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"THIRD
MAN" AN UNCOVETED DISTINCTION
When a party of Mounted Infantry or Yeomanry goes into battle one man of
each four holds the horses of his companions—two with his right hand and
two with his left hand, which explains why "No. 3" is the unfortunate man—
and remains mounted himself, an excellent target for the enemy, while the
rest of his sub-section seek cover. Among the Boers the horses are trained
to stand still as soon as the reins are dropped over their heads;
consequently all their men can fight instead of three out of four as for us.
From: H. W. Wilson, After Pretoria, 1902 |
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Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XXXIII
The Northern Operations from January to April, 1901
Three consecutive chapters
have now given some account of the campaign of De Wet, of the operations in
the Transvaal up to the end of the year 1900, and of the invasion of Cape
Colony up to April 1901. The present chapter will deal with the events in
the Transvaal from the beginning of the new century. The military operations
in that country, though extending over a very large area, may be roughly
divided into two categories: the attacks by the Boers upon British posts,
and the aggressive sweeping movements of British columns. Under the first
heading come the attacks on Belfast, on Zuurfontein, on Kaalfontein, on
Zeerust, on Modderfontein, and on Lichtenburg, besides many minor affairs.
The latter comprises the operations of Babington and of Cunningham to the
west and south-west of Pretoria, those of Methuen still further to the
south-west, and the large movement of French in the south-east. In no
direction did the British forces in the field meet with much active
resistance. So long as they moved the gnats did not settle; it was only when
quiet that they buzzed about and occasionally stung.
The early days of January 1901 were not fortunate for the British arms, as
the check in which Kitchener's Bodyguard was so roughly handled, near
Lindley, was closely followed by a brisk action at Naauwpoort or Zandfontein,
near the Magaliesberg, in which De la Rey left his mark upon the Imperial
Light Horse. The Boer commandos, having been driven into the mountains by
French and Clements in the latter part of December, were still on the
look-out to strike a blow at any British force which might expose itself.
Several mounted columns had been formed to scour the country, one under
Kekewich, one under Gordon, and one under Babington. The two latter, meeting
in a mist upon the morning of January 5th, actually turned their rifles upon
each other, but fortunately without any casualties resulting. A more deadly
rencontre was, however, awaiting them.
A force of Boers were observed, as the mist cleared, making for a ridge
which would command the road along which the convoy and guns were moving.
Two squadrons (B and C) of the Light Horse were instantly detached to seize
the point. They do not appear to have realised that they were in the
immediate presence of the enemy, and they imagined that the ground over
which they were passing had been already reconnoitred by a troop of the 14th
Hussars. It is true that four scouts were thrown forward, but as both
squadrons were cantering there was no time for these to get ahead. Presently
C squadron, which was behind, was ordered to close up upon the left of B
squadron, and the 150 horsemen in one long line swept over a low grassy
ridge. Some hundreds of De la Rey's men were lying in the long grass upon
the further side, and their first volley, fired at a fifty-yard range,
emptied a score of saddles. It would have been wiser, if less gallant, to
retire at once in the presence of a numerous and invisible enemy, but the
survivors were ordered to dismount and return the fire. This was done, but
the hail of bullets was terrific and the casualties were numerous. Captain
Norman, of C squadron, then retired his men, who withdrew in good order. B
squadron having lost Yockney, its brave leader, heard no order, so they held
their ground until few of them had escaped the driving sleet of lead. Many
of the men were struck three and four times. There was no surrender, and the
extermination of B company added another laurel, even at a moment of defeat,
to the regiment whose reputation was so grimly upheld. The Boer victors
walked in among the litter of stricken men and horses. 'Practically all of
them were dressed in khaki and had the water-bottles and haversacks of our
soldiers. One of them snatched a bayonet from a dead man, and was about to
despatch one of our wounded when he was stopped in the nick of time by a man
in a black suit, who, I afterwards heard, was De la Rey himself... The
feature of the action was the incomparable heroism of our dear old Colonel
Wools-Sampson.' So wrote a survivor of B company, himself shot through the
body. It was four hours before a fresh British advance reoccupied the ridge,
and by that time the Boers had disappeared. Some seventy killed and wounded,
many of them terribly mutilated, were found on the scene of the disaster. It
is certainly a singular coincidence that at distant points of the seat of
war two of the crack irregular corps should have suffered so severely within
three days of each other. In each case, however, their prestige was enhanced
rather than lowered by the result. These incidents tend, however, to shake
the belief that scouting is better performed in the Colonial than in the
regular forces.
Of the Boer attacks upon British posts to which allusion has been made, that
upon Belfast, in the early morning of January 7th, appears to have been very
gallantly and even desperately pushed. On the same date a number of smaller
attacks, which may have been meant simply as diversions, were made upon
Wonderfontein, Nooitgedacht, Wildfontein, Pan, Dalmanutha, and Machadodorp.
These seven separate attacks, occurring simultaneously over sixty miles,
show that the Boer forces were still organised and under one effective
control. The general object of the operations was undoubtedly to cut Lord
Roberts's communications upon that side and to destroy a considerable
section of the railway.
The town of Belfast was strongly held by Smith-Dorrien, with 1,750 men, of
which 1,300 were infantry belonging to the Royal Irish, the Shropshires, and
the Gordons. The perimeter of defence, however, was fifteen miles, and each
little fort too far from its neighbour for mutual support, though connected
with headquarters by telephone. It is probable that the leaders and burghers
engaged in this very gallant attack were in part the same as those concerned
in the successful attempt at Helvetia upon December 29th, for the assault
was delivered in the same way, at the same hour, and apparently with the
same primary object. This was to gain possession of the big 5-inch gun,
which is as helpless by night as it is formidable by day. At Helvetia they
attained their object and even succeeded not merely in destroying, but in
removing their gigantic trophy. At Belfast they would have performed the
same feat had it not been for the foresight of General Smith-Dorrien, who
had the heavy gun trundled back into the town every night.
The attack broke first upon Monument Hill, a post held by Captain Fosbery
with eighty-three Royal Irish. Chance or treason guided the Boers to the
weak point of the wire entanglement and they surged into the fort, where the
garrison fought desperately to hold its own. There was thick mist and
driving rain; and the rush of vague and shadowy figures amid the gloom was
the first warning of the onslaught. The Irishmen were overborne by a swarm
of assailants, but they nobly upheld their traditional reputation. Fosbery
met his death like a gallant gentleman, but not more heroically than Barry,
the humble private, who, surrounded by Boers, thought neither of himself nor
of them, but smashed at the maxim gun with a pickaxe until he fell riddled
with bullets. Half the garrison were on the ground before the post was
carried.
A second post upon the other side of the town was defended by Lieutenant
Marshall with twenty men, mostly Shropshires. For an hour they held out
until Marshall and nine out of his twelve Shropshires had been hit. Then
this post also was carried.
The Gordon Highlanders held two posts to the southeast and to the south-west
of the town, and these also were vigorously attacked. Here, however, the
advance spent itself without result. In vain the Ermelo and Carolina
commandos stormed up to the Gordon pickets. They were blown back by the
steady fire of the infantry. One small post manned by twelve Highlanders was
taken, but the rest defied all attack. Seeing therefore that his attempt at
a COUP-DE-MAIN was a failure, Viljoen withdrew his men before daybreak. The
Boer casualties have not been ascertained, but twenty-four of their dead
were actually picked up within the British lines. The British lost sixty
killed and wounded, while about as many were taken prisoners. Altogether the
action was a brisk and a gallant one, of which neither side has cause to be
ashamed. The simultaneous attacks upon six other stations were none of them
pressed home, and were demonstrations rather than assaults.
The attempts upon Kaalfontein and on Zuurfontein were both made in the early
morning of January 12th. These two places are small stations upon the line
between Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is clear that the Boers were very
certain of their own superior mobility before they ventured to intrude into
the very heart of the British position, and the result showed that they were
right in supposing that even if their attempt were repulsed, they would
still be able to make good their escape. Better horsed, better riders, with
better intelligence and a better knowledge of the country, their ventures
were always attended by a limited liability.
The attacks seem to have been delivered by a strong commando, said to have
been under the command of Beyers, upon its way to join the Boer
concentration in the Eastern Transvaal. They had not the satisfaction,
however, of carrying the garrison of a British post with them, for at each
point they were met by a stout resistance and beaten off. Kaalfontein was
garrisoned by 120 men of Cheshire under Williams-Freeman, Zuurfontein by as
many Norfolks and a small body of Lincolns under Cordeaux and Atkinson. For
six hours the pressure was considerable, the assailants of Kaalfontein
keeping up a brisk shell and rifle fire, while those of Zuurfontein were
without artillery. At the end of that time two armoured trains came up with
reinforcements and the enemy continued his trek to the eastward. Knox 's 2nd
cavalry brigade followed them up, but without any very marked result.
Zeerust and Lichtenburg had each been garrisoned and provisioned by Lord
Methuen before he carried his column away to the south-west, where much
rough and useful work awaited him. The two towns were at once invested by
the enemy, who made an attack upon each of them. That upon Zeerust, on
January 7th, was a small matter and easily repulsed. A more formidable one
was made on Lichtenburg, on March 3rd. The attack was delivered by De la Rey,
Smuts, and Celliers, with 1,500 men, who galloped up to the pickets in the
early morning. The defenders were 600 in number, consisting of Paget's Horse
and three companies of the 1st battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers, a
veteran regiment with a long record of foreign service, not to be confused
with that 2nd battalion which was so severely handled upon several
occasions. It was well that it was so, for less sturdy material might have
been overborne by the vigour of the attack. As it was, the garrison were
driven to their last trench, but held out under a very heavy fire all day,
and next morning the Boers abandoned the attack. Their losses appear to have
been over fifty in number, and included Commandant Celliers, who was badly
wounded and afterwards taken prisoner at Warm Baths. The brave garrison lost
fourteen killed, including two officers of the Northumberlands, and twenty
wounded.
In each of these instances the attacks by the Boers upon British posts had
ended in a repulse to themselves. They were more fortunate, however, in
their attempt upon Modderfontein on the Gatsrand at the end of January. The
post was held by 200 of the South Wales Borderers, reinforced by the 59th
Imperial Yeomanry, who had come in as escort to a convoy from Krugersdorp.
The attack, which lasted all day, was carried out by a commando of 2,000
Boers under Smuts, who rushed the position upon the following morning. As
usual, the Boers, who were unable to retain their prisoners, had little to
show for their success. The British casualties, however, were between thirty
and forty, mostly wounded.
On January 22nd General Cunninghame left Oliphant's Nek with a small force
consisting of the Border and Worcester Regiments, the 6th Mounted Infantry,
Kitchener's Horse, 7th Imperial Yeomanry, 8th R.F.A., and P battery R.H.A.
It had instructions to move south upon the enemy known to be gathering
there. By midday this force was warmly engaged, and found itself surrounded
by considerable bodies of De la Rey's burghers. That night they camped at
Middelfontein, and were strongly attacked in the early morning. So menacing
was the Boer attitude, and so formidable the position, that the force was in
some danger. Fortunately they were in heliographic communication with
Oliphant's Nek, and learned upon the 23rd that Babington had been ordered to
their relief. All day Cunninghame's men were under a long-range fire, but on
the 24th Babington appeared, and the British force was successfully
extricated, having seventy-five casualties. This action of Middelfontein is
interesting as having been begun in Queen Victoria's reign, and ended in
that of Edward VII.
Cunninghame's force moved on to Krugersdorp, and there, having heard of the
fall of the Modderfontein post as already described, a part of his command
moved out to the Gatsrand in pursuit of Smuts. It was found, however, that
the Boers had taken up a strong defensive position, and the British were not
numerous enough to push the attack. On February 3rd Cunninghame endeavoured
to outflank the enemy with his small cavalry force while pushing his
infantry up in front, but in neither attempt did he succeed, the cavalry
failing to find the flank, while the infantry were met with a fire which
made further advance impossible. One company of the Border Regiment found
itself in such a position that the greater part of it was killed, wounded,
or taken. This check constituted the action of Modderfontein. On the 4th,
however, Cunningham, assisted by some of the South African Constabulary,
made his way round the flank, and dislodged the enemy, who retreated to the
south. A few days later some of Smuts's men made an attempt upon the railway
near Bank, but were driven off with twenty-six casualties. It was after this
that Smuts moved west and joined De la Rey's commando to make the attack
already described upon Lichtenburg. These six attempts represent the chief
aggressive movements which the Boers made against British posts in the
Transvaal during these months. Attacks upon trains were still common, and
every variety of sniping appears to have been rife, from the legitimate
ambuscade to something little removed from murder.
It has been described in a previous chapter how Lord Kitchener made an offer
to the burghers which amounted to an amnesty, and how a number of those
Boers who had come under the influence of the British formed themselves into
peace committees, and endeavoured to convey to the fighting commandos some
information as to the hopelessness of the struggle, and the lenient mood of
the British. Unfortunately these well-meant offers appear to have been
mistaken for signs of weakness by the Boer leaders, and encouraged them to
harden their hearts. Of the delegates who conveyed the terms to their fellow
countrymen two at least were shot, several were condemned to death, and few
returned without ill-usage. In no case did they bear back a favourable
answer. The only result of the proclamation was to burden the British
resources by an enormous crowd of women and children who were kept and fed
in refugee camps, while their fathers and husbands continued in most cases
to fight.
This allusion to the peace movement among the burghers may serve as an
introduction to the attempt made by Lord Kitchener, at the end of February
1901, to bring the war to a close by negotiation. Throughout its course the
fortitude of Great Britain and of the Empire had never for an instant
weakened, but her conscience had always been sensitive at the sight of the
ruin which had befallen so large a portion of South Africa, and any
settlement would have been eagerly hailed which would insure that the work
done had not been wasted, and would not need to be done again. A peace on
any other terms would simply shift upon the shoulders of our descendants
those burdens which we were not manly enough to bear ourselves. There had
arisen, as has been said, a considerable peace movement among the burghers
of the refugee camps and also among the prisoners of war. It was hoped that
some reflection of this might be found among the leaders of the people. To
find out if this were so Lord Kitchener, at the end of February, sent a
verbal message to Louis Botha, and on the 27th of that month the Boer
general rode with an escort of Hussars into Middelburg. 'Sunburned, with a
pleasant, fattish face of a German type, and wearing an imperial,' says one
who rode beside him. Judging from the sounds of mirth heard by those
without, the two leaders seem to have soon got upon amiable terms, and there
was hope that a definite settlement might spring from their interview. From
the beginning Lord Kitchener explained that the continued independence of
the two republics was an impossibility. But on every other point the British
Government was prepared to go great lengths in order to satisfy and
conciliate the burghers.
On March 7th Lord Kitchener wrote to Botha from Pretoria, recapitulating the
points which he had advanced. The terms offered were certainly as far as,
and indeed rather further than, the general sentiment of the Empire would
have gone. If the Boers laid down their arms there was to be a complete
amnesty, which was apparently to extend to rebels also so long as they did
not return to Cape Colony or Natal. Self-government was promised after a
necessary interval, during which the two States should be administered as
Crown colonies. Law courts should be independent of the Executive from the
beginning, and both languages be official. A million pounds of compensation
would be paid to the burghers - a most remarkable example of a war indemnity
being paid by the victors. Loans were promised to the farmers to restart
them in business, and a pledge was made that farms should not be taxed. The
Kaffirs were not to have the franchise, but were to have the protection of
law. Such were the generous terms offered by the British Government. Public
opinion at home, strong]y supported by that of the colonies, and especially
of the army, felt that the extreme step had been taken in the direction of
conciliation, and that to do more would seem not to offer peace, but to
implore it. Unfortunately, however, the one thing which the British could
not offer was the one thing which the Boers would insist upon having, and
the leniency of the proposals in all other directions may have suggested
weakness to their minds. On March 15th an answer was returned by General
Botha to the effect that nothing short of total independence would satisfy
them, and the negotiations were accordingiy broken off.
There was a disposition, however, upon the Boer side to renew them, and upon
May 10th General Botha applied to Lord Kitchener for permission to cable to
President Kruger, and to take his advice as to the making of peace. The
stern old man at The Hague was still, however, in an unbending mood. His
reply was to the effect that there were great hopes of a successful issue of
the war, and that he had taken steps to make proper provision for the Boer
prisoners and for the refugee women. These steps, and very efficient ones
too, were to leave them entirely to the generosity of that Government which
he was so fond of reviling.
On the same day upon which Botha applied for leave to use the British cable,
a letter was written by Reitz, State Secretary of the Transvaal, to Steyn,
in which the desperate condition of the Boers was clearly set forth. This
document explained that the burghers were continually surrendering, that the
ammunition was nearly exhausted, the food running low, and the nation in
danger of extinction. 'The time has come to take the final step,' said the
Secretary of State. Steyn wrote back a reply in which, like his brother
president, he showed a dour resolution to continue the struggle, prompted by
a fatalist conviction that some outside interference would reverse the
result of his appeal to arms. His attitude and that of Kruger determined the
Boer leaders to hold out for a few more months, a resolution which may have
been injudicious, but was certainly heroic. 'It's a fight to a finish this
time,' said the two combatants in the' Punch' cartoon which marked the
beginning of the war. It was indeed so, as far as the Boers were concerned.
As the victors we can afford to acknowledge that no nation in history has
ever made a more desperate and prolonged resistance against a vastly
superior antagonist. A Briton may well pray that his own people may be as
staunch when their hour of adversity comes round.
The British position at this stage of the war was strengthened by a greater
centralisation. Garrisons of outlying towns were withdrawn so that fewer
convoys became necessary. The population was removed also and placed near
the railway lines, where they could be more easily fed. In this way the
scene of action was cleared and the Boer and British forces left face to
face. Convinced of the failure of the peace policy, and morally strengthened
by having tried it, Lord Kitchener set himself to finish the war by a series
of vigorous operations which should sweep the country from end to end. For
this purpose mounted troops were essential, and an appeal from him for
reinforcements was most nobly answered. Five thousand horsemen were
despatched from the colonies, and twenty thousand cavalry, mounted infantry,
and Yeomanry were sent from home. Ten thousand mounted men had already been
raised in Great Britain, South Africa, and Canada for the Constabulary force
which was being organised by Baden-Powell. Altogether the reinforcements of
horsemen amounted to more than thirty-five thousand men, all of whom had
arrived in South Africa before the end of April. With the remains of his old
regiments Lord Kitchener had under him at this final period of the war
between fifty and sixty thousand cavalry-such a force as no British General
in his happiest dream had ever thought of commanding, and no British war
minister in his darkest nightmare had ever imagined himself called upon to
supply.
Long before his reinforcements had come to hand, while his Yeomanry was
still gathering in long queues upon the London pavement to wait their turn
at the recruiting office, Lord Kitchener had dealt the enemy several shrewd
blows which materially weakened their resources in men and material. The
chief of these was the great drive down the Eastern Transvaal undertaken by
seven columns under the command of French. Before considering this, however,
a few words must be devoted to the doings of Methuen in the south-west.
This hard-working General, having garrisoned Zeerust and Lichtenburg, had
left his old district and journeyed with a force which consisted largely of
Bushmen and Yeomanry to the disturbed parts of Bechuanaland which had been
invaded by De Villiers. Here he cleared the country as far as Vryburg, which
he had reached in the middle of January, working round to Kuruman and thence
to Taungs. From Taungs his force crossed the Transvaal border and made for
Klerksdorp, working through an area which had never been traversed and which
contained the difficult Masakani hills. He left Taungs upon February 2nd,
fighting skirmishes at Uitval's Kop, Paardefontein and Lilliefontein, in
each of which the enemy was brushed aside. Passing through Wolmaranstad,
Methuen turned to the north, where at Haartebeestefontein, on February 19th,
he fought a brisk engagement with a considerable force of Boers under De
Villiers and Liebenberg. On the day before the fight he successfully
outwitted the Boers, for, learning that they had left their laager in order
to take up a position for battle, he pounced upon the laager and captured
10,000 head of cattle, forty-three wagons, and forty prisoners. Stimulated
by this success, he attacked the Boers next day, and after five hours of
hard fighting forced the pass which they were holding against him. As
Methuen had but 1,500 men, and was attacking a force which was as large as
his own in a formidable position, the success was a very creditable one. The
Yeomanry all did well, especially the 5th and 10th battalions. So also did
the Australians and tho Loyal North Lancashires. The British casualties
amounted to sixteen killed and thirty-four wounded, while the Boers left
eighteen of their dead upon the position which they had abandoned. Lord
Methuen's little force ret urnedto Klerksdorp, having deserved right well of
their country. From Klerksdorp Methuen struck back westwards to the south of
his former route, and on March 14th he was reported at Warrenton. Here also
in April came Erroll's small column, bringing with it the garrison and
inhabitants of Hoopstad, a post which it had been determined, in accordance
with Lord Kitchener's policy of centralisation, to abandon.
In the month of January, 1901, there had been a considerable concentration
of the Transvaal Boers into that large triangle which is bounded by the
Delagoa railway line upon the north, the Natal railway line upon the south,
and the Swazi and Zulu frontiers upon the east. The buschveldt is at this
season of the year unhealthy both for man and beast, so that for the sake of
their herds, their families, and themselves the burghers were constrained to
descend into the open veldt. There seemed the less objection to their doing
so since this tract of country, though traversed once both by Buller and by
French, has still remained a stronghold of the Boers and a storehouse of
supplies. Within its borders are to be found Carolina, Ermelo, Vryheid, and
other storm centres. Its possession offers peculiar strategical advantages,
as a force lying there can always attack either railway, and might even
make, as was indeed intended, a descent into Natal. For these mingled
reasons of health and of strategy a considerable number of burghers united
in this district under the command of the Bothas and of Smuts.
Their concentration had not escaped the notice of the British military
authorities, who welcomed any movement which might bring to a focus that
resistance which had been so nebulous and elusive. Lord Kitchener having
once seen the enemy fairly gathered into this huge cover, undertook the
difficult task of driving it from end to end. For this enterprise General
French was given the chief command, and had under his orders no fewer than
seven columns, which started from different points of the Delagoa and of the
Natal railway lines, keeping in touch with each other and all trending south
and east. A glance at the map would show, however, that it was a very large
field for seven guns, and that it would need all their alertness to prevent
the driven game from breaking back. Three columns started from the Delagoa
line, namely, Smith-Dorrien's from Wonderfontein (the most easterly),
Campbell's from Middelburg, and Alderson's from Eerstefabrieken, close to
Pretoria. Four columns came from the western railway line: General Knox's
from Kaalfontein, Major Allenby's from Zuurfontein (both stations between
Pretoria and Johannesburg), General Dartnell's from Springs, close to
Johannesburg, and finally General Colville (not to be confused with Colvile)
from Greylingstad in the south. The whole movement resembled a huge drag
net, of which Wonderfontein and Greylingstad formed the ends, exactly one
hundred miles apart. On January 27th the net began to be drawn. Some
thousands of Boers with a considerable number of guns were known to be
within the enclosure, and it was hoped that even if their own extreme
mobility enabled them to escape it would be impossible for them to save
their transport and their cannon.
Each of the British columns was about 2,000 strong, making a total of 14,000
men with about fifty guns engaged in the operations. A front of not less
than ten miles was to be maintained by each force. The first decided move
was on the part of the extreme left wing, Smith-Dorrien's column, which
moved south on Carolina, and thence on Bothwell near Lake Chrissie. The
arduous duty of passing supplies down from the line fell mainly upon him,
and his force was in consequence larger than the others, consisting of 8,500
men with thirteen guns. On the arrival of Smith-Dorrien at Carolina the
other columns started, their centre of advance being Ermelo. Over seventy
miles of veldt the gleam of the helio by day and the flash of the signal
lamps at night marked the steady flow of the British tide. Here and there
the columns came in touch with the enemy and swept him before them. French
had a skirmish at Wilge River at the end of January, and Campbell another
south of Middelburg, in which he had twenty casualties. On February 4th
Smith-Dorrien was at Lake Chrissie; French had passed through Bethel and the
enemy was retiring on Amsterdam. The hundred-mile ends of the drag net were
already contracted to a third of that distance, and the game was still known
to be within it. On the 5th Ermelo was occupied, and the fresh deep ruts
upon the veldt told the British horsemen of the huge Boer convoy that was
ahead of them. For days enormous herds, endless flocks, and lines of wagons
which stretched from horizon to horizon had been trekking eastward. Cavalry
and mounted infantry were all hot upon the scent.
Botha, however, was a leader of spirit, not to be hustled with impunity.
Having several thousand burghers with him, it was evident that if he threw
himself suddenly upon any part of the British line he might hope for a time
to make an equal fight, and possibly to overwhelm it. Were Smith-Dorrien out
of the way there would be a clear road of escape for his whole convoy to the
north, while a defeat of any of the other columns would not help him much.
It was on Smith-Dorrien, therefore, that he threw himself with great
impetuosity. That General's force was, however, formidable, consisting of
the Suffolks, West Yorks and Camerons, 5th Lancers, 2nd Imperial Light
Horse, and 3rd Mounted Infantry, with eight field guns and three heavy
pieces. Such a force could hardly be defeated in the open, but no one can
foresee the effect of a night surprise well pushed home, and such was the
attack delivered by Botha at 3 A.M. upon February 6th, when his opponent was
encamped at Bothwell Farm.
The night was favourable to the attempt, as it was dark and misty.
Fortunately, however, the British commander had fortified himself and was
ready for an assault. The Boer forlorn hope came on with a gallant dash,
driving a troop of loose horses in upon the outposts, and charging forward
into the camp. The West Yorkshires, however, who bore the brunt of the
attack, were veterans of the Tugela, who were no more to be flurried at
three in the morning than at three in the afternoon. The attack was blown
backwards, and twenty dead Boers, with their brave leader Spruyt, were left
within the British lines. The main body of the Boers contented themselves
with a heavy fusillade out of the darkness, which was answered and crushed
by the return fire of the infantry. In the morning no trace, save their
dead, was to be seen of the enemy, but twenty killed and fifty wounded in
Smith-Dorrien's column showed how heavy had been the fire which had swept
through the sleeping camp. The Carolina attack, which was to have
co-operated with that of the Heidelbergers, was never delivered, through
difficulties of the ground, and considerable recriminations ensued among the
Boers in consequence.
Beyond a series of skirmishes and rearguard actions this attack of Botha's
was the one effort made to stay the course of French's columns. It did not
succeed, however, in arresting them for an hour. From that day began a
record of captures of men, herds, guns, and wagons, as the fugitives were
rounded up from the north, the west, and the south. The operation was a very
thorough one, for the towns and districts occupied were denuded of their
inhabitants, who were sent into the refugee camps while the country was laid
waste to prevent its furnishing the commandos with supplies in the future.
Still moving south-east, General French's columns made their way to Piet
Betief upon the Swazi frontier, pushing a disorganised array which he
computed at 5,000 in front of them. A party of the enemy, including the
Carolina commando, had broken back in the middle of February and Louis Botha
had got away at the same time, but so successful were his main operations
that French was able to report his total results at the end of the month as
being 292 Boers killed or wounded, 500 surrendered, 3 guns and one maxim
taken, with 600 rifles, 4,000 horses, 4,500 trek oxen, 1,300 wagons and
carts, 24,000 cattle, and 165,000 sheep. The whole vast expanse of the
eastern veldt was dotted with the broken and charred wagons of the enemy.
Tremendous rains were falling and the country was one huge quagmire, which
crippled although it did not entirely prevent the further operations. All
the columns continued to report captures. On March 3rd Dartnell got a maxim
and 50 prisoners, while French reported 50 more, and Smith-Dorrien 80. On
March 6th French captured two more guns, and on the 14th he reported 46 more
Boer casualties and 146 surrenders, with 500 more wagons, and another great
haul of sheep and oxen. By the end of March French had moved as far south as
Vryheid, his troops having endured the greatest hardships from the continual
heavy rains, and the difficulty of bringing up any supplies. On the 27th he
reported seventeen more Boer casualties and 140 surrenders, while on the
last day of the month he took another gun and two pom-poms. The enemy at
that date were still retiring eastward, with Alderson and Dartnell pressing
upon their rear. On April 4th French announced the capture of the last piece
of artillery which the enemy possessed in that region. The rest of the Boer
forces doubled back at night between the columns and escaped over the
Zululand border, where 200 of them surrendered. The total trophies of
French's drive down the Eastern Transvaal amounted to eleven hundred of the
enemy killed, wounded, or taken, the largest number in any operation since
the surrender of Prinsloo. There is no doubt that the movement would have
been even more successful had the weather been less boisterous, but this
considerable loss of men, together with the capture of all the guns in that
region, and of such enormous quantities of wagons, munitions, and stock,
inflicted a blow upon the Boers from which they never wholly recovered. On
April 20th French was back in Johannesburg once more.
While French had run to earth the last Boer gun in the south.eastern corner
of the Transvaal, De la Rey, upon the western side, had still managed to
preserve a considerable artillery with which he flitted about the passes of
the Magaliesberg or took refuge in the safe districts to the south-west of
it. This part of the country had been several times traversed, but had never
been subdued by British columns. The Boers, like their own veldt grass, need
but a few sparks to be left behind to ensure a conflagration breaking out
again. It was into this inflammable country that Babington moved in March
with Klerksdorp for his base. On March 21st he had reached
Haartebeestefontein, the scene not long before of a successful action by
Methuen. Here he was joined by Shekleton's Mounted Infantry, and his whole
force consisted of these, with the 1st Imperial Light Horse, the 6th
Imperial Bushmen, the New-Zealanders, a squadron of the 14th Hussars, a wing
each of the Somerset Light Infantry and of the Welsh Fusiliers, with
Carter's guns and four pom-poms. With this mobile and formidable little
force Babington pushed on in search of Smuts and De la Rey, who were known
to be in the immediate neighbourhood.
As a matter of fact the Boers were not only there, but were nearer and in
greater force than had been anticipated. On the 22nd three squadrons of the
Imperial Light Horse under Major Briggs rode into 1,500 of them, and it was
only by virtue of their steadiness and gallantry that they succeeded in
withdrawing themselves and their pom-pom without a disaster. With Boers in
their front and Boers on either flank they fought an admirable rearguard
action. So hot was the fire that A squadron alone had twenty-two casualties.
They faced it out, however, until their gun had reached a place of safety,
when they made an orderly retirement towards Babington's camp, having
inflicted as heavy a loss as they had sustained. With Elandslaagte, Waggon
Hill, the relief of Mafeking, Naauwpoort, and Haartebeestefontein upon their
standards, the Imperial Light Horse, should they take a permanent place in
the Army List, will start with a record of which many older regiments might
be proud.
If the Light Horse had a few bad hours on March 22nd at the hands of the
Boers, they and their colonial comrades were soon able to return the same
with interest. On March 23rd Babington moved forward through Kafir Kraal,
the enemy falling back before him. Next morning the British again advanced,
and as the New-Zealanders and Bushmen, who formed the vanguard under Colonel
Gray, emerged from a pass they saw upon the plain in front of them the Boer
force with all its guns moving towards them. Whether this was done of set
purpose or whether the Boers imagined that the British had turned and were
intending to pursue them cannot now be determined, but whatever the cause it
is certain that for almost the first time in the campaign a considerable
force of each side found themselves in the open and face to face.
It was a glorious moment. Setting spurs to their horses, officers and men
with a yell dashed forward at the enemy. One of the Boer guns unlimbered and
attempted to open fire, but was overwhelmed by the wave of horsemen. The
Boer riders broke and fled, leaving their artillery to escape as best it
might. The guns dashed over the veldt in a mad gallop, but wilder still was
the rush of the fiery cavalry behind them. For once the brave and
cool-headed Dutchmen were fairly panic-stricken. Hardly a shot was fired at
the pursuers, and the riflemen seem to have been only too happy to save
their own skins. Two field guns, one pom-pom, six maxims, fifty-six wagons
and 140 prisoners were the fruits of that one magnificent charge, while
fifty-four stricken Boers were picked up after the action. The pursuit was
reluctantly abandoned when the spent horses could go no farther.
While the vanguard had thus scattered the main body of the enemy a
detachment of riflemen had ridden round to attack the British rear and
convoy. A few volleys from the escort drove them off, however, with some
loss. Altogether, what with the loss of nine guns and of at least 200 men,
the rout of Haartebeestefontein was a severe blow to the Boer cause. A week
or two later Sir H. Rawlinson's column, acting with Babington, rushed
Smuts's laager at daylight and effected a further capture of two guns and
thirty prisoners. Taken in conjunction with French's successes in the east
and Plumer's in the north, these successive blows might have seemed fatal to
the Boer cause, but the weary struggle was still destined to go on until it
seemed that it must be annihilation rather than incorporation which would at
last bring a tragic peace to those unhappy lands.
All over the country small British columns had been operating during these
months - operations which were destined to increase in scope and energy as
the cold weather drew in. The weekly tale of prisoners and captures, though
small for any one column, gave the aggregate result of a considerable
victory. In these scattered and obscure actions there was much good work
which can have no reward save the knowledge of duty done. Among many
successful raids and skirmishes may be mentioned two by Colonel Park from
Lydenburg, which resulted between them in the capture of nearly 100 of the
enemy, including Abel Erasmus of sinister reputation. Nor would any summary
of these events be complete without a reference to the very gallant defence
of Mahlabatini in Zululand, which was successfully held by a handful of
police and civilians against an irruption of the Boers. With the advent of
winter and of reinforcements the British operations became very energetic in
every part of the country, and some account of them will now be added.
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