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ARTILLERY
FORDING THE CALEDON AT KAREEPOORT DRIFT.
From: H. W. Wilson,
After Pretoria, 1902 |
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Arthur Conan
Doyle,
The Great Boer War
London, Smith, Elder &
Co., 1902
CHAPTER XXX
The Campaign of De Wet
TIT
had been hoped that the dispersal of the main Boer army, the capture of its
guns and the expulsion of many both of the burghers and of the foreign
mercenaries, would have marked the end of the war. These expectations were,
however, disappointed, and South Africa was destined to be afflicted and the
British Empire disturbed by a useless guerilla campaign. After the great and
dramatic events which characterised the earlier phases of the struggle
between the Briton and the Boer for the mastery of South Africa it is
somewhat of the nature of an anticlimax to turn one's attention to those
scattered operations which prolonged the resistance for a turbulent year at
the expense of the lives of many brave men on either side. These raids and
skirmishes, which had their origin rather in the hope of vengeance than of
victory, inflicted much loss and misery upon the country, but, although we
may deplore the desperate resolution which bids brave men prefer death to
subjugation, it is not for us, the countrymen of Hereward or Wallace, to
condemn it.
In one important respect these numerous, though trivial, conflicts differed
from the battles in the earlier stages of the war. The British had learned
their lesson so thoroughly that they often turned the tables upon their
instructors. Again and again the surprise was effected, not by the nation of
hunters, but by those roineks whose want of cunning and of veldt-craft had
for so long been a subject of derision and merriment. A year of the kopje
and the donga had altered all that. And in the proportion of casualties
another very marked change had occurred. Time was when in battle after
battle a tenth would have been a liberal estimate for the losses of the
Boers compared with those of the Briton. So it was at Stormberg; so it was
at Colenso; so it may have been at Magersfontein. But in this last stage of
the war the balance was rather in favour of the British. It may have been
because they were now frequently acting on the defensive, or it may have
been from an improvement in their fire, or it may have come from the more
desperate mood of the burghers, but in any case the fact remains that every
encounter diminished the small reserves of the Boers rather than the ample
forces of their opponents.
One other change had come over the war, which caused more distress and
searchings of conscience among some of the people of Great Britain than the
darkest hours of their misfortunes. This lay in the increased bitterness of
the struggle, and in those more strenuous measures which the British
commanders felt themselves entitled and compelled to adopt. Nothing could
exceed the lenity of Lord Roberts's early proclainations in the Free State.
But, as the months went on and the struggle still continued, the war assumed
a harsher aspect. Every farmhouse represented a possible fort, and a
probable dept for the enemy. The extreme measure of burning them down was
only carried out after a definite offence, such as affording cover for
snipers, or as a deterrent to railway wreckers, but in either case it is
evident tbat the women or children who were usually the sole occupants of
the farm could not by their own unaided exertions prevent the line from
being cut or the riflemen from firing. It is even probable that the Boers
may have committed these deeds in the vicinity of houses the destruction of
which they would least regret. Thus, on humanitarian grounds there were
strong arguments against this policy of destruction being pushed too far,
and the political reasons were even stronger, since a homeless man is
necessarily the last man to settle down, and a burned-out family the last to
become contented British citizens. On the other hand, the impatience of the
army towards what they regarded as the abuses of lenity was very great, and
they argued that the war would be endless if the women in the farm were
allowed always to supply the sniper on the kopje. The irregular and
brigand-like fashion in which the struggle was carried out had exasperated
the soldiers, and though there were few cases of individual outrage or
unauthorised destruction, the general orders were applied with some
harshness, and repressive measures were taken which warfare may justify but
which civilisation must deplore.
After the dispersal of the main army at Komatipoort there remained a
considerable number of men in arms, some of them irreconcilable burghers,
some of them foreign adventurers, and some of them Cape rebels, to whom
British arms were less terrible than British law. These men, who were still
well armed and well mounted, spread themselves over the country, and acted
with such energy that they gave the impression of a large force. They made
their way into the settled districts, and brought fresh hope and fresh
disaster to many who had imagined that the war had passed for ever away from
them. Under compulsion from their irreconcilable countrymen, a large number
of the farmers broke their parole, mounted the horses which British leniency
had left with them, and threw themselves once more into the struggle, adding
their honour to the other sacrifices which they had made for their country.
In any account of the continual brushes between these scattered bands and
the British forces, there must be such a similarity in procedure and result,
that it would be hard for the writer and intolerable for the reader if they
were set forth in detail. As a general statement it may be said that during
the months to come there was no British garrison in any one of the numerous
posts in the Transvaal, and in that portion of the Orange River Colony which
lies east of the railway, which was not surrounded by prowling riflemen,
there was no convoy sent to supply those garrisons which was not liable to
be attacked upon the road, and there was no train upon any one of the three
lines which might not find a rail up and a hundred raiders covering it with
their Mausers. With some two thousand miles of railroad to guard, so many
garrisons to provide, and an escort to be furnished to every convoy, there
remained out of the large body of British troops in the country only a
moderate force who were available for actual operations. This force was
distributed in different districts scattered over a wide extent of country,
and it was evident that while each was strong enough to suppress local
resistance, still at any moment a concentration of the Boer scattered forces
upon a single British column might place the latter in a serious position.
The distribution of the British in October and November was roughly as
follows. Methuen was in the Rustenburg district, Barton at Krugersdorp and
operating down the line to Klerksdorp, Settle was in the West, Paget at
Pienaar's River, Clements in the Magaliesberg, Hart at Potchefstroom,
Lyttelton at Middelburg, Smith-Dorrien at Belfast, W. Kitchener at Lydenburg,
French in the Eastern Transvaal, Hunter, Rundle, Brabant, and Bruce Hamilton
in the Orange River Colony. Each of these forces was occupied in the same
sort of work, breaking up small bodies of the enemy, hunting for arms,
bringing in refugees, collecting supplies, and rounding up cattle. Some,
however, were confronted with organised resistance and some were not. A
short account may be given in turn of each separate column.
I would treat first the operations of General Barton, because they form the
best introduction to that narrative of the doings of Christian De Wet to
which this chapter will be devoted.
The most severe operations during the month of October fell to the lot of
this British General, who, with some of the faithful fusiliers whom he had
led from the first days in Natal, was covering the line from Krugersdorp to
Klerksdorp. It is a long stretch, and one which, as the result shows, is as
much within striking distance of the Orange Free Staters as of the men of
the Transvaal. Upon October 5th Barton left Krugersdorp with a force which
consisted of the Scots and Welsh Fusiliers, five hundred mounted men, the
78th R.F.A., three pom-poms, and a 4.7 naval gun. For a fortnight, as the
small army moved slowly down the line of the railroad, their progress was
one continual skirmish. On October 6th they brushed the enemy aside in an
action in which the volunteer company of the Scots Fusiliers gained the
applause of their veteran comrades. On the 8th and 9th there was sharp
skirmishing, the brunt of which on the latter date fell upon the Welsh
Fusiliers, who had three officers and eleven men injured. The commandos of
Douthwaite, Liebenberg, and Van der Merve seem to have been occupied in
harassing the column during their progress through the Gatsrand range. On
the 15th the desultory sniping freshened again into a skirmish in which the
honours and the victory belonged mainly to the Welshmen and to that very
keen and efficient body, the Scottish Yeomanry. Six Boers were left dead
upon the ground. On October 17th the column reached Frederickstad, where it
halted. On that date six of Marshall's Horse were cut off while collecting
supplies. The same evening three hundred of the Imperial Light Horse came in
from Krugersdorp.
Up to this date the Boer forces which dogged the column had been annoying
but not seriously aggressive. On the 19th, however, affairs took an
unexpected turn. The British scouts rode in to report a huge dust cloud
whirling swiftly northwards from the direction of the Vaal River - soon
plainly visible to all, and showing as it drew nearer the hazy outline of a
long column of mounted men. The dark coats of the riders, and possibly the
speed of their advance, showed tbat they were Boers, and soon it was
rumoured that it was no other than Christian De Wet with his merry men, who,
with characteristic audacity, had ridden back into the Transvaal in the hope
of overwhelming Barton's column.
It is some time since we have seen anything of this energetic gentleman with
the tinted glasses, but as the narrative will be much occupied with him in
the future a few words are needed to connect him with the past. It has been
already told how he escaped through the net which caught so many of his
countrymen at the time of the surrender of Prinsloo, and how he was chased
at furious speed from the Vaal River to the mountains of Magaliesberg. Here
he eluded his pursuers, separated from Steyn, who desired to go east to
confer with Kruger, and by the end of August was back again in his favourite
recruiting ground in the north of the Orange River Colony. Here for nearly
two months he had lain very quiet, refitting and reassembling his scattered
force, until now, ready for action once more, and fired by the hope of
cutting off an isolated British force, he rode swiftly northwards with two
thousand men under that rolling cloud which had been spied by the watchers
of Frederickstad.
The problem before him was a more serious one, however, than any which he
had ever undertaken, for this was no isolated regiment or ill-manned post,
but a complete little field force very ready to do battle with him. De Wet's
burghers, as they arrived, sprang from their ponies and went into action in
their usual invisible but effective fashion, covered by the fire of several
guns. The soldiers had thrown up lines of sangars, however, and were able,
though exposed to a very heavy fire coming from several directions, to hold
their own until nightfall, when the defences were made more secure. On the
20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th the cordon of the attack was drawn
gradually closer, the Boers entirely surrounding the British force, and it
was evident that they were feeling round for a point at which an assault
might be delivered.
The position of the defenders upon the morning of October 25th was as
follows. The Scots Fusiliers were holding a ridge to the south. General
Barton with the rest of his forces occupied a hill some distance off.
Between the two was a valley down which ran the line, and also the spruit
upon which the British depended for their water supply. On each side of the
line were ditches, and at dawn on this seventh day of the investment it was
found that these had been occupied by snipers during the night, and that it
was impossible to water the animals. One of two things must follow. Either
the force must shift its position or it must drive these men out of their
cover. No fire could do it, as they lay in perfect safety. They must be
turned out at the point of the bayonet.
About noon several companies of Scots and Welsh Fusiliers advanced from
different directions in very extended order upon the ditcbes. Captain
Baillie's company of the former regiment first attracted the fire of the
burghers. Wounded twice the brave officer staggered on until a third bullet
struck him dead. Six of his men were found lying beside him. The other
companies were exposed in their turn to a severe fire, but rushing onwards
they closed rapidly in upon the ditches. There have been few finer infantry
advances during the war, for the veldt was perfectly flat and the fire
terrific. A mile of ground was crossed by the fusiliers. Three gallant
officers - Dick, Elliot, and Best - went down; but the rush of the men was
irresistible. At the edge of the ditches the supports overtook the firing
line, and they all surged into the trenches together. Then it was seen how
perilous was the situation of the Boer snipers. They had placed themselves
between the upper and the nether millstone. There was no escape for them
save across the open. It says much for their courage that they took that
perilous choice rather than wave the white flag, which would have ensured
their safety.
The scene which followed has not often been paralleled. About a hundred and
fifty burghers rushed out of the ditches, streaming across the veldt upon
foot to the spot where their horses had been secreted. Rifles, pom-poms, and
shrapnel played upon them during this terrible race. 'A black running mob
carrying coats, blankets, boots, rifles, &c., was seen to rise as if from
nowhere and rush as fast as they could, dropping the various things they
carried as they ran.' One of their survivors has described how awful was
that wild blind flight, through a dust-cloud thrown up by the shells. For a
mile the veldt was dotted with those who had fallen. Thirty-six were found
dead, thirty were wounded, and thirty more gave themselves up as prisoners.
Some were so demoralised that they rushed into the hospital and surrendered
to the British doctor. The Imperial Light Horse were for some reason slow to
charge. Had they done so at once, many eye-witnesses agree that not a
fugitive should have escaped. On the other hand, the officer in command may
have feared that in doing so he might mask the fire of the British guns.
One incident in the action caused some comment at he time. A small party of
Imperial Light Horse, gallantly led by Captain Yockney of B Squadron, came
to close quarters with a group of Boers. Five of the enemy having held up
their hands Yockney passed them and pushed on against their comrades. On
this the prisoners seized their rifles once more and fired upon their
captors. A fierce fight ensued with only a few feet between the muzzles of
the rifles. Three Boers were shot dead, five wounded, and eight taken. Of
these eight three were shot next day by order of court-martial for having
resumed their weapons after surrender, while two others were acquitted. The
death of these men in cold blood is to be deplored, but it is difficult to
see how any rules of civilised warfare can be maintained if a flagrant
breach of them is not promptly and sternly punished.
On receiving this severe blow De Wet promptly raised the investment and
hastencd to regain his favourite haunts. Considerable reinforcements had
reached Barton upon the same day, including the Dublins, the Essex,
Strathcona's Horse, and the Elswick Battery, with some very welcome supplies
of ammunition. As Barton had now more than a thousand mounted men of most
excellent quality it is difficult to imagine why he did not pursue his
defeated enemy. He seems to have underrated the effect which he had
produced, for instead of instantly assuming the offensive he busied himself
in strengthening his defences. Yet the British losses in the whole
operations had not exceeded one hundred, so that there does not appear to
have been any reason why the force should be crippled. As Barton was in
direct and constant telegraphic communication with Pretoria, it is possible
that he was acting under superior orders in the course which he adopted.
It was not destined, however, that De Wet should be allowed to escape with
his usual impunity. On the 27th, two days after his retreat from
Frederickstad he was overtaken - stumbled upon by pure chance apparently -
by the mounted infantry and cavalry of Charles Knox and De Lisle. The Boers,
a great disorganised cloud of horsemen, swept swiftly along the northern
bank of the Vaal, seeking for a place to cross, while the British rode
furiously after them, spraying them with shrapnel at every opportunity.
Darkness and a violent storm gave De Wet his opportunity to cross, but the
closeness of the pursuit compelled him to abandon two of his guns, one of
them a Krupp and the other one of the British twelve-pounders of Sanna's
Post, which, to the delight of the gunners, was regained by that very U
battery to which it belonged.
Once across the river and back in his own country De Wet, having placed
seventy miles between himself and his pursuers, took it for granted that he
was out of their reach, and halted near the village of Bothaville to refit.
But the British were hard upon his track, and for once they were able to
catch this indefatigable man unawares. Yet their knowledge of his position
seems to have been most hazy, and on the very day before that on which they
found him, General Charles Knox, with the main body of the force, turned
north, and was out of the subsequent action. De Lisle's mounted troops also
turned north, but fortunately not entirely out of call. To the third and
smallest body of mounted men, that under Le Gallais, fell the honour of the
action which I am about to describe.
It is possible that the move northwards of Charles Knox and of De Lisle had
the effect of a most elaborate stratagem, since it persuaded the Boer scouts
that the British were retiring. So indeed they were, save only the small
force of Le Gallais, which seems to have taken one last cast round to the
south before giving up the pursuit. In the grey of the morning of November
6th, Major Lean with forty men of the 5th Mounted Infantry came upon three
weary Boers sleeping upon the veldt. Having secured the men, and realising
that they were an outpost, Lean pushed on, and topping a rise some hundreds
of yards further, he and his men saw a remarkable scene. There before them
stretched the camp of the Boers, the men sleeping, the horses grazing, the
guns parked, and the wagons outspanned.
There was little time for consideration. The Kaffir drivers were already
afoot and strolling out for their horses, or lighting the fires for their
masters' coffee. With splendid decision, although he had but forty men to
oppose to over a thousand, Lean sent back for reinforcements and opened fire
upon the camp. In an instant it was buzzing like an overturned hive. Up
sprang the sleepers, rushed for their horses, and galloped away across the
veldt, leaving their guns and wagons behind. A few stalwarts remained,
however, and their numbers were increased by those whose horses had
stampeded, and who were, therefore, unable to get away. They occupied an
enclosed kraal and a farmhouse in front of the British, whence they opened a
sharp fire. At the same time a number of the Boers who had ridden away came
back again, having realised how weak their assailants were, and worked round
the British flanks upon either side.
Le Gallais, with his men, had come up, but the British force was still far
inferior to that which it was attacking. A section of U battery was able to
unlimber, and open fire at four hundred yards from the Boer position. The
British made no attempt to attack, but contented themselves with holding on
to the position from which they could prevent the Boer guns from being
removed. The burghers tried desperately to drive off the stubborn fringe of
riflemen. A small stone shed in the possession of the British was the centre
of the Boer fire, and it was within its walls that Ross of the Durhams was
horribly wounded by an explosive ball, and that the brave Jerseyman, Le
Gallais, was killed. Before his fall he had despatched his staff officer,
Major Hickie, to hurry up men from the rear,
On the fall of Ross and Le Gallais the command fell upon Major Taylor of U
battery. The position at that time was sufficiently alarming. The Boers were
working round each flank in considerable numbers, and they maintained a
heavy fire from a stone enclosure in the centre. The British forces actually
engaged were insignificant, consisting of forty men of the 5th Mounted
Infantry, and two guns in the centre, forty-six men of the 17th and 18th
Imperial Yeomanry upon the right, and 105 of the 8th Mounted Infantry on the
left or 191 rifles in all. The flanks of this tiny force had to extend to
half a mile to hold off the Boer flank attack, but they were heartened in
their resistance by the knowledge that their comrades were hastening to
their assistance. Taylor, realising that a great effort must be made to tide
over the crisis, sent a messenger back with orders that the convoy should be
parked, and every available man sent up to strengthen the right flank, which
was the weakest. The enemy got close on to one of the guns, and swept down
the whole detachmcnt, but a handful of the Suffolk Mounted Infantry under
Lieutenant Peebles most galtantly held them off from it. For an hour the
pressure was extreme. Then two companies of the 7th Mounted Infantry came
up, and were thrown on to each flank. Shortly afterwards Major Welch, with
two more companies of the same corps, arrived, and the tide began slowly to
turn. The Boers were themselves outflanked by the extension of the British
line and were forced to fall back. At half-past eight De Lisle, whose force
had trotted and galloped for twelve miles, arrived with several companies of
Australians, and the success of the day was assured. The smoke of the
Prussian guns at Waterloo was not a more welcome sight than the dust of De
Lisle's horsemen. But the question now was whether the Boers, who were in
the walled inclosure and farm which formed their centre, would manage to
escape. The place was shelled, but here, as often before, it was found how
useless a weapon is shrapnel against buildings. There was nothing for it but
to storm it, and a grim little storming party of fifty men, half British,
half Australian, was actually waiting with fixed bayonets for the whistle
which was to be their signal, when the white flag flew out from the farm,
and all was over. Warned by many a tragic experience the British still lay
low in spite of the flag. 'Come out! come out!' they shouted. Eighty-two
unwounded Boers filed out of the enclosure, and the total number of
prisoners came to 114, while between twenty and thirty Boers were killed.
Six guns, a pom-pom, and 1,000 head of cattle were the prizes of the
victors.
This excellent little action showed that the British mounted infantry had
reached a point of efficiency at which they were quite able to match the
Boers at their own game. For hours they held them with an inferior force,
and finally, when the numbers became equal, were able to drive them off and
capture their guns. The credit is largely due to Major Lean for his prompt
initiative on discovering their laager, and to Major Taylor for his handling
of the force during a very critical time. Above all, it was due to the dead
leader, Le Gallais, who had infected every man under him with his own spirit
of reckless daring. 'If I die, tell my mother that I die happy, as we got
the guns,' said he, with his failing breath. The British total losses were
twelve killed (four officers) and thirty-three wounded (seven officers).
Major Welch, a soldier of great promise, much beloved by his men, was one of
the slain. Following closely after the repulse at Frederickstad this action
was a heavy blow to De Wet. At last, the British were beginning to take
something off the score which they owed the bold raider, but there was to be
many an item on either side before the long reckoning should be closed. The
Boers, with De Wet, fled south, where it was not long before they showed
that they were still a military force with which we had to reckon.
In defiance of chronology it may perhaps make a clearer narrative if I
continue at once with the movements of De Wet from the time that he lost his
guns at Bothaville, and then come back to the consideration of the campaign
in the Transvaal, and to a short account of those scattered and disconnected
actions which break the continuity of the story. Before following De Wet,
however, it is necessary to say something of the general state of the Orange
River Colony and of some military developments which had occurred there.
Under the wise and conciliatory rule of General Pretyman the farmers in the
south and west were settling down, and for the time it looked as if a large
district was finally pacified. The mild taxation was cheerfully paid,
schools were reopened, and a peace party made itself apparent, with Fraser
and Piet de Wet, the brother of Christian, among its strongest advocates.
Apart from the operations of De Wet there appeared to be no large force in
the field in the Orange River Colony, but early in October of 1900 a small
but very mobile and efficient Boer force skirted the eastern outposts of the
British, struck the southern line of communications, and then came up the
western flank, attacking, where an attack was possible, each of the isolated
and weakly garrisoned townlets to which it came, and recruiting its strength
from a district which had been hardly touched by the ravages of war, and
which by its prosperity alone might have proved the amenity of British
military rule. This force seems to have skirted Wepener without attacking a
place of such evil omen to their cause. Their subsequent movements are
readily traced by a sequence of military events.
On October 1st Rouxville was threatened. On the 9th an outpost of the
Cheshire Militia was taken and the railway cut for a few hours in the
neighbourhood of Bethulie. A week later the Boer riders were dotting the
country round Phillipolis, Springfontein and Jagersfontein, the latter town
being occupied upon October 16th, while the garrison held out upon the
nearest kopje. The town was retaken from the enemy by King Hall and his men,
who were Seaforth Highlanders and police. There was fierce fighting in the
streets, and from twenty to thirty of each side were killed or wounded.
Fauresmith was attacked on October 19th, but was also in the very safe hands
of the Seaforths, who held it against a severe assault. Phillipolis was
continually attacked between the 18th and the 24th, but made a most notable
defence, which was conducted by Gostling, the resident magistrate, with
forty civilians. For a week this band of stalwarts held their own against
600 Boers, and were finally relieved by a force from the railway. All the
operations were not, however, as successful as these three defences. On
October 24th a party of cavalry details belonging to many regiments were
snapped up in an ambuscade. On the next day Jacobadal was attacked, with
considerable loss to the British. The place was entered in the night, and
the enemy occupied the houses which surrounded the square. The garrison,
consisting of about sixty men of the Capetown Highlanders, bad encamped in
the square, and were helpless when fire was opened upon them in the morning.
There was practically no resistance, and yet for hours a murderous fire was
kept up upon the tents in which they cowered, so that the affair seems not
to have been far removed from murder. Two-thirds of the little force were
killed or wounded. The number of the assailants does not appear to have been
great, and they vanished upon the appearance of a relieving force from
Modder River.
After the disaster at Jacobsdal the enemy appeared on November 1st near
Kimberley and captured a small convoy. The country round was disturbed, and
Settle was sent south with a column to pacify it. In this way we can trace
this small cyclone from its origin in the old storm centre in the north-east
of the Orange River Colony, sweeping round the whole country, striking one
post after another, and finally blowing out at the corresponding point upon
the other side of the seat of war.
We have last seen De Wet upon November 6th, when he fled south from
Bothaville, leaving his guns but not his courage behind him. Trekking across
the line, and for a wonder gathering up no train as he passed, he made for
that part of the eastern Orange River Colony which had been reoccupied by
his countrymen. Here, in the neighbourhood of Thabanchu, he was able to join
other forces, probably the commandos of Haasbroek and Fourie, which still
retained some guns. At the head of a considerable force he attacked the
British garrison of Dewetsdorp, a town some forty miles to the south-east of
Bloemfontein.
It was on November 18th that De Wet assailed the place, and it fell upon the
24th, after a defence which appears to have been a very creditable one.
Several small British columns were moving in the south-east of the Colony,
but none of them arrived in time to avert the disaster, which is the more
inexplicable as the town is within one day's ride of Bloemfontein. The place
is a village hemmed in upon its western side by a semicircle of steep rocky
hills broken in the centre by a gully. The position was a very extended one,
and had the fatal weakness that the loss of any portion of it meant the loss
of it all. The garrison consisted of one company of Highland Light Infantry
on the southern horn of the semicircle, three companies of the 2nd
Gloucester Regiment on the northern and central part, with two guns of the
68th battery. Some of the Royal Irish Mounted Infantry and a handful of
police made up the total of the defenders to something over four hundred,
Major Massy in command
The attack developed at that end of the ridge which was held by the company
of Highlanders. Every night the Boer riflemen drew in closer, and every
morning found the position more desperate. On the 20th the water supply of
the garrison was cut, though a little was still brought up by volunteers
during the night. The thirst in the sultry trenches was terrible, but the
garrison still, with black lips and parched tongues, held on to their lines.
On the 22nd the attack had made such progress that the post had by the
Highlanders became untenable, and had to be withdrawn. It was occupied next
morning by the Boers, and the whole ridge was at their mercy. Out of
eighteen men who served one of the British guns sixteen were killed or
wounded, and the last rounds were fired by the sergeant-farrier, who
carried, loaded, and fired all by himself. All day the soldiers held out,
but the thirst was in itself enough to justify if not to compel a surrender.
At half-past five the garrison laid down their arms, having lost about sixty
killed or wounded. There does not, as far as one can learn, seem to have
been any attempt to injure the two guns which fell into the hands of the
enemy. De Wet himself was one of the first to ride into the British
trenches, and the prisoners gazed with interest at the short strong figure,
with the dark tail coat and the square-topped bowler hat, of the most famous
of the Boer leaders.
British columns were converging, however, from several quarters, and De Wet
had to be at once on the move. On the 26th Dewetsdorp was reoccupied by
General Charles Knox with fifteen hundred men. De Wet had two days' start,
but so swift was Knox that on the 27th he had run him down at Vaalbank,
where he shelled his camp. De Wet broke away, however, and trekking south
for eighteen hours without a halt, shook off the pursuit. He had with him at
this time nearly 8,000 men with several guns under Haasbroek, Fourie, Philip
Botha, and Steyn. It was his declared intention to invade Cape Colony with
his train of weary footsore prisoners, and the laurels of Dewetsdorp still
green upon him. He was much aided in all his plans by that mistaken leniency
which had refused to recognise that a borse is in that country as much a
weapon as a rifle, and had left great numbers upon the farms with which he
could replace his useless animals. So numerous were they that many of the
Boers had two or three for their own use. It is not too much to say that our
weak treatment of the question of horses will come to be recognised as the
one great blot upon the conduct of the war, and that our undue and fantastic
scruples have prolonged hostilities for months, and cost the country many
lives and many millions of pounds.
De Wet's plan for the invasion of the Colony was not yet destined to be
realised, for a tenacious man had set himself to frustrate it. Several small
but mobile British columns, those of Pilcher, of Barker, and of Herbert,
under the supreme direction of Charles Knox, were working desperately to
head him off. In torrents of rain which turned every spruit into a river and
every road into a quagmire, the British horsemen stuck manfully to their
work. De Wet had hurried south, crossed the Caledon River, and made for
Odendaal's Drift. But Knox, after the skirmish at Vaalbank, had trekked
swiftly south to Bethulie, and was now ready with three mobile columns and a
network of scouts and patrols to strike in any direction. For a few days he
had lost touch, but his arrangements were such that he must recover it if
the Boers either crossed the railroad or approached the river. On December
2nd he had authentic information that De Wet was crossing the Caledon, and
in an instant the British columns were all off at full cry once more,
sweeping over the country with a front of fifteen miles. On the 3rd and 4th,
in spite of frightful weather, the two little armies of horsemen struggled
on, fetlock-deep in mud, with the rain lashing their faces. At night without
cover, drenched and bitterly cold, the troopers threw themselves down on the
sodden veldt to snatch a few hours' sleep before renewing the interminable
pursuit. The drift over the Caledon flowed deep and strong, but the Boer had
passed and the Briton must pass also. Thirty guns took to the water, diving
completely under the coffee-coloured surface, to reappear glistening upon
the southern bank. Everywhere there were signs of the passage of the enemy.
A litter of crippled or dying horses marked their track, and a Krupp gun was
found abandoned by the drift. The Dewetsdorp prisoners, too, had been set
loose, and began to stumble and stagger back to their countrymen, their
boots worn off, and their putties wrapped round their bleeding feet. It is
painful to add that they had been treated with a personal violence and a
brutality in marked contrast to the elaborate hospitality shown by the
British Government to its involuntary guests.
On December 6th De Wet had at last reached the Orange River a clear day in
front of his pursuers. But it was only to find that his labours had been in
vain. At Odendaal, where he had hoped to cross, the river was in spate, the
British flag waved from a post upon the further side, and a strong force of
expectant Guardsmen eagerly awaited him there. Instantly recognising that
the game was up, the Boer leader doubled back for the north and safety. At
Rouxvilie he hesitated as to whether he should snap up the small garrison,
but the commandant, Rundle, showed a bold face, and De Wet passed on to the
Coomassie Bridge over the Caledon. The small post there refused to be
bluffed into a surrender, and the Boers, still dropping their horses fast,
passed on, and got over the drift at Amsterdam, their rearguard being hardly
across before Knox had also reached the river.
On the 10th the British were in touch again near Helvetia, where there was a
rearguard skirmish. On the 11th both parties rode through Reddersberg, a few
hours separating them. The Boers in their cross-country trekking go, as one
of their prisoners observed, 'slap-bang at everything,' and as they are
past-masters in the art of ox and mule driving, and have such a knowledge of
the country that they can trek as well by night as by day, it says much for
the energy of Knox and his men that he was able for a fortnight to keep in
close touch with them.
It became evident now that there was not much chance of overtaking the main
body of the burghers, and an attempt was therefore made to interpose a fresh
force who might head them off. A line of posts existed between Thabanchu and
Ladybrand, and Colonel Thorneycroft was stationed there with a movable
column. It was Knox's plan therefore to prevent the Boers from breaking to
the west and to head them towards the Basuto border. A small column under
Parsons had been sent by Hunter from Bloemfontein, and pushed in upon the
flank of De Wet, who had on the 12th got back to Dewetsdorp. Again the
pursuit became warm, but De Wet's time was not yet come. He headed for
Springhaan Nek, about fifteen miles east of Thabanchu. This pass is about
four miles broad, with a British fort upon either side of it. There was only
one way to safety, for Knox's mounted infantrymen and lancers were already
dotting the southern skyline. Without hesitation the whole Boer force, now
some 2,500 strong, galloped at full speed in open order through the Nek,
braving the long range fire of riflemen and guns. The tactics were those of
French in his ride to Kimberley, and the success was as complete. De Wet's
force passed through the last barrier which had been held against him, and
vanished into the mountainous country round Ficksburg, where it could safely
rest and refit.
The result then of these bustling operations had been that De Wet and his
force survived, but that he had failed in his purpose of invading the
Colony, and had dropped some five hundred horses, two guns, and about a
hundred of his men. Haasbroek's commando had been detached by De Wet to make
a feint at another pass while he made his way through the Springhaan.
Parsons's force followed Haasbroek up and engaged him, but under cover of
night he was able to get away and to join his leader to the north of
Thabanchu. On December 13th, this, the second great chase after De Wet, may
be said to have closed.
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