elands River appears to have been one of
the very finest deeds of arms of the war. The Australians have been so split
up during the campaign, that though their valour and efficiency were
universally recognised, they had no single exploit which they could call
their own. But now they can point to Elands River as proudly as the
Canadians can to Paardeberg. They were 500 in number, Victorians, New South
Welshmen, and Queenslanders, the latter the larger unit, with a corps of
Rhodesians. Under Hore were Major Hopper of the Rhodesians, and Major
Toubridge of the Queenslanders. Two thousand five hundred Boers surrounded
them, and most favourable terms of surrender were offered and scouted. Six
guns were trained upon them, and during 11 days 1,800 shells fell within
their lines. The river was half a mile off, and every drop of water for man
or beast had to come from there. Nearly all their horses and 75 of the men
were killed or wounded. With extraordinary energy and ingenuity the little
band dug shelters which are said to have exceeded in depth and efficiency
any which the Boers have devised. Neither the repulse of Carrington, nor the
jamming of their only gun, nor the death of the gallant Annett, was
sufficient to dishearten them. They were sworn to die before the white flag
should wave above them. And so fortune yielded, as fortune will when brave
men set their teeth, and Broadwood's troopers, filled with wonder and
admiration, rode into the lines of the reduced and emaciated but indomitable
garrison. When the ballad-makers of Australia seek for a subject, let them
turn to Elands River, for there was no finer resistance in the war. They
will not grudge a place in their record to the 130 gallant Rhodesians who
shared with them the honours and the dangers of the exploit.
On August 7th Ian Hamilton abandoned Rustenburg, taking Baden-Powell and his
men with him. It was obviously unwise to scatter the British forces too
widely by attempting to garrison every single town. For the instant the
whole interest of the war centred upon De Wet and his dash into the
Transvaal. One or two minor events, however, which cannot be fitted into any
continuous narrative may be here introduced.
One of these was the action at Faber's Put, by which Sir Charles Warren
crushed the rebellion in Griqualand. In that sparsely inhabited country of
vast distances it was a most difficult task to bring the revolt to a
decisive ending. This Sir Charles Warren, with his special local knowledge
and interest, was able to do, aud the success is doubly welcome as bringing
additional honour to a man who, whatever view one may take of his action at
Spion Kop, has grown grey in the service of the Empire. With a column
consisting mainly of colonials and of yeomanry he had followed the rebels up
to a point within twelve miles of Douglas. Here at the end of May they
turned upon him and delivered a fierce night attack, so sudden and so
strongly pressed that much credit is due both to General and to troops for
having repelled it. The camp was attacked on all sides in the early dawn.
The greater part of the horses were stampeded by the firing, and the enemy's
riflemen were found to be at very close quarters. For an hour the action was
warm, but at the end of that time the Boers fled, leaving a number of dead
behind them. The troops engaged in this very creditable action, which might
have tried the steadiness of veterans, were four hundred of the Duke of
Edinburgh's volunteers, some of Paget's horse and of the 8th Regiment
Imperial Yeomanry, four Canadian guns, and twenty-five of Warren's Scouts.
Their losses were eighteen killed and thirty wounded. Colonel Spence, of the
volunteers, died at the head of his regiment. A few days before, on May
27th, Colonel Adye had won a small engagement at Kheis, some distance to the
westward, and the effect of the two actions was to put an end to open
resistance. On June 20th De Villiers, the Boer leader, finally surrendered
to Sir Charles Warren, handing over two hundred and twenty men with stores,
rifles, and ammunition. The last sparks had for the time been stamped out in
the colony.
There remain to be mentioned those attacks upon trains and upon the railway
which had spread from the Free State to the Transvaal. On July 19th a train
was wrecked on the way from Potchefstroom to Krugersdorp without serious
injury to the passengers. On July 31st, however, the same thing occurred
with more murderous effect, the train running at full speed off the metals.
Thirteen of the Shropshires were killed and thirty-seven injured in this
deplorable affair, which cost us more than many an important engagement. On
August 2nd a train coming up from Bloemfontein was derailed by Sarel Theron
and his gang some miles south of Kroonstad. Thirty-five trucks of stores
were burned, and six of the passengers (unarmed convalescent soldiers) were
killed or wounded. A body of mounted infantry followed up the Boers, who
numbered eighty, and succeeded in killing and wounding several of them.
On July 21st the Boers made a determined attack upon the railhead at a point
thirteen miles east of Heidelberg, where over a hundred Royal Engineers were
engaged upon a bridge. They were protected by three hundred Dublin Fusiliers
under Major English. For some hours the little party was hard pressed by the
burghers, who had two field-pieces and a pom-pom. They could make no
impression, however, upon the steady Irish infantry, and after some hours
the arrival of General Hart with reinforcements scattered the assailants,
who succeeded in getting their guns away in safety.
At the beginning of August it must be confessed that the general situation
in the Transvaal was not reassuring. Springs near Johannesburg had in some
inexplicable way, without fighting, fallen into the hands of the enemy.
Klerksdorp, an important place in the south-west, had also been reoccupied,
and a handful of men who garrisoned it had been made prisoners without
resistance. Rustenburg was about to be abandoned, and the British were known
to be falling back from Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, concentrating upon
Mafeking. The sequel proved however, that there was no cause for uneasiness
in all this. Lord Roberts was concentrating his strength upon those objects
which were vital, and letting the others drift for a time. At present the
two obviously important things were to hunt down De Wet and to scatter the
main Boer army under Botha. The latter enterprise must wait upon the former,
so for a fortnight all operations were in abeyance while the flying columns
of the British endeavoured to run down their extremely active and energetic
antagonist.
At the end of July De Wet had taken refuge in some exceedingly difficult
country near Reitzburg, seven miles south of the Vaal River. The operations
were proceeding vigorously at that time against the main army at Fouriesberg,
and sufficient troops could not be spared to attack him, but he was closely
observed by Kitchener and Broadwood with a force of cavalry and mounted
infantry. With the surrender of Prinsloo a large army was disengaged, and it
was obvious that if De Wet remained where he was he must soon be surrounded.
On the other hand, there was no place of refuge to the south of him. With
great audacity he determined to make a dash for the Transvaal, in the hope
of joining hands with De la Rey's force, or else of making his way across
the north of Pretoria, and so reaching Botha's army. President Steyn went
with him, and a most singular experience it must have been for him to be
harried like a mad dog through the country in which he had once been an
honoured guest. De Wet's force was exceedingly mobile, each man having a led
horse, and the ammunition being carried in light Cape carts.
In the first week of August the British began to thicken round his
lurking-place, and De Wet knew that it was time for him to go. He made a
great show of fortifying a position, but it was only a ruse to deceive those
who watched him. Travelling as lightly as possible, he made a dash on August
7th at the drift which bears his own name, and so won his way across the
Vaal River, Kitchener thundering at his heels with his cavalry and mounted
infantry. Methuen's force was at that time at Potchefstroom, and instant
orders had been sent to him to block the drifts upon the northern side. It
was found as he approached the river that the vanguard of the enemy was
already across and that it was holding the spurs of the hills which would
cover the crossing of their comrades. By the dash of the Royal Welsh
Fusiliers and the exertions of the artillery ridge after ridge was carried,
but before evening De Wet with supreme skill had got his convoy across, and
had broken away, first to the eastward and then to the north. On the 9th
Methuen was in touch with him again, and the two savage little armies,
Methuen worrying at the haunch, and De Wet snapping back over his shoulder,
swept northward over the huge plains. Wherever there was ridge or kopje the
Boer riflemen staved off the eager pursuers. Where the ground lay flat and
clear the British guns thundered onwards and fired into the lines of wagons.
Mile after mile the running fight was sustained, but the other British
columns, Broadwood's men and Kitchener's men, had for some reason not come
up. Methuen alone was numerically inferior to the men he was chasing, but he
held on with admirable energy and spirit. The Boers were hustled off the
kopjes from which they tried to cover their rear. Twenty men of the
Yorkshire Yeomanry carried one hill with the bayonet, though only twelve of
them were left to reach the top.
De Wet trekked onwards during the night of the 9th, shedding wagons and
stores as he went. He was able to replace some .of his exhausted beasts from
the farmhouses which he passed. Methuen on the morning of the 10th struck
away to the west, sending messages back to Broadwood and Kitchener in the
rear that they should bear to the east, and so nurse the Boer column between
them. At the same time he sent on a messenger, who unfortunately never
arrived, to warn Smith-Dorrien at Bank Station to throw himself across De
Wet's path. On the 11th it was realised that De Wet had succeeded, in spite
of great exertions upon the part of Smith-Dorrien's infantry, in crossing
the railway line, and that he had left all his pursuers to the south of him.
But across his front lay the Magaliesberg range. There are only three
passes, the Magato Pass, Olifant's Nek, and Commando Nek. It was understood
that all three were held by British troops. It was obvious, therefore, that
if Methuen could advance in such a way as to cut De Wet off from slipping
through to the west he would be unable to get away. Broadwood and Kitchener
would be behind him, and Pretoria, with the main British army, to the east.
Methuen continued to act with great energy and judgment. At three A.M. on
the 12th be started from Fredericstadt, and by 5 P.M. on Tuesday he had done
eighty miles in sixty hours. The force which accompanied him was all
mounted, 1,200 of the Colonial Division (1st Brabant's, Cape Mounted Rifles,
Kaifrarian Rifles, and Border Horse), and the Yeomanry with ten guns.
Douglas with the infantry was to follow behind, and these brave fellows
covered sixty-six miles in seventy-six hours in their eagerness to be in
time. No men could have made greater efforts than did those of Methuen, for
there was not one who did not appreciate the importance of the issue and
long to come to close quarters with the wily leader who had baffled us so
long.
On the 12th Methuen's van again overtook De Wet's rear, and the old game of
rearguard riflemen on one side, and a pushing artillery on the other, was
once more resumed. All day the Boers streamed over the veldt with the guns
and the horsemen at their heels. A shot from the 78th battery struck one of
De Wet's guns, which was abandoned and captured. Many stores were taken and
much more, with the wagons which contained them, burned by the Boers.
Fighting incessantly, both armies traversed thirty-five miles of ground that
day.
It was fully understood that Olifant's Nek was held by the British, so
Methuen felt that if he could block the Magato Pass all would be well. He
therefore left De Wet's direct track, knowing that other British forces were
behind him, and he continued his swift advance until he had reached the
desired position. It really appeared that at last the elusive raider was in
a corner. But, alas for fallen hopes, and alas for the wasted efforts of
gallant men! Olifant's Nek had been abandoned and De Wet had passed safely
through it into the plains beyond, where De la Rey's force was still in
possession. In vain Methuen's weary column forced the Magato Pass and
descended into Rustenburg. The enemy was in a safe country once more. Whose
the fault, or whether there was a fault at all, it is for the future to
determine. At least unalloyed praise can be given to the Boer leader for the
admirable way in which he had extricated himself from so many dangers. On
the 17th,. moving along the northern side of the mountains, he appeared at
Commando Nek on the Little Crocodile River, where he summoned Baden-Powell
to surrender, and received some chaff in reply from that light-hearted
commander. Then, swinging to the eastward, he endeavoured to cross to the
north of Pretoria. On the 19th he was heard of at Hebron. Baden-Powell and
Paget had, however, already barred this path, and De Wet, having sent Steyn
on with a small escort, turned back to the Free State. On the 22nd it was
reported that, with only a handful of his followers, he had crossed the
Magaliesberg range by a bridlepath and was riding southwards. Lord Roberts
was at last free to turn his undivided attention upon Botha.
Two Boer plots had been discovered during the first half of August, the one
in Pretoria and the other in Johannesburg, each having for its object a
rising against the British in the town. Of these the former, which was the
more serious, involving as it did the kidnapping of Lord Roberts, was broken
up by the arrest of the deviser, Hans Cordua, a German lieutenant in the
Transvaal Artillery. On its merits it is unlikely that the crime would have
been met by the extreme penalty, especially as it was a question whether the
AGENT PROVOCATEUR had not played a part. But the repeated breaches of
parole, by which our prisoners of one day were in the field against us on
the next, called imperatively for an example, and it was probably rather for
his broken faith than for his hare-brained scheme that Cordua died. At the
same time it is impossible not to feel sorrow for this idealist of
twenty-three who died for a cause which was not his own. He was shot in the
garden of Pretoria Gaol upon August 24th. A fresh and more stringent
proclamation from Lord Roberts showed that the British Commander was losing
his patience in the face of the wholesale return of paroled men to the
field, and announced that such perfidy would in future be severely punished.
It was notorious that the same men had been taken and released more than
once. One man killed in action was found to have nine signed passes in his
pocket. It was against such abuses that the extra severity of the British
was aimed.
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