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THE ATTACK
AT HAMELFONTEIN FARM
A British outpost of twenty Yeomanry and nine Grenadier Guards, commanded
by Lieut. Fletcher, was surrounded by Boers on December 17, 1900, and bravely
held for seven
hours before the enemy retired.
From: H. W. Wilson, After Pretoria, 1902 |
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Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XXXI
The Guerilla Warfare in the Transvaal: Nooitgedacht
Leaving De Wet in the
Ficksburg mountains, where he lurked until after the opening of the New
Year, the story of the scattered operations in the Transvaal may now be
carried down to the same point - a story comprising many skirmishes and one
considerable engagement, but so devoid of any central thread that it is
difficult to know how to approach it. From Lichtenburg to Komati, a distance
of four hundred miles, there was sporadic warfare everywhere, attacks upon
scattered posts, usually beaten off but occasionally successful, attacks
upon convoys, attacks upon railway trains, attacks upon anything and
everything which could harass the invaders. Each General in his own district
had his own work of repression to perform, and so we had best trace the
doings of each up to the end of the year 1900.
Lord Methuen after his pursuit of De Wet in August had gone to Mafeking to
refit. From that point, with a force which contained a large proportion of
yeomanry and of Australian bushmen, he conducted a long series of operations
in the difficult and important district which lies between Rustenburg,
Lichtenburg, and Zeerust. Several strong and mobile Boer commandos with guns
moved about in it, and an energetic though not very deadly warfare raged
between Lemmer, Snyman, and De la Rey on the one side, and the troops of
Methuen, Douglas, Broadwood, and Lord Errol upon the other. Methuen moved
about incessantly through the broken country, winning small skirmishes and
suffering the indignity of continual sniping. From time to time he captured
stores, wagons, and small bodies of prisoners. Early in October he and
Douglas had successes. On the 15th Broadwood was engaged. On the 20th there
was a convoy action. On the 25th Methuen had a success and twenty-eight
prisoners. On November 9th he surprised Snyman and took thirty prisoners. On
the 10th he got a pom-pom. Early in this month Douglas separated from
Methuen, and marched south from Zeerust through Ventersdorp to Klerksdorp,
passing over a country which had been hardly touched before, and arriving at
his goal with much cattle and some prisoners. Towards the end of the month a
considerable stock of provisions were conveyed to Zeerust, and a garrison
left to hold that town so as to release Methuen's column for service
elsewhere.
Hart's sphere of action was originaUy round Potchefstroom. On September 9th
he made a fine forced march to surprise this town, which bad been left some
time before with an entirely inadequate garrison to fall into the hands of
the enemy. His infantry covered thirty-six and his cavalry fifty-four miles
in fifteen hours. The operation was a complete success, the town with eighty
Boers falling into his hands with little opposition. On September 30th Hart
returned to Krugersdorp, where, save for one skirmish upon the Gatsrand on
November 22nd, he appears to have had no actual fighting to do during the
remainder of the year.
After the clearing of the eastern border of the Transvaal by the movement of
Pole-Carew along the railway line, and of Buller aided by Ian Hamilton in
the mountainous country to the north of it, there were no operations of
importance in this district. A guard was kept upon the frontier to prevent
the return of refugees and the smuggling of ammunition, while General
Kitchener, the brother of the Sirdar, broke up a few small Boer laagers in
the neighbourhood of Lydenburg. Smith-Dorrien guarded the line at Belfast,
and on two occasions, November 1st and November 6th, he made aggressive
movements against the enemy. The first, which was a surprise executed in
concert with Colonel Spens of the Shropshires, was frustrated by a severe
blizzard, which prevented the troops from pushing home their success. The
second was a two days' expedition, which met with a spirited opposition, and
demands a fuller notice.
This was made from Belfast, and the force, which consisted of about fourteen
hundred men, advanced south to the Komati River. The infantry were Suffolks
and Shropshires, the cavalry Canadians and 5th Lancers, with two Canadian
guns and four of the 84th battery. All day the Boer snipers clung to the
column, as they had done to French's cavalry in the same district. Mere
route marches without a very definite and adequate objective appear to be
rather exasperating than overawing, for so long as the column is moving
onwards the most timid farmer may be tempted into long-range fire from the
flanks or rear. The river was reached and the Boers driven from a position
which they had taken up, but their signal fires brought mounted riflemen
from every farm, and the retreat of the troops was pressed as they returned
to Belfast. There was all the material for a South African Lexington. The
most difficult of military operations, the covering of a detachment from a
numerous and aggressive enemy, was admirably carried out by the Canadian
gunners and dragoons under the command of Colonel Lessard. So severe was the
pressure that sixteen of the latter were for a time in the hands of the
enemy, who attempted something in the nature of a charge upon the steadfast
rearguard. The movement was repulsed, and the total Boer loss would appear
to have been considerable, since two of their leaders, Commandant Henry
Prinsloo and General Joachim Fourie, were killed, while General Johann
Grobler was wounded. If the rank and file suffered in proportion the losses
must have been severe. The British casualties in the two days amounted to
eight killed and thirty wounded, a small total when the arduous nature of
the service is considered. The Canadians and the Shropshires seem to have
borne off the honours of these trying operations.
In the second week of October, General French, with three brigades of
cavalry (Dickson's, Gordon's, and Mahon's), started for a cross-country ride
from Machadodorp. Three brigades may seem an imposing force, but the actual
numbers did not exceed two strong regiments, or about 1,500 sabres in all. A
wing of the Suffolk Regiment went with them. On October 13th Mahon's brigade
met with a sharp resistance, and lost ten killed and twenty-nine wounded. On
the 14th the force entered Carolina. On the 16th they lost six killed and
twenty wounded, and from the day that they started until they reached
Heidelberg on the 27th there was never a day that they could shake
themselves clear of their attendant snipers. The total losses of the force
were about ninety killed and wounded, but they brought in sixty prisoners
and a large quantity of cattle and stores. The march had at least the effect
of making it clear that the passage of a column of troops encumbered with
baggage through a hostile country is an inefficient means for quelling a
popular resistance. Light and mobile parties acting from a central dept were
in future to be employed, with greater hopes of success.
Some appreciable proportion of the British losses during this phase of the
war arose from railway accidents caused by the persistent tampering with the
lines. In the first ten days of October there were four such mishaps, in
which two Sappers, twenty-three of the Guards (Coldstreams), and eighteen of
the 66th battery were killed or wounded. On the last occasion, which
occurred on October 10th near Vlakfontein, the reinforcements who came to
aid the sufferers were themselves waylaid, and lost twenty, mostly of the
Rifle Brigade, killed, wounded, or prisoners. Hardly a day elapsed that the
line was not cut at some point. The bringing of supplies was complicated by
the fact that the Boer women and children were coming more and more into
refugee camps, where they had to be fed by the British, and the strange
spectacle was frequently seen of Boer snipers killing or wounding the
drivers and stokers of the very trains which were bringing up food upon
which Boer families were dependent for their lives. Considering that these
tactics were continued for over a year, and that they resulted in the death
or mutilation of many hundreds of British officers and men, it is really
inexplicable that the British authorities did not employ the means used by
all armies under such circumstances - which is to place hostages upon the
trains. A truckload of Boers behind every engine would have stopped the
practice for ever. Again and again in this war the British have fought with
the gloves when their opponents used their knuckles.
We will pass now to a consideration of the doings of General Paget, who was
operating to the north and north-east of Pretoria with a force which
consisted of two regiments of infantry, about a thousand horsemen, and
twelve guns. His mounted men were under the command of Plumer. In the early
part of November this force had been withdrawn from Warm Baths and had fllen
back upon Pienaar's River, where it had continual skirmishes with the enemy.
Towards the end of November, news having reached Pretoria that the enemy
under Erasmus and Viljoen were present in force at a place called Rhenoster
Kop, which is about twenty miles north of the Delagoa Railway line and fifty
miles north-east of the capital, it was arranged that Paget should attack
them from the south, while Lyttelton from Middelburg should endeavour to get
behind them. The force with which Paget started upon this enterprise was not
a very formidable one. He had for mounted troops some Queensland, South
Australian, New Zealand, and Tasmanian Bushmen, together with the York,
Montgomery, and Warwick Yeomanry. His infantry were the 1st West Riding
regiment and four companies of the Munsters. His guns were the 7th and 38th
batteries, with two naval quick-firing twelve-pounders and some smaller
pieces. The total could not have exceeded some two thousand men. Here, as at
other times, it is noticeable that in spite of the two hundred thousand
soldiers whom the British kept in the field, the lines of communication
absorbed so many that at the actual point of contact they were seldom
superior and often inferior in numbers to the enemy. The opening of the
Natal and Delagoa lines though valuable in many ways, had been an additional
drain. Where every culvert needs its picket and every bridge its company,
the guardianship of many hundreds of miles of rail is no light matter.
In the early morning of November 29th Paget's men came in contact with the
enemy, who were in some force upon an admirable position. A ridge for their
centre, a flanking kopje for their cross fire, and a grass glacis for the
approach-it was an ideal Boer battlefield. The colonials and the yeomanry
under Plumer on the left, and Hickman on the right, pushed in upon them,
until it was evident that they meant to hold their ground. Their advance
being checked by a very severe fire, the horsemen dismounted and took such
cover as they could. Paget's original idea had been a turning movement, but
the Boers were the more numerous body, and it was impossible for the smaller
British force to find their flanks, for they extended over at least seven
miles. The infantry were moved up into the centre, therefore, between the
wings of dismounted horsemen, and the guns were brought up to cover the
advance. The country was ill-suited, however, to the use of artillery, and
it was only possible to use an indirect fire from under a curve of the grass
land. The guns made good practice, however, one section of the 38th battery
being in action all day within 800 yards of the Boer line, and putting
themselves out of action after 300 rounds by the destruction of their own
rifling. Once over the curve every yard of the veldt was commanded by the
hidden riflemen. The infantry advanced, but could make no headway against
the deadly fire which met them. By short rushes the attack managed to get
within 300 yards of the enemy, and there it stuck. On the right the Munsters
carried a detached kopje which was in front of them, but could do little to
aid the main attack. Nothing could have exceeded the tenacity of the
Yorkshiremen and the New-Zealanders, who were immediately to their left.
Though unable to advance they refused to retire, and indeed they were in a
position from which a retirement would have been a serious operation.
Colonel Lloyd of the West Ridings was hit in three places and killed. Five
out of six officers of the New Zealand corps were struck down. There were no
reserves to give a fresh impetus to the attack, and the thin scattered line,
behind bullet-spotted stones or anthills, could but hold its own while the
sun sank slowly upon a day which will not be forgotten by those who endured
it. The Boers were reinforced in the afternoon, and the pressure became so
severe that the field guns were retired with much difficulty. Many of the
infantry had shot away all their cartridges and were helpless. Just one year
before British soldiers had lain under similar circumstances on the plain
which leads to Modder River, and now on a smaller scale the very same drama
was being enacted. Gradually the violet haze of evening deepened into
darkness, and the incessant rattle of the rifle fire died away on either
side. Again, as at Modder River, the British infantry still lay in their
position, determined to take no backward step, and again the Boers stole
away in the night, leaving the ridge which they had defended so well. A
hundred killed and wounded was the price paid by the British for that line
of rock studded hills - a heavier proportion of losses than had befallen
Lord Methuen in the corresponding action. Of the Boer losses there was as
usual no means of judging, but several grave.mounds, newly dug, showed that
they also had something to deplore. Their retreat, however, was not due to
exhaustion, but to the demonstration which Lyttelton had been able to make
in their rear. The gunners and the infantry had all done well in a most
trying action, but by common consent it was with the men from New Zealand
that the honours lay. It was no empty compliment when Sir Alfred Milner
telegraphed to the Premier of New Zealand his congratulations upon the
distinguished behaviour of his fellow countrymen.
>From this time onwards there was nothing of importance in this part of the
seat of war.
It is necessary now to turn from the north-east to the north-west of
Pretoria, where the presence of De la Rey and the cover afforded by the
Magaliesberg mountains had kept alive the Boer resistance. Very rugged lines
of hill, alternating with fertile valleys, afforded a succession of forts
and of granaries to the army which held them. To General Clements' column
had been committed the task of clearing this difficult piece of country. His
force fluctuated in numbers, but does not appear at any time to have
consisted of more than three thousand men, which comprised the Border
Regiment, the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the second Northumberland Fusiliers,
mounted infantry, yeomanry, the 8th R.F.A., P battery R.H.A., and one heavy
gun. With this small army he moved about the district, breaking up Boer
bands, capturing supplies, and bringing in refugees. On November 13th he was
at Krugersdorp, the southern extremity of his beat. On the 24th he was
moving north again, and found himself as he approached the hills in the
presence of a force of Boers with cannon. This was the redoubtable De la Rey,
who sometimes operated in Methuen's country to the north of the Magaliesberg,
and sometimes to the south. He had now apparently fixed upon Clements as his
definite opponent. De la Rey was numerically inferior, and Clements had no
difficulty in this first encounter in forcing him back with some loss. On
November 26th Clements was back at Krugersdorp again with cattle and
prisoners. In the early days of December he was moving northwards once more,
where a serious disaster awaited him. Before narrating the circumstances
connected with the Battle of Nooitgedacht there is one incident which
occurred in this same region which should be recounted.
This consists of the determined attack made by a party of De la Rey's men,
upon December 3rd, on a convoy which was proceeding from Pretoria to
Rustenburg, and had got as far as Buffel's Hoek. The convoy was a very large
one, consisting of 150 wagons, which covered about three miles upon the
march. It was guarded by two companies of the West Yorkshires, two guns of
the 75th battery, and a handful of the Victoria Mounted Rifles. The escort
appears entirely inadequate when it is remembered that these stores, which
were of great value, were being taken through a country which was known to
be infested by the enemy. What might have been foreseen occurred. Five
hundred Boers suddenly rode down upon the helpless line of wagons and took
possession of them. The escort rallied, however, upon a kopje, and, though
attacked all day, succeeded in holding their own until help arrived. They
prevented the Boers from destroying or carrying off as much of the convoy as
was under their guns, but the rest was looted and burned. The incident was a
most unfortunate one, as it supplied the enemy with a large quantity of
stores, of which they were badly in need. It was the more irritating as it
was freely rumoured that a Boer attack was pending; and there is evidence
that a remonstrance was addressed from the convoy before it left Rietfontein
to the General of the district, pointing out the danger to which it was
exposed. The result was the loss of 120 wagons and of more than half the
escort. The severity of the little action and the hardihood of the defence
are indicated by the fact that the small body who held the kopje lost
fifteen killed and twenty-two wounded, the gunners losing nine out of
fifteen. A relieving force appeared at the close of the action, but no
vigorous pursuit was attempted, although the weather was wet and the Boers
had actually carried away sixty loaded wagons, which could only go very
slowly. It must be confessed that from its feckless start to its spiritless
finish the story of the Buffel's Hoek convoy is not a pleasant one to tell.
Clements, having made his way once more to the Magaliesberg range, had
pitched his camp at a place called Nooitgedacht - not to be confused with
the post upon the Delagoa Railway at which the British prisoners had been
confined. Here, in the very shadow of the mountain, he halted for five days,
during which, with the usual insouciance of British commanders, he does not
seem to have troubled himself with any entrenching. He knew, no doubt, that
he was too strong for his opponent De la Rey, but what he did not know, but
might have feared, was that a second Boer force might appear suddenly upon
the scene and join with De la Rey in order to crush him. This second Boer
force was that of Commandant Beyers from Warm Baths. By a sudden and skilful
movement the two united, and fell like a thunderbolt upon the British
column, which was weakened by the absence of the Border Regiment. The result
was such a reverse as the British bad not sustained since Sanna's Post - a
reverse which showed that, though no regular Boer army might exist, still a
sudden coalition of scattered bands could at any time produce a force which
would be dangerous to any British column which might be taken at a
disadvantage. We had thought that the days of battles in this war were over,
but an action which showed a missing and casualty roll of 550 proved that in
this, as in so many other things, we were mistaken.
As already stated, the camp of Clements lay under a precipitous cliff, upon
the summit of which he had placed four companies of the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers. This strong post was a thousand feet higher than the camp. Below
lay the main body of the force, two more companies of fusiliers, four of
Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 2nd Mounted Infantry, Kitchener's Horse,
yeomanry, and the artillery. The latter consisted of one heavy naval gun,
four guns of the 8th R.F.A., and P battery R.H.A. The whole force amounted
to about fifteen hundred men.
It was just at the first break of dawn - the hour of fate in South African
warfare - that the battle began. The mounted infantry post between the camp
and the mountains were aware of moving figures in front of them. In the dim
light they could discern that they were clothed in grey, and that they wore
the broad-brimmed hats and feathers of some of our own irregular corps. They
challenged, and the answer was a shattering volley, instantly returned by
the survivors of the picket. So hot was the Boer attack that before help
could come every man save one of the picket was on the ground. The sole
survivor, Daley of the Dublins, took no backward step, but continued to
steadily load and fire until help came from the awakened camp. There
followed a savage conflict at point blank-range. The mounted infantry men,
rushing half clad to the support of their comrades, were confronted by an
ever-thickening swarm of Boer riflemen, who had already, by working round on
the flank, established their favourite cross fire. Legge, the leader of the
mounted infantry, a hard little Egyptian veteran, was shot through the head,
and his men lay thick around him. For some minutes it was as hot a corner as
any in the war. But Clements himself had appeared upon the scene, and his
cool gallantry turned the tide of fight. An extension of the line checked
the cross fire, and gave the British in turn a flanking position. Gradually
the Boer riflemen were pushed back, until at last they broke and fled for
their horses in the rear. A small body were cut off, many of whom were
killed and wounded, while a few were taken prisoners.
This stiff fight of an hour had ended in a complete repulse of the attack,
though at a considerable cost. Both Boers and British had lost heavily.
Nearly all the staff were killed or wounded, though General Clements had
come through untouched. Fifty or sixty of both sides had fallen. But it was
noted as an ominous fact that in spite of shell fire the Boers still
lingered upon the western flank. Were they coming on again? They showed no
signs of it. And yet they waited in groups, and looked up towards the
beetling crags above them. What were they waiting for? The sudden crash of a
murderous Mauser fire upon the summit, with the rolling volleys of the
British infantry, supplied the answer.
Only now must it have been clear to Clements that he was not dealing merely
with some spasmodic attack from his old enemy De la Rey, but that this was a
largely conceived movement, in which a force at least double the strength of
his own had suddenly been concentrated upon him. His camp was still menaced
by the men whom he had repulsed, and he could not weaken it by sending
reinforcements up the hill. But the roar of the musketry was rising louder
and louder. It was becoming clearer that there was the main attack. It was a
Majuba-Hill action up yonder, a thick swarm of skirmishers closing in from
many sides upon a central band of soldiers. But the fusiliers were
hopelessly outnumbered, and this rock fighting is that above all others in
which the Boer has an advantage over the regular. A helio on the hill cried
for help. The losses were heavy, it said, and the assailants numerous. The
Boers closed swiftly in upon the flanks, and the fusiliers were no match for
their assailants. Till the very climax the helio still cried that they were
being overpowered, and it is said that even while working it the soldier in
charge was hurled over the cliff by the onrush of the victorious Boers.
The fight of the mounted infantry men had been at half-past four. At six the
attack upon the hill had developed, and Clements in response to those
frantic flashes of light had sent up a hundred men of the yeomanry, from the
Fife and Devon squadrons, as a reinforcement. To climb a precipitous
thousand feet with rifle, bandolier, and spurs, is no easy feat, yet that
roar of battle above them heartened them upon their way. But in spite of all
their efforts they were only in time to share the general disaster. The head
of the line of hard-breathing yeomen reached the plateau just as the Boers,
sweeping over the remnants of the Northumberland Fusiliers, reached the
brink of the cliff. One by one the yeomen darted over the edge, and
endeavoured to find some cover in the face of an infernal point-blank fire.
Captain Mudie of the staff, who went first, was shot down. So was Purvis of
the Fifes, who followed him. The others, springing over their bodies, rushed
for a small trench, and tried to restore the fight. Lieutenant Campbell, a
gallant young fellow, was shot dead as he rallied his men. Of twenty-seven
of the Fifeshires upon the hill six were killed and eleven wounded. The
statistics of the Devons are equally heroic. Those yeomen who had not yet
reached the crest were in a perfectly impossible position, as the Boers were
firing from complete cover right down upon them. There was no alternative
for them but surrender. By seven o'clock every British soldier upon the
hill, yeoman or fusilier, had been killed, wounded, or taken. It is not true
that the supply of csrtridges ran out, and the fusiliers, with the ill-luck
which has pursued the 2nd battalion, were outnumbered and outfought by
better skirmishers than themselves.
Seldom has a General found himself in a more trying position than Clements,
or extricated himself more honourably. Not only had he lost nearly half his
force, but his camp was no longer tenable, and his whole army was commanded
by the fringe of deadly rifles upon the cliff. From the berg to the camp was
from 800 to 1,000 yards, and a sleet of bullets whistled down upon it. How
severe was the fire may be gauged from the fact that the little pet monkey
belonging to the yeomanry - a small enough object - was hit three times,
though he lived to survive as a battle-scarred veteran. Those wounded in the
early action found themselves in a terrible position, laid out in the open
under a withering fire, 'like helpless Aunt Sallies,' as one of them
described it. 'We must get a red flag up, or we shall be blown off the face
of the earth,' says the same correspondent, a corporal of the Ceylon Mounted
Infantry. 'We had a pillow-case, but no red paint. Then we saw what would do
instead, so they made the upright with my blood, and the horizontal with
Paul's.' It is pleasant to add that this grim flag was respected by the
Boers. Bullocks and mules fell in heaps, and it was evident that the
question was not whether the battle could be restored, but whether the guns
could be saved. Leaving a fringe of yeomen, mounted infantry, and
Kitchener's Horse to stave off the Boers, who were already descending by the
same steep kloof up which the yeomen had climbed, the General bent all his
efforts to getting the big naval gun out of danger. Only six oxen were left
out of a team of forty, and so desperate did the situation appear that twice
dynamite was placed beneath the gun to destroy it. Each time, however, the
General intervened, and at last, under a stimulating rain of pom-pom shells,
the great cannon lurched slowly forward, quickening its pace as the men
pulled on the drag-ropes, and the six oxen broke into a wheezy canter. Its
retreat was covered by the smaller guns which rained shrapnel upon the crest
of the hill, and upon the Boers who were descending to the camp. Once the
big gun was out of danger, the others limbered up and followed, their rear
still covered by the staunch mounted infantry, with whom rest all the
honours of the battle. Cookson and Brooks with 250 men stood for hours
between Clements and absolute disaster. The camp was abandoned as it stood,
and all the stores, four hundred picketed horses, and, most serious of all,
two wagons of ammunition, fell into the hands of the victors. To have saved
all his guns, however, after the destruction of half his force by an active
enemy far superior to him in numbers and in mobility, was a feat which goes
far to condone the disaster, and to increase rather than to impair the
confidence which his troops feel in General Clements. Having retreated for a
couple of miles he turned his big gun round upon the hill, which is called
Yeomanry Hill, and opened fire upon the camp, which was being looted by
swarms of Boers. So bold a face did he present that he was able to remain
with his crippled force upon Yeomanry Hill from about nine until four in the
afternoon, and no attack was pressed home, though he lay under both shell
and rifle fire all day. At four in the afternoon he began his retreat, which
did not cease till he had reached Rietfontein, twenty miles off, at six
o'clock upon the following morning. His weary men had been working for
twenty-six hours, and actually fighting for fourteen, but the bitterness of
defeat was alleviated by the feeling that every man, from the General
downwards, had done all that was possible, and that there was every prospect
of their having a chance before long of getting their own back.
The British losses at the battle of Nooitgedacht amounted to 60 killed, 180
wounded, and 315 prisoners, all of whom were delivered up a few days later
at Rustenburg. Of the Boer losses it is, as usual, impossible to speak with
confidence, but all the evidence points to their actual casualties being as
heavy as those of the British. There was the long struggle at the camp in
which they were heavily punished, the fight on the mountain, where they
exposed themselves with unusual recklessness, and the final shelling from
shrapnel and from lyddite. All accounts agree that their attack was more
open than usual. 'They were mowed down in twenties that day, but it had no
effect. They stood like fanatics,' says one who fought against them. From
first to last their conduct was most gallant, and great credit is due to
their leaders for the skilful sudden concentration by which they threw their
whole strength upon the exposed force. Some eighty miles separate Warm Baths
from Nooitgedacht, and it seems strange that our Intelligence Department
should have remained in ignorance of so large a movement.
General Broadwood's 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been stationed to the north of
Magaliesberg, some twelve miles westward of Clements, and formed the next
link in the long chain of British forces. Broadwood does not appear,
however, to have appreciated the importance of the engagement, and made no
energetic movement to take part in it. If Colvile is open to the charge of
having been slow to 'march upon the cannon' at Sanna's Post, it might be
urged that Broadwood in turn showed some want of energy and judgment upon
this occasion. On the morning of the 13th his force could hear the heavy
firing to the eastward, and could even see the shells bursting on the top of
the Magaliesberg. It was but ten or twelve miles distant, and, as his
Elswick guns have a range of nearly five, a very small advance would have
enabled him to make a demonstration against the flank of the Boers, and so
to relieve the pressure upon Clements. It is true that his force was not
large, but it was exceptionally mobile. Whatever the reasons, no effective
advance was made by Broadwood. On hearing the result he fell back upon
Rustenburg, the nearest British post, his small force being dangerously
isolated.
Those who expected that General Clements would get his own back had not long
to wait. In a few days he was in the field again. The remains of his former
force had, however, been sent into Pretoria to refit, and nothing remained
of it save the 8th R.F.A. and the indomitable cow-gun still pocked with the
bullets of Nooitgedacht. He had also F battery R.H.A., the Inniskillings,
the Border regiment, and a force of mounted infantry under Alderson. More
important than all, however, was the co-operation of General French, who
came out from Pretoria to assist in the operations. On the 19th, only six
days after his defeat, Clements found himself on the very same spot fighting
some at least of the very same men. This time, however, there was no element
of surprise, and the British were able to approach the task with
deliberation and method. The result was that both upon the 19th and 20th the
Boers were shelled out of successive positions with considerable loss, and
driven altogether away from that part of the Magaliesberg. Shortly
afterwards General Clements was recalled to Pretoria, to take over the
command of the 7th Division, General Tucker having been appointed to the
military command of Bloemfontein in the place of the gallant Hunter, who, to
the regret of the whole army, was invalided home. General Cunningham
henceforward commanded the column which Clements had led back to the
Magaliesberg.
Upon November 13th the first of a series of attacks was made upon the posts
along the Delagoa Railway line. These were the work of Viljoen's commando,
who, moving swiftly from the north, threw themselves upon the small
garrisons of Balmoral and of Wilge River, stations which are about six miles
apart. At the former was a detachment of the Buffs, and at the latter of the
Royal Fusiliers. The attack was well delivered, but in each instance was
beaten back with heavy loss to the assailants. A picket of the Buffs was
captured at the first rush, and the detachment lost six killed and nine
wounded. No impression was made upon the position, however, and the double
attack seems to have cost the Boers a large number of casualties.
Another incident calling for some mention was the determined attack made by
the Boers upon the town of Vryheid, in the extreme south-east of the
Transvaal near the Natal border. Throughout November this district had been
much disturbed, and the small British garrison had evacuated the town and
taken up a position on the adjacent hills. Upon December 11th the Boers
attempted to carry the trenches. The garrison of the town appears to have
consisted of the 2nd Royal Lancaster regiment, some five hundred strong, a
party of the Lancashire Fusiliers, 150 strong, and fifty men of the Royal
Garrison Artillery, with a small body of mounted infantry. They held a hill
about half a mile north of the town, and commanding it. The attack, which
was a surprise in the middle of the night, broke upon the pickets of the
British, who held their own in a way which may have been injudicious but was
certainly heroic. Instead of falling back when seriously attacked, the young
officers in charge of these outposts refused to move, and were speedily
under such a fire that it was impossible to reinforce them. There were four
outposts, under Woodgate, Theobald, Lippert, and Mangles. The attack at 2.15
on a cold dark morning began at the post held by Woodgate, the Boers coming
hand-to-hand before they were detected. Woodgate, who was unarmed at the
instant, seized a hammer, and rushed at the nearest Boer, but was struck by
two bullets and killed. His post was dispersed or taken. Theobald and
Lippert, warned by the firing, held on behind their sangars, and were ready
for the storm which burst over them. Lippert was unhappily killed, and his
ten men all hit or taken, but young Theobald held his own under a heavy fire
for twelve hours. Mangles also, the gallant son of a gallant father, held
his post all day with the utmost tenacity. The troops in the trenches behind
were never seriously pressed, thanks to the desperate resistance of the
outposts, but Colonel Gawne of the Lancasters was unfortunately killed.
Towards evening the Boers abandoned the attack, leaving fourteen of their
number dead upon the ground, from which it may be guessed that their total
casualties were not less than a hundred. The British losses were three
officers and five men killed, twenty-two men wounded, and thirty men with
one officer missing - the latter being the survivors of those outposts which
were overwhelmed by the Boer advance.
A few incidents stand out among the daily bulletins of snipings, skirmishes,
and endless marchings which make the dull chronicle of these, the last
months of the year 1900. These must be enumerated without any attempt at
connecting them. The first is the longdrawn-out siege or investment of
Schweizer-Renecke. This small village stands upon the Harts River, on the
western border of the Transvaal. It is not easy to understand why the one
party should desire to hold, or the other to attack, a position so
insignificant. >From August 19th onwards it was defended by a garrison of
250 men, under the very capable command of Colonel Chamier, who handled a
small business in a way which marks him as a leader. The Boer force, which
varied in numbers from five hundred to a thousand, never ventured to push
home an attack, for Chamier, fresh from the experience of Kimberley, had
taken such precautions that his defences were formidable, if not
impregnable. Late in September a relieving force under Colonel Settle threw
fresh supplies into the town, but when he passed on upon his endless march
the enemy closed in once more, and the siege was renewed. It lasted for
several months, until a column withdrew the garrison and abandoned the
position.
Of all the British detachments, the two which worked hardest and marched
furthest during this period of the war was the 21st Brigade (Derbysbires,
Sussex, and Camerons) under General Bruce Hamilton, and the column under
Settle, which operated down the western border of the Orange River Colony,
and worked round and round with such pertinacity that it was familiarly
known as Settle's Imperial Circus. Much hard and disagreeable work, far more
repugnant to the soldier than the actual dangers of war, fell to the lot of
Bruce Hamilton and his men. With Kroonstad as their centre they were
continually working through the dangerous Lindley and Heilbron districts,
returning to the railway line only to start again immediately upon a fresh
quest. It was work for mounted police, not for infantry soldiers, but what
they were given to do they did to the best of their ability. Settle's men
had a similar thankless task. From the neighbourhood of Kimberley he marched
in November with his small column down the border of the Orange River
Colony, capturing supplies and bringing in refugees. He fought one brisk
action with Hertzog's commando at Kloof, and then, making his way across the
colony, struck the railway line again at Edenburg on December 7th, with a
train of prisoners and cattle.
Rundle also had put in much hard work in his efforts to control the
difficult district in the north-east of the Colony which had been committed
to his care. He traversed in November from north to south the same country
which he had already so painfully traversed from south to north. With
occasional small actions he moved about from Vrede to Reitz, and so to
Bethlehem and Harrismith. On him, as on all other commanders, the vicious
system of placing small garrisons in the various towns imposed a constant
responsibility lest they should be starved or overwhelmed.
The year and the century ended by a small reverse to the British arms in the
Transvaal. This consisted in the capture of a post at Helvetia defended by a
detachment of the Liverpool Regiment and by a 4.7 gun. Lydenburg, being
seventy miles off the railway line, had a chain of posts connecting it with
the junction at Machadodorp. These posts were seven in number, ten miles
apart, each defended by 250 men. Of these Helvetia was the second. The key
of the position was a strongly fortified hill about three-quarters of a mile
from the headquarter camp, and commanding it. This post was held by Captain
Kirke with forty garrison artillery to work the big gun, and seventy
Liverpool infantry. In spite of the barbed-wire entanglements, the Boers
most gallantly rushed this position, and their advance was so rapid, or the
garrison so slow, that the place was carried with hardly a shot fired. Major
Cotton, who commanded the main lines, found himself deprived in an instant
of nearly half his force and fiercely attacked by a victorious and exultant
enemy. His position was much too extended for the small force at his
disposal, and the line of trenches was pierced and enfiladed at many points.
It must be acknowledged that the defences were badly devised - little barbed
wire, frail walls, large loopholes, and the outposts so near the trenches
that the assailants could reach them as quickly as the supports. With the
dawn Cotton's position was serious, if not desperate. He was not only
surrounded, but was commanded from Gun Hill. Perhaps it would have been
wiser if, after being wounded, he had handed over the command to Jones, his
junior officer. A stricken man's judgement can never be so sound as that of
the hale. However that may be, he came to the conclusion that the position
w~s untenable, and that it was best to prevent further loss of life. Fifty
of the Liverpools were killed and wounded, 200 taken. No ammunition of the
gun was captured, but the Boers were able to get safely away with this
humiliating evidence of their victory. One post, under Captain Wilkinson
with forty men, held out with success, and harassed the enemy in their
retreat. As at Dewetsdorp and at Nooitgedacht. the Boers were unable to
retain their prisoners, so that the substantial fruits of their enterprise
were small, but it forms none the less one more of those incidents which may
cause us to respect our enemy and to be critical towards ourselves.[Footnote:
Considering that Major Stapelton Cotton was himself wounded in three places
during the action (one of these wounds being in the head), he has had hard
measure in being deprived of his commission by a court-martial which sat
eight months after the event. It is to be earnestly hoped that there may be
sowe revision of this severe sentence.]
In the last few months of the year some of those corps which had served
their time or which were needed elsewhere were allowed to leave the seat of
war. By the middle of November the three different corps of the City
Imperial Volunteers, the two Canadian contingents, Lumsden's Horse, the
Composite Regiment of Guards, six hundred Australians, A battery R.H.A., and
the volunteer companies of the regular regiments, were all homeward bound.
This loss of several thousand veteran troops before the war was over was to
be deplored, and though unavoidable in the case of volunteer contingents, it
is difficult to explain where regular troops are concerned. Early in the new
year the Government was compelled to send out strong reinforcements to take
their place.
Early in December Lord Roberts also left the country, to take over the
duties of Commander-in-Chief. High as his reputation stood when, in January,
he landed at Cape Town, it is safe to say that it had been immensely
enhanced when, ten months later, he saw from the quarter-deck of the
'Canada' the Table Mountain growing dimmer in the distance. He found a
series of disconnected operations, in which we were uniformly worsted. He
speedily converted them into a series of connected operations in which we
were almost uniformly successful. Proceeding to the front at the beginiung
of February, within a fortnight he had relieved Kimberley, within a month he
had destroyed Cronje's force, and within six weeks he was in Bloemfontein.
Then, after a six weeks' halt which could not possibly have been shortened,
he made another of his tiger leaps, and within a month had occupied
Johannesburg and Pretoria. From that moment the issue of the campaign was
finally settled, and though a third leap was needed, which carried him to
Komatipoort, and though brave and obstinate men might still struggle against
their destiny, he had done what was essential, and the rest, however
difficult, was only the detail of the campaign. A kindly gentleman, as well
as a great soldier, his nature revolted from all harshness, and a worse man
might. have been a better leader in the last hopeless phases of the war. He
remembered, no doubt, how Grant had given Lee's army their horses, but Lee
at the time had been thoroughly beaten, and his men had laid down their
arms. A similar boon to the partially conquered Boers led to very different
results, and the prolongation of the war is largely due to this act of
clemency. At the same time political and military considerations were
opposed to each other upon the point, and his moral position in the use of
harsher measures is the stronger since a policy of conciliation had been
tried and failed. Lord Roberts returned to London with the respect and love
of his soldiers and of his fellow-countrymen. A passage from his farewell
address to his troops may show the qualities which endeared him to them
'The service which the South African Force has performed is, I venture to
think, unique in the annals of war, inasmuch as it has been absolutely
almost incessant for a whole year, in some cases for more than a year. There
has been no rest, no days off to recruit, no going into winter quarters, as
in other campaigns which have extended over a long period. For months
together, in fierce heat, in biting cold, in pouring rain, you, my comrades,
have marched and fought without halt, and bivouacked without shelter from
the elements. You frequently have had to continue marching with your clothes
in rags and your boots without soles, time being of such consequence that it
was impossible for you to remain long enough in one place to refit. When not
engaged in actual battle you have been continually shot at from behind
kopjes by invisible enemies to whom every inch of the country was familiar,
and who, from the peculiar nature of the country, were able to inflict
severe punishment while perfectly safe themselves. You have forced your way
through dense jungles, over precipitous mountains, through and over which
with infinite manual labour you have had to drag heavy guns and ox-wagons.
You have covered with almost incredible speed enormous distances, and that
often on very short supplies of food. You have endured the sufferings
inevitable in war to sick and wounded men far from the base, without a
murmur and even with cheerfulness.'
The words reflect honour both upon the troops addressed and upon the man who
addressed them. From the middle of December 1900 Lord Kitchener took over
the control of the campaign.
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