|
|
Cowan's Scouts, The Scottish
Horse, and the 5th Imperial
Yeomanry Repelling the Boer Assault.
From: H. W. Wilson, After Pretoria, 1902 |
|
Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XXXVIII
De La Rey's Campaign of 1902
IT will be remembered
that at the close of 1901 Lord Methuen and Colonel Kekewich had both come
across to the eastern side of their district and made their base at the
railway line in the Klerksdorp section. Their position was strengthened by
the fact that a blockhouse cordon now ran from Klerksdorp to Ventersdorp,
and from Ventersdorp to Potchefstroom, so that this triangle could be
effectively controlled. There remained, however, a huge tract of difficult
country which was practically in the occupation of the enemy. Several
thousand stalwarts were known to be riding with De la Rey and his energetic
lieutenant Kemp. The strenuous operations of the British in the Eastern
Transvaal and in the Orange River Colony had caused this district to be
comparatively neglected, and so everything was in favour of an aggressive
movement of the Boers. There was a long lull after the unsuccessful attack
upon Kekewich's camp at Moedwill, but close observers of the war distrusted
this ominous calm and expected a storm to follow.
The new year found the British connecting Ventersdorp with Tafelkop by a
blockhouse line. The latter place had been a centre of Boer activity.
Colonel Hickie's column covered this operation. Meanwhile Methuen had struck
across through Wolmaranstad as far as Vryburg. In these operations, which
resulted in constant small captures, he was assisted by a column under Major
Paris working from Kimberley. From Vryburg Lord Methuen made his way in the
middle of January to Lichtenburg, meeting with a small rebuff in the
neighbourhood of that town, for a detachment of Yeomanry was overwhelmed by
General Celliers, who killed eight, wounded fifteen, and captured forty.
From Lichtenburg Lord Methuen continued his enormous trek, and arrived on
February 1st at Klerksdorp once more. Little rest was given to his
hard-worked troops, and they were sent off again within the week under the
command of Von Donop, with the result that on February 8th, near
Wolmaranstad, they captured Potgieter's laager with forty Boer prisoners.
Von Donop remained at Wolmaranstad until late in February; On the 23rd he
despatched an empty convoy back to Klerksdorp, the fate of which will be
afterwards narrated.
Kekewich and Hickie had combined their forces at the beginning of February.
On February 4th an attempt was made by them to surprise General De la Rey.
The mounted troops who were despatched under Major Leader failed in this
enterprise, but they found and overwhelmed the laager of Sarel Alberts,
capturing 132 prisoners. By stampeding the horses the Boer retreat was cut
off, and the attack was so furiously driven home, especially by the admirable
Scottish Horse, that few of the enemy got away. Alberts himself with all his
officers were among the prisoners. From this time until the end of February
this column was not seriously engaged.
It has been stated above that on February 23rd Von Donop sent in an empty
convoy from Wolmaranstad to Klerksdorp, a distance of about fifty miles.
Nothing bad been heard for some time of De la Rey, but he had called
together his men and was waiting to bring off some coup. The convoy gave him
the very opportunity for which he sought.
The escort of the convoy consisted of the 5th Imperial Yeomanry, sixty of
Paget's Horse, three companies of the ubiquitous Northumberland Fusiliers,
two guns of the 4th R.F.A., and a pom-pom, amounting in all to 630 men.
Colonel Anderson was in command. On the morning of Tuesday, February 25th,
the convoy was within ten miles of its destination, and the sentries on the
kopjes round the town could see the gleam of the long line of white-tilted
wagons. Their hazardous voyage was nearly over, and yet they were destined
to most complete and fatal wreck within sight of port. So confident were
they that the detachment of Paget's Horse was permitted to ride on the night
before into the town. It was as well, for such a handful would have shared
and could not have averted the disaster.
The night had been dark and wet, and the Boers under cover of it had crept
between the sleeping convoy and the town. Some bushes which afford excellent
cover lie within a few hundred yards of the road, and here the main ambush
was laid. In the first grey of the morning the long line of the convoy, 130
wagons in all, came trailing past-guns and Yeomanry in front, Fusiliers upon
the flanks and rear. Suddenly the black bank of scrub was outlined in flame,
and a furious rifle fire was opened upon the head of the column. The troops
behaved admirably under most difficult circumstances. A counter-attack by
the Fusiliers and some of the Yeomanry, under cover of shrapnel from the
guns, drove the enemy out of the scrub and silenced his fire at this point.
It was evident, however, that he was present in force, for firing soon broke
out along the whole left flank, and the rearguard found itself as warmly
attacked as the van. Again, however, the assailants were driven off. It was
now broad daylight, and the wagons, which had got into great confusion in
the first turmoil of battle, had been remarshalled and arranged. It was
Colonel Anderson's hope that he might be able to send them on into safety
while he with the escort covered their retreat. His plan was certainly the
best one, and if it did not succeed it was due to nothing which he could
avert, but to the nature of the ground and the gallantry of the enemy.
The physical obstacle consisted in a very deep and difficult spruit, the
Jagd Spruit, which forms an ugly passage in times of peace, but which when
crowded and choked with stampeding mules and splintering wagons, under their
terrified conductors, soon became impassable. Here the head of the column
was clubbed and the whole line came to a stand. Meanwhile the enemy,
adopting their new tactics, came galloping in on the left flank I and on the
rear. The first attack was repelled by the steady fire of the Fusiliers, but
on the second occasion the horsemen got up to the wagons, and galloping down
them were able to overwhelm in detail the little knots of soldiers who were
scattered along the flank. The British, who were outnumbered by at least
three to one, made a stout resistance, and it was not until seven o'clock
that the last shot was fired. The result was a complete success to the
burghers, but one which leaves no shadow of discredit on any officer or man
among those who were engaged. Eleven officers and 176 men fell out of about
550 actually engaged. The Boers, so the teams were shot and the wagons
burned before they withdrew. The prisoners too, they were unable to retain,
and their sole permanent trophies consisted of the two guns, the rifles, and
the ammunition. Their own losses amounted to about fifty killed and wounded.
A small force sallied out from Klerksdorp in the hope of helping Anderson,
but on reaching the Jagd Drift it was found that the fighting was over and
that the field was in possession of the Boers. De la Rey was seen in person
among the burghers, and it is pleasant to add that he made himself
conspicuous by his humanity to the wounded. His force drew off in the course
of the morning, and was soon out of reach of immediate pursuit, though this
was attempted by Kekewich, Von Donop, and Grenfell. It was important to
regain the guns if possible, as they were always a menace to the blockhouse
system, and for this purpose Grenfell with sixteen hundred horsemen was
despatched to a point south of Lichtenburg, which was conjectured to be upon
the Boer line of retreat. At the same time Lord Methuen was ordered up from
Vryburg in order to cooperate in this movement, and to join his forces to
those of Grenfell. It was obvious that with an energetic and resolute
adversary like De la Rey there was great danger of these two forces being
taken in detail, but it was hoped that each was strong enough to hold its
own until the other could come to its aid. The result was to show that the
danger was real and the hope fallacious.
It was on March 2nd that Methuen left Vryburg. The column was not his old
one, consisting of veterans of the trek, but was the Kimberley column under
Major Paris, a body of men who bad seen much less service and were in every
way less reliable. It included a curious mixture of units, the most solid of
which were four guns (two of the 4th, and two of the 38th R.F.A.), 200
Northumberland Fusiliers, and 100 Loyal North Lancashires. The mounted men
included 5th Imperial Yeomanry (184), Cape Police (233), Cullinan's Horse
(64), 86th Imperial Yeomanry (110), Diamond Fields Horse (92), Dennison' s
Scouts (58), Ashburner's Horse (126), and British South African Police (24).
Such a collection of samples would be more in place, one would imagine, in a
London procession than in an operation which called for discipline and
cohesion. In warfare the half is often greater than the whole, and the
presence of a proportion of halfhearted and inexperienced men may be a
positive danger to their more capable companions.
Upon March 6th Methuen, marching east towards Lichtenburg, came in touch
near Leeuwspruit with Van Zyl's commando, and learned in the small skirmish
which ensued that some of his Yeomanry were unreliable and ill-instructed.
Having driven the enemy off by his artillery fire, Methuen moved to
Tweebosch, where he laagered until next morning. At 3 A.M. of the 7th the
ox-convoy was sent on, under escort of half of his little force. The other
half followed at 4.20, 50 as to give the slow-moving oxen a chance of
keeping ahead. It was evident, however, immediately after the column had got
started that the enemy were all round in great numbers, and that an attack
in force was to be expected. Lord Methuen gave orders therefore that the
ox-wagons should be halted and that the mule-transport should close upon
them so as to form one solid block, instead of a straggling line. At the
same time he reinforced his rearguard with mounted men and with two guns,
for it was in that quarter that the enemy appeared to be most numerous and
aggressive. An attack was also developing upon the right flank, which was
held off by the infantry and by the second section of the guns.
It has been said that Methuen's horsemen were for the most part
inexperienced irregulars. Such men become in time excellent soldiers, as all
this campaign bears witness, but it is too much to expose them to a severe
ordeal in the open field when they are still raw and untrained. As it
happened, this particular ordeal was exceedingly severe, but nothing can
excuse the absolute failure of the troops concerned to rise to the occasion.
Had Methuen's rearguard consisted of Imperial Light Horse, or Scottish
Horse, it is safe to say that the battle of Tweebosch would have had a very
different ending.
What happened was that a large body of Boers formed up in five lines and
charged straight home at the rear screen and rearguard, firing from their
saddles as they had done at Brakenlaagte. The sight of those wide-flung
lines of determined men galloping over the plain seems to have been too much
for the nerves of the unseasoned troopers. A panic spread through their
ranks, and in an instant they had turned their horses' heads and were
thundering to their rear, leaving the two guns uncovered and streaming in
wild confusion past the left flank of the jeering infantry who were lying
round the wagons. The limit of their flight seems to have been the wind of
their horses, and most of them never drew rein until they had placed many
miles between themselves and the comrades whom they had deserted. ' It was
pitiable,' says an eye-witness, 'to see the grand old General begging them
to stop, but they would not; a large body of them arrived in Kraaipan
without firing a shot,' It was a South African 'Battle of the Spurs,'
By this defection of the greater portion of the force the handful of brave
men who remained were left in a hopeless position. The two guns of the 38th
battery were overwhelmed and ridden over by the Boer horsemen, every man
being killed or wounded, including Lieutenant Nesham, who acted up to the
highest traditions of his corps.
The battle, however, was not yet over. The infantry were few in number, but
they were experienced troops, and they maintained the struggle for some
hours in the face of overwhelming numbers. Two hundred of the Northumberland
Fusiliers lay round the wagons and held the Boers off from their prey. With
them were the two remaining guns, which were a mark for a thousand Boer
riflemen. It was while encouraging by his presence and example the
much-tried gunners of this section that the gallant Methuen was wounded by a
bullet which broke the bone of his thigh. Lieutenant Venning and all the
detachment fell with their General round the guns.
An attempt had been made to rally some of the flying troopers at a
neighbouring kraal, and a small body of Cape Police and Yeomanry under the
command of Major Paris held out there for some hours. A hundred of the
Lancashire Infantry aided them in their stout defence. But the guns taken by
the Boers from Von Donop's convoy had free play now that the British guns
were out of action, and they were brought to bear with crushing effect upon
both the kraal and the wagons. Further resistance meant a useless slaughter,
and orders were given for a surrender. Convoy, ammunition, guns, horses -
nothing was saved except the honour of the infantry and the gunners. The
losses, 68 killed and 121 wounded, fell chiefly upon these two branches of
the service. There were 205 unwounded prisoners.
This, the last Boer victory in the war, reflected equal credit upon their
valour and humanity, qualities which had not always gone hand in hand in our
experience of them. Courtesy and attention were extended to the British
wounded, and Lord Methuen was sent under charge of his chief medical
officer, Colonel Townsend (the doctor as severely wounded as the patient),
into Klerksdorp. In De la Rey we have always found an opponent who was as
chivalrous as he was formidable. The remainder of the force reached the
Kimberley-Mafeking railway line in the direction of Kraaipan, the spot where
the first bloodshed of the war had occurred some twenty-nine months before.
On Lord Methuen himself no blame can rest for this unsuccessful action. If
the workman's tool snaps in his hand he cannot be held responsible for the
failure of his task. The troops who misbehaved were none of his training.
'If you hear anyone slang him,' says one of his men, 'you are to tell them
that he is the finest General and the truest gentleman that ever fought in
this war.' Such was the tone of his own troopers, and such also that of the
spokesmen of the nation when they commented upon the disaster in the Houses
of Parliament. It was a fine example of British justice and sense of fair
play, even in that bitter moment, that to hear his eulogy one would have
thought that the occasion had been one when thanks were being returned for a
victory. It is a generous public with fine instincts, and Paul Methuen,
wounded and broken, still remained in their eyes the heroic soldier and the
chivalrous man of honour.
The De Wet country had been pretty well cleared by the series of drives
which have already been described, and Louis Botha's force in the Eastern
Transvaal had been much diminished by the tactics of Bruce Hamilton and
Wools-Sampson. Lord Kitchener was able, therefore, to concentrate his troops
and his attention upon that wide-spread western area in which General De la
Rey had dealt two such shrewd blows within a few weeks of each other. Troops
were rapidly concentrated at Klerksdorp. Kekewich, Walter Kitchener,
Rawlinson, and Rochfort, with a number of small columns, were ready in the
third week of March to endeavour to avenge Lord Methuen.
The problem with which Lord Kitchener was confronted was a very difficult
one, and he has never shown more originality and audacity than in the
fashion in which he handled it. De la Rey's force was scattered over a long
tract of country, capable of rapidly concentrating for a blow, but otherwise
as intangible and elusive as a phantom army. Were Lord Kitchener simply to
launch ten thousand horsemen at him, the result would be a weary ride over
illimitable plains without sight of a Boer, unless it were a distant scout
upon the extreme horizon. De La Rey and his men would have slipped away to his
northern hiding-places beyond the Marico River. There was no solid obstacle
here, as in the Orange River Colony, against which the flying enemy could be
rounded up. One line of blockhouses there was, it is true - the one called
the Schoonspruit cordon, which flanked the De la Rey country. It flanked it,
however, upon the same side as that on which the troops were assembled. If
the troops were only on the other side, and De la Rey was between them and
the blockhouse line, then, indeed, something might be done. But to place the
troops there, and then bring them instantly back again, was to put such a
strain upon men and horses as had never yet been done upon a large scale in
the course of the war. Yet Lord Kitchener knew the mettle of the men whom he
commanded, and he was aware that there were no exertions of which the human
frame is capable which he might not confidently demand.
The precise location of the Boer laagers does not appear to have been known,
but it was certain that a considerable number of them were scattered about
thirty miles or so to the west of Klerksdorp and the Shoonspruit line. The
plan was to march a British force right through them, then spread out into a
wide line and come straight back, driving the burghers on to the cordon of
blockhouses, which had been strengthened by the arrival of three regiments
of Highlanders. But to get to the other side of the Boers it was necessary
to march the columns through by night. It was a hazardous operation, but the
secret was well kept, and the movement was so well carried out that the
enemy had no time to check it. On the night of Sunday, March 23rd, the
British horsemen passed stealthily in column through the De La Rey country,
and then, spreading out into a line, which from the left wing at Lichtenburg
to the right wing at Commando Drift measured a good eighty miles, they
proceeded to sweep back upon their traces. In order to reach their positions
the columns had, of course, started at different points of the British
blockhouse line, and some had a good deal farther to go than others, while
the southern extension of the line was formed by Rochfort's troops, who had
moved up from the Vaal. Above him from south to north came Walter Kitchener,
Rawlinson, and Kekewich in the order named.
On the morning of Monday, March 24th, a line of eighty miles of horsemen,
without guns or transport, was sweeping back towards the blockhouses, while
the country between was filled with scattered parties of Boers who were
seeking for gaps by which to escape. It was soon learned from the first
prisoners that De la Rey was not within the cordon. His laager had been some
distance farther west. But the sight of fugitive horsemen rising and dipping
over the rolling veldt assured the British that they had something within
their net. The catch was, however, by no means as complete as might have
been desired. Three hundred men in khaki slipped through between the two
columns in the early morning. Another large party escaped to the south
wards. Some of the Boers adopted extraordinary devices in order to escape
from the ever-narrowing cordon. 'Three, in charge of some cattle, buried
themselves, and left a small hole to breathe through with a tube. Some men
began to probe with bayonets in the new-turned earth and got immediate and
vociferous subterranean yells. Another man tried the same game and a horse
stepped on him. He writhed and reared the horse, and practically the horse
found the prisoner for us.' But the operations achieved one result, which
must have lifted a load of anxiety from Lord Kitchener's mind. Three
fifteen-pounders, two pom-poms, and a large amount of ammunition were taken.
To Kekewich and the Scottish Horse fell the honour of the capture, Colonel
Wools-Sampson and Captain Rice heading the charge and pursuit. By this means
the constant menace to the blockhouses was lessened, if not entirely
removed. One hundred and seventy-five Boers were disposed of, nearly all as
prisoners, and a considerable quantity of transport was captured. In this
operation the troops had averaged from seventy to eighty miles in twenty-six
hours without change of horses. To such a point had the slow-moving
ponderous British Army attained after two years' training of that stern
drill-master, necessity.
The operations had attained some success, but nothing commensurate with the
daring of the plan or the exertions of the soldiers. Without an instant's
delay, however, Lord Kitchener struck a second blow at his enemy. Before the
end of March Kekewich, Rawlinson, and Walter Kitchener were all upon the
trek once more. Their operations were pushed farther to the west than in the
last drive, since it was known that on that occasion De la Rey and his main
commando had been outside the cordon.
It was to one of Walter Kitchener's lieutenants that the honour fell to come
in direct contact with the main force of the burghers. This General had
moved out to a point about forty miles west of Klerksdorp. Forming his
laager there, he despatched Cookson on March 30th with seventeen hundred men
to work further westward in the direction of the Harts River. Under
Cookson's immediate command were the 2nd Canadian Mounted Infantry, Damant's
Horse, and four guns of the 7th R.F.A. His lieutenant, Keir, commanded the
28th Mounted Infantry, the Artillery Mounted Rifles, and 2nd Kitchener's
Fighting Scouts. The force was well mounted, and carried the minimum of
baggage.
It was not long before this mobile force found itself within touch of the
enemy. The broad weal made by the passing of a convoy set them off at full
cry, and they were soon encouraged by the distant cloud of dust which
shrouded the Boer wagons. The advance guard of the column galloped at the
top of their speed for eight miles, and closed in upon the convoy, but found
themselves faced by an escort of five hundred Boers, who fought a clever
rearguard action, and covered their charge with great skill. At the same
time Cookson closed in upon his mounted infantry, while on the other side
De La Rey's main force fell back in order to reinforce the escort. British and
Boers were both riding furiously to help their own comrades. The two forces
were fairly face to face.
Perceiving that he was in front of the whole Boer army, and knowing that he
might expect reinforcements, Cookson decided to act upon the defensive. A
position was rapidly taken up along the Brakspruit, and preparations made to
resist the impending attack. The line of defence was roughly the line of the
spruit, but for some reason, probably to establish a cross fire, one
advanced position was occupied upon either flank. On the left flank was a
farmhouse, which was held by two hundred men of the Artillery Rifles. On the
extreme right was another outpost of twenty-four Canadians and forty-five
Mounted Infantry. They occupied no defensible position, and their situation
was evidently a most dangerous one, only to be justified by some strong
military reason which is not explained by any account of the action.
The Boer guns had opened fire, and considerable bodies of the enemy appeared
upon the flanks and in front. Their first efforts were devoted towards
getting possession of the farmhouse, which would give them a POINT D'APPUI
from which they could turn the whole line. Some five hundred of them charged
on horseback, but were met by a very steady fire from the Artillery Rifles,
while the guns raked them with shrapnel. They reached a point within five
hundred yards of the building, but the fire was too hot, and they wheeled
round in rapid retreat. Dismounting in a mealie-patch they skirmished up
towards the farmhouse once more, but they were again checked by the fire of
the defenders and by a pompom which Colonel Keir had brought up. No progress
whatever was made by the attack in this quarter.
In the meantime the fate which might have been foretold had befallen the
isolated detachment of Canadians and 28th Mounted Infantry upon the extreme
right. Bruce Carruthers, the Canadian officer in command, behaved with the
utmost gallantry, and was splendidly seconded by his men. Overwhelmed by
vastly superior numbers, amid a perfect hail of bullets they fought like
heroes to the end. 'There have been few finer instances of heroism in the
course of the campaign,' says the reticent Kitchener in his official
despatch. Of the Canadians eighteen were hit out of twenty-one, and the
Mounted Infantry hard by lost thirty out of forty-five before they
surrendered.
This advantage gained upon the right flank was of no assistance to the Boers
in breaking the British line. The fact that it was so makes it the more
difficult to understand why this outpost was so exposed. The burghers had
practically surrounded Cookson's force, and De la Rey and Kemp urged on the
attack; but their artillery fire was dominated by the British guns, and no
weak point could be found in the defence. At 1 o'clock the attack had been
begun, and at 5.30 it was finally abandoned, and De La Rey was in full
retreat. That he was in no sense routed is shown by the fact that Cookson
did not attempt to follow him up or to capture his guns; but at least he had
failed in his purpose, and had lost more heavily than in any engagement
which he had yet fought. The moral effect of his previous victories had also
been weakened, and his burghers had learned, if they had illusions upon the
subject, that the men who fled at Tweebosch were not typical troopers of the
British Army. Altogether, it was a well-fought and useful action, though it
cost the British force some two hundred casualties, of which thirty-five
were fatal. Cookson's force stood to arms all night until the arrival of
Walter Kitchener's men in the morning.
General Ian Hamilton, who had acted for some time as Chief of the Staff to
Lord Kitchener, had arrived on April 8th at Klerksdorp to take supreme
command of the whole operations against De la Rey. Early in April the three
main British columns had made a rapid cast round without success. To the
very end the better intelligence and the higher mobility seem to have
remained upon the side of the Boers, who could always force a fight when
they wished and escape when they wished. Occasionally, however, they forced
one at the wrong time, as in the instance which I am about to describe.
Hamilton had planned a drive to cover the southern portion of De La Rey's
country, and for this purpose, with Hartebeestefontein for his centre, he
was manoeuvring his columns so as to swing them into line and then sweep
back towards Klerksdorp. Kekewich, Rawlinson, and Walter Kitchener were all
manoeuvring for this purpose. The Boers, however, game to the last, although
they were aware that their leaders had gone in to treat, and that peace was
probably due within a few days, determined to have one last gallant fall
with a British column. The forces of Kekewich were the farthest to the
westward, and also, as the burghers thought, the most isolated, and it was
upon them, accordingly, that the attack was made. In the morning of April
11th, at a place called Rooiwal, the enemy, who had moved up from
Wolmaranstad, nineteen hundred strong, under Kemp and Vermaas, fell with the
utmost impetuosity upon the British column. There was no preliminary
skirmishing, and a single gallant charge by 1,500 Boers both opened and
ended the engagement. 'I was just saying to the staff officer that there
were no Boers within twenty miles,' says one who was present, 'when we heard
a roar of musketry and saw a lot of men galloping down on us.' The British
were surprised but not shaken by this unexpected apparition. 'I never saw a
more splendid attack. They kept a distinct line,' says the eye-witness.
Another spectator says, 'They came on in one long line four deep and knee to
knee.' It was an old-fashioned cavalry charge, and the fact that it got as
far as it did shows that we have over rated the stopping power of modern
rifles. They came for a good five hundred yards under direct fire, and were
only turned within a hundred of the British line. The Yeomanry, the Scottish
Horse, and the Constabulary poured a steady fire upon the advancing wave of
horsemen, and the guns opened with case at two hundred yards. The Boers were
stopped, staggered, and turned. Their fire, or rather the covering fire of
those who had not joined in the charge, had caused some fifty casualties,
but their own losses were very much more severe. The fierce Potgieter fell
just in front of the British guns. 'Thank goodness he is dead! ' cried one
of his wounded burghers, 'for he sjamboked me into the firing line this
morning.' Fifty dead and a great number of wounded were left upon the field
of battle. Rawlinson's column came up on Kekewich's left, and the Boer
flight became a rout, for they were chased for twenty miles, and their two
guns were captured. It was a brisk and decisive little engagement, and it
closed the Western campaign, leaving the last trick, as well as the game, to
the credit of the British. From this time until the end there was a gleaning
of prisoners but little fighting in De la Rey's country, the most noteworthy
event being a surprise visit to Schweizer-Renecke by Rochfort, by which some
sixty prisoners were taken, and afterwards the drive of Ian Hamilton's
forces against the Mafeking railway line by which no fewer than 364
prisoners were secured. In this difficult and well-managed operation the
gaps between the British columns were concealed by the lighting of long
veldt-fires and the discharge of rifles by scattered scouts. The newly
arrived Australian Commonwealth Regiments gave a brilliant start to the
military history of their united country by the energy of their marching and
the thoroughness of their entrenching.
Upon May 29th, only two days before the final declaration of peace, a raid
was made by a few Boers upon the native cattle reserves near Fredericstad. A
handful of horsemen pursued them, and were ambushed by a considerable body
of the enemy in some hilly country ten miles from the British lines. Most of
the pursuers got away in safety, but young Sutherland, second lieutenant of
the Seaforths, and only a few months from Eton, found himself separated from
his horse and in a hopeless position. Scorning to surrender, the lad
actually fought his way upon foot for over a mile before he was shot down by
the horsemen who circled round him. Well might the Boer commander declare
that in the whole course of the war he had seen no finer example of British
courage. It is indeed sad that at this last instant a young life should be
thrown away, but Sutherland died in a noble fashion for a noble cause, and
many inglorious years would be a poor substitute for the example and
tradition which such a death will leave behind.
|